‭ Energy, Security, and Strategy:‬ W‭hy Central Asia Matters to India

India EU Green Hydrogen Trade Potential Tracing the Road to a Sustainable Energy Trade 7 e1758387236871

Vaibhav Das

The 5 “stans” form the Central Asian region, namely Kazakhstan (Astana), Uzbekistan (Tashkent), Turkmenistan (Ashabat), Kyrgyzstan (Bishkek), and Tajikistan (Dushanbe). Andre Gunder Frank compares Central Asia to a “black hole in the middle of the world” and argues that Central Asia is both the most important and the most neglected part of the world and its history (Frank, 1992, 45).

Central Asia represents a strategic triumvirate of energy security, regional stability, and geopolitical influence that could determine global influence as per the Halford Mackinder’s Heartland Theory (Ismailov & Papava, 2010, 84-102). The region’s unique geographical location at the crossroads of Europe and East and South Asia and its abundant natural resources like natural gas, oil, uranium, etc., make it a geo-strategic magnet for world powers.

Zbigniew Brzezinski called the region ‘Grand Chessboard’ in 1997 to highlight its importance in the US geo-political corridors (Brzezinski, 1997, 30). At present, the clout of Russia and China is unparalleled in the region while the United States and Europe sit on the edge, seeking opportunities for greater political and economic involvement in the region.

However, despite being its “extended neighbourhood”, India’s presence in the region is almost inconspicuous. Due to existing geopolitics, India-Central Asia relations remain limited in time and space. Lack of direct access to the region makes matters worse. Evidently, a case exists for India to find new drivers and new intermediate formats in the region.

The Energy Imperative: Fueling India’s Growth

India’s energy relationship with Central Asia represents one of the most compelling aspects of this prospective partnership. As the third-largest energy consumer, India imports approximately 85% of its crude oil requirements and faces an exponentially growing energy demand (Sharma, 2024). The International Energy Agency projects that India will witness the largest increase in energy demand of any country between 2021 and 2040 (International Energy Agency, 2021). The unexpected, unilateral US bullying of India for bying Russian crude adds to the concern (Shukla et al., 2025). These realities makes vast hydrocarbon reserves of Central Asia not just attractive but essential for India’s energy needs.

Kazakhstan emerges as India’s primary energy partner in the region, accounting for 55.6% (1 billion USD) of India’s total trade with Central Asia in 2023-2024 (India – Kazakhstan Relations: Bilateral Brief, 2024). The partnership extends beyond mere trade statistics. In April 2011, India’s ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) and Kazakhstan’s KazMunaiGaz signed a groundbreaking agreement to explore the Satpayev oil block in the Caspian Sea. This deal marked India’s physical entry into the energy-rich Caspian region and demonstrates the serious commitment both nations have toward long-term energy cooperation (Pradhan, 2022, 112).

The energy relationship extends beyond oil and gas. Central Asia’s uranium reserves hold particular significance for India’s civilian nuclear program. In FY21, India imported 2,000.299 MTU of uranium from Canada and Kazakhstan. Later, in FY24 and FY25, India imported 350 MTU and 250 MTU respectively from Uzbekistan (Department of Atomic Energy, GOI, 2025). Moreover, the hydroelectric potential of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan presents opportunities for renewable energy cooperation that aligns with India’s commitment to achieving net-zero emissions by 2070 (Kaulgud, 2021).

Despite these promising partnerships, India’s efforts to build energy ties with Central Asia face two main hurdles: poor connectivity to the region and China’s strong economic and infrastructure presence through projects like the BRI and pipelines. While Russia still dominates security, China’s investments give it a clear advantage over India (Kaulgud, 2021).

Security Convergence: Shared Challenges, Common Solutions

The security dimension of India-Central Asia relations has become significantly more important, particularly following the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021. The shared concerns about terrorism, extremism, and regional instability have transformed security cooperation from a peripheral issue to a central pillar of bilateral engagements.

Afghanistan represents the most significant common security challenge for both India and Central Asia. The country’s instability directly impacts regional security dynamics, with implications for terrorism, drug trafficking, and refugee flows (Bhattacharya, 2022). India’s participation in the 6th Regional Security Dialogue on Afghanistan in February 2024 brought together National Security Advisers from Central Asian republics, Russia, and Iran, demonstrating the region’s commitment to collective security approaches (Bhattacherjee, 2024).

India has signed defence cooperation pacts with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, covering areas like joint training, military medicine, and technical cooperation (Das, 2024). Annual military exercises including “KazInd” with Kazakhstan, “Khanjar” with Kyrgyzstan, and “Dustlik” with Uzbekistan focus on counter-terrorism and urban warfare capabilities. These involve special forces, air support, and mountaineering expeditions, and strengthens cooperation against terrorism, drug trafficking, and regional security threats (Gupta, 2022).

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) provides another crucial platform for security cooperation. India’s full membership since 2017 has strengthened its strategic presence in Central Asia and allows it to participate in regional security initiatives and counter-terrorism efforts (Wani, 2023). The organization’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) serves as an important mechanism for intelligence sharing and coordinated responses to terrorist threats.

However, security cooperation faces its own challenges. The complex geopolitical environment sometimes constrains the scope of bilateral security partnerships with multiple great powers vying for influence (Kumar, 2022, 8-27). Moreover, the varying threat perceptions among Central Asian countries require India to adopt differentiated approaches to security cooperation with each nation.

Strategic Competition: The New Great Game

The strategic dimension of India-Central Asia relations cannot be understood without acknowledging the broader context of great power competition in the region. China’s superior financial resources (BRI) and geographical proximity provide significant advantages in infrastructure development and economic partnerships (Sachdeva, 2025). Russia’s continued security influence in the region creates a complex triangular dynamic that India must navigate carefully (Kumar, 2022, 35-46). By 2020, China had surpassed Russia as the top trade partner for most Central Asian states (Hamilton, 2024, 13). This creates both opportunities and challenges for India’s engagement strategy.

The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) represents India’s most ambitious connectivity project with the region. This 7,200-kilometer multimodal network connects Mumbai to St. Petersburg via Iran, offering a route that is 30% cheaper and 40% shorter than the traditional Suez Canal route (Pal, 2024, 5). The Chabahar Port in Iran serves as another linchpin of India’s Central Asia strategy. The 10-year agreement signed between India and Iran in May 2024 ensures India’s continued operation of the Shahid Beheshti terminal, providing a Pakistan-bypass route to Afghanistan and Central Asia (Gaur, 2024). Despite

U.S. sanctions-related concerns, India has remained committed to this project, recognizing its critical importance for regional connectivity and energy security (Deshpande & Deshmukh, 2025).

As the geopolitical landscape continues to evolve, India’s engagement with Central Asia serves as a test case for its broader foreign policy vision. The region’s strategic value will only increase as global energy transitions accelerate and new security challenges emerge. For India, Central Asia is not just an extended neighborhood, it is a strategic imperative that could define its trajectory as a rising power in the 21st century.

References

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About the contributor: Vaibhav Das is an Undergraduate Student from New Delhi. He is a fellow of DFPGYF Diplomacy, Foreign Policy & Geopolitics Youth Fellowship- Cohort 2.0.

Disclaimer: All views expressed in the article belong solely to the author and not necessarily to the organisation.

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Acknowledgement: This article was posted by Shivashish Narayan, a visiting researcher at IMPRI.

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