Walking The Tightrope : The Challenges Of India’s Multi-Alignment Policy

Sanya Patni

Immediately after its independence, India’s foreign relations were characterised by the infamous ‘Non-Alignment Policy’. Non-alignment in lucid terms implied a policy aimed at harbouring the strategic autonomy of a newly decolonised country by refusing alignment with any major military alliance or superpower thereabove.

There were various reasons why the first Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru inclined towards Non-Alignment during the Cold War years, including reluctance to invite military threat from any side by joining its counterpart and the ideological conundrum of tilting to one camp while being a combination of a liberal democracy and a mixed economy. A pertinent reason however was to decisively place India such that it could extract benefits from both camps on a de-hyphenated basis. Non-alignment was then, effectively, a policy of self-interest characterised by flexibility, national interest and sovereignty.

The post-liberalisation era witnessed a profound expression of ‘multi-alignment’ with the conclusion of the Cold War’s bipolarity and heralding of the ‘Manmohan Singh doctrine’ which prioritized India’s socio-economic development and autonomy in shaping the contours of its external relations, as the fundamental considerations behind foreign policy decisions and facilitated the forming of multiple parallel partnerships in South Asia, Africa and with the major powers of the world. Under the prevailing Bharatiya Janata Party’s leadership, India seeks to persist with issue-based alignments and transition from a ‘balancing force’ to a ‘leading power’.

However, in an increasingly volatile global landscape, where countries are beginning to look inwards and prioritize hard-power capabilities, India’s multialigned posture may reduce its foreign policy to a reactive and passive entity, with no earnest ally, while also compromising the normative superiority it has claimed since its inception.

Eroding moral credibility?

India has since the Gandhian and Nehruvian era branded itself as a ‘Moralpolitik’ seeking to balance pragmatism with moral idealism. In fact, by positioning itself as a leader of the Global South and an ethically and spiritually superior nation, it claims to be one of the Great powers of the world. Even though the current foreign policy regime under S. Jaishankar claims to be realist

and interest-driven, it has perpetuated a principled and high-minded image of India, accentuating its civilizational heritage of inclusivity and morality to reap soft-power currency. In this process, it has struggled to sustain a delicate balance between gritty realism and projected idealism.

India has repeatedly abstained from voting on UN resolutions against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine- including those calling for immediate ceasefire in Europe. In regards to the ongoing genocide in Gaza, India has abstained from multiple resolutions demanding ceasefire except the General Assembly’s (UNGA) resolution in December 2023. While a simple and logical understanding of these abstentions suggests that India, on grounds of its multi-alignment policy, is looking out for its historical ties with Russia and thriving strategic relations with Israel and its western partners, a deeper look signals towards India’s diminishing moral credibility as a nation whose identity claims to be premised on the values of ‘ahimsa’.

In the past, India has abstained from UNGA resolutions denunciating Sri-lanka’s human rights abuses as well as Myanmar’s mistreatment of the Rohingyas. In an attempt to harbour its relations in all directions, India risks endorsing a conscience-deprived world order, where major powers or their allies twist global governance norms to their convenience. This is detrimental in the long run, given that India is neither an exorbitantly powerful nation nor can she expect committed alignments from major powers while seeming to be a friend to all.

Rise of Minilaterism- where does India stand?

A shift from traditional power dynamics and growing dissatisfaction with the inefficacies, dithered functioning, and often partial and tokenistic nature of multilateral institutions has led to the rise of minilateral groupings comprising a handful nations, decisively focused on common interests and issues. India finds itself a member of myriad minilaterals, often rendering them suboptimal, owing to its multialigned positioning.

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) for instance, which was conceived to balance the growing prowess of China in the Indo-Pacific region, lacks real hard-balancing strength as India is neither a formal strategic ally of the QUAD members nor shares common ambitions with them. It aspires to curb China’s revisionism while containing USA’s influence in the Indo-Pacific and counterbalance China with America’s support while espousing Asian solidarity.

While the US, Japan and Australia are committed allies, India is an odd-one out with membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as well. Consequently, QUAD’s neither a strong military oriented grouping, nor capable of shaping the regional order in the Indo-Pacific, when compared to AUKUS or the US-Japan-Australia Trilateral Strategic Dialogue that have focussed on enforcing deterrence through building collective military capabilities.

BRICS is another platform where India finds itself muddled up, trying to facilitate the interests of emerging economies in a west-dominated governance regime, while distancing itself from an unequivocally anti-west rhetoric. Cooperation amongst BRICS nations has ceased to effectively

expand beyond reforming the global financial architecture with initiatives like the New Development bank and the members have failed to embody a united front against western hegemony. Neither does Russia and China endorse India’s bid to become UNSC’s permanent member, nor have the BRICS nations condemned Pakistan as a sponsor of terrorism, repeatedly addressing the issue in generic terms despite India’s insistence.

Similar to examples above, other minilateral groupings with New Delhi’s membership like the India-France-Australia and the India-Brazil-South Africa trilaterals, are likely to operate in a narrow ambit, thanks to India’s multialignment policy and compulsion to balance south-south cooperation and rights advocacy with interest-based partnerships with the west. The I2U2, commonly dubbed as the ‘West-Asian QUAD’, is also likely to suffer as Israel and UAE navigate their relations in a shaky West Asia. While the US maintains a clear pro-Israel stance, India may once again find itself in a precarious position – reduced to equilibrizing relations with Israel and the Arab world.

Conclusion

The Trump-led Washington’s imposition of 50 per cent tariffs on India, risks to push off the rails, over 25 years old meticulously built economic and strategic relations between the two nations. While India may consider consolidating ties with the BRICS nations to redirect exports hitherto dispatched to the US or even reviving the RIC (Russia, India and China) troika, it would hesitate in inching closer to China on account of their protracted border disputes and the latter’s hegemonic ambitions embodied in efforts like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), especially when Russia’s support also looks unsteady on differences with the Chinese.

Nevertheless, America’s hostility has proved that multialignment is failing and risks leaving India with no trustworthy ally and a weak moral compass in a turbulent geopolitical atmosphere. This is not to say that multialignment can and will be abandoned. However, it needs to be pursued more assertively and with greater clarity, to forge serious alliances and a resilient ethical standpoint even if that means making some trade-offs. India would have to weigh its choices and learn to make tough decisions. The desperation to please all may not work anymore, amidst the growing narcissism of global politics.

About the author: Sanya is an undergraduate with Honours in Political Science from Miranda House College, University of Delhi. She is an aspiring Political Researcher, who will shortly be pursuing a master’s degree in International Relations. Her research interests zero in on Transnational human rights issues, Social justice, and Security studies. She has been working with various think tanks and research institutes with an objective of engaging in constructive inquiry and making academia more accessible and people-centric.

Acknowledgment: This article was posted by Aashvee Prisha, a Visiting Researcher at IMPRI.

Disclaimer: All views expressed in the article belong to the author and not necessarily to the organisation.