Shaping A Multipolar Agenda: India’s Strategic Role At The 25th SCO Summit

Srikanth Kondapalli

In the wake of menacingly constraining US policies, New Delhi actively participated in shaping a multipolar agenda.

Having made incremental progress in getting the Pahalgam terror attacks inscribed in the 25th Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit joint statement at Tianjin, and enhancing personal rapport with other leaders, India is now confident of weathering the emerging gloomy global geopolitics.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Tianjin from August 31 to September 1 to attend the 25th SCO Summit meeting after his productive visit to Tokyo. In the backdrop of the initiation of debilitating tariffs by United States President Donald Trump, starting on August 27, India had fanned out to many countries to limit the looming damage.

Trade diversification to Europe and other countries, signing free trade area agreements with the UK and others, consolidation of the existing trade agreements with Japan, South Korea, Southeast Asia and Australia, local currency exchange arrangements with BRICS countries, and emphasising multipolarity have been India’s responses to the debilitating tariffs.

Since the 1990s, India is wary of US postures on unilateralism, regime change, structural economic reforms and “colour revolutions”. New Delhi cushioned these challenges first with the Russia-India-China triangle that diversified into SCO, BRICS and other multilateral fora. A major thrust of these initiatives is multipolarity – that is to view the world in terms of emerging and thriving poles and powers in the international system.

Despite the initial opposition of China — and balancing through Pakistan — to India’s membership in such initiatives, with Russian help, New Delhi assiduously built its image as a constructive democratic partner bringing about incremental changes in such multilateral organisations.

This is precisely the role India pursued at the 25th SCO meeting at Tianjin. In the wake of menacingly constraining US policies, New Delhi actively participated in shaping a multipolar agenda. The photo optics of PM Modi talking to Russian President Vladimir Putin in his car for 50 minutes, or the Modi-Putin-Xi Jinping impromptu body language at the venue was not lost on global media.

More concretely, PM Modi reminded the audience at Tianjin how India’s chairmanship of the SCO in 2023 attempted to change the agenda of the grouping from a top-down approach to a people-centric bottom-up democratic approach. He said, addressing the SCO summit on September 1, “Our effort was to take SCO beyond governments. To connect people, young scientists, scholars, and start-ups as well.”

For the first time in the SCO’s quarter century of practice, India introduced new ideas of empowerment through start-ups and innovation, traditional medicine, youth, digital inclusion, and Buddhist heritage. It is not the corruption-ridden big state-owned enterprises that India is promoting in the SCO but transparent and decentralised unicorns, as a panacea for the problems afflicting developing countries.

When the US administration is counting pennies earned through the debilitating tariffs across the world and abandoning its “Statue of Liberty”, India is showing the beacon – in a persuasive way for democracy in its foreign policy practice. This is a clear signalling of the emergence of the Mumbai Consensus as against the interventionist Washington Consensus or debt-inducing Beijing Consensus.

PM Modi also touched upon the much-needed reforms in multilateral institutions including the United Nations Security Council. While a majority of permanent members of the UNSC endorsed restructuring, China at the 2009 Yekaterinburg meeting of the SCO and the BRICS used vague words in this regard.

Beijing was prepared to support “India playing a bigger role in the international institutions, including in the UN” but stopped short of mentioning the UNSC. Modi argued, “The colourful dreams of the new generation [of Global South] cannot be displayed on a black-and-white screen. It is time to change the screen.”

Apart from multipolarity, the SCO is known for counter-terrorism, connectivity, energy security for member states, all of which were endorsed at the joint statement. However, precept and practice differed.

India’s main concerns were over sovereignty and terrorism. On both these issues, India found some members of the SCO were posing concerns, or even double standards. PM Modi asked in his address, “Can the open support for terrorism by certain countries ever be acceptable to us?”

This refers to not only the April 22 Pahalgam terror attacks but also to China’s active support to Pakistan both at the bilateral level as well as in the UNSC 1267 committee dealing with the subject. For years, India would provide evidence related to terror activities, funding, movements and dossiers on individual terrorists but China used its veto.

While the SCO declaration finally mentioned the Pahalgam attacks, it was watered down by mentioning other incidents in Pakistan, thus bringing in hyphenation.

Another crucial issue is sovereignty and territorial integrity. This is inscribed in the SCO Charter but selectively applied in practice. In 1947, the then Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir signed a legal Instrument of Accession to join the Indian Union. Subsequently, Pakistan occupied portions of Kashmir, despite the UNSC Resolution 47 of April 21, 1948 directing it to withdraw. In the April 1963 agreement with Pakistan, China did mention a provision to give up occupied Kashmir territories but recently removed this provision.

However, Beijing had bound all SCO countries to abide by China’s sovereignty issues, including on Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, South China Sea disputed islands and Senkakus. Yet, on the issue of Kashmir, China not only exhibited double standards but actively supports Pakistan’s illegal position. China even took this up thrice in “informal meetings” on August 16 and December 19 in 2019 and in January 2020 at the UNSC but had to withdraw in the face of opposition by other members.

Moreover, since 2013, China began constructing CPEC infrastructure projects. It spent $52 billion in Pakistan for the CPEC projects, some of which was invested in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. PM Modi stated in his address to the SCO gathering that “connectivity, that by-passes sovereignty, ultimately loses both trust and meaning”. The irony is that the SCO declaration mentions about protecting members’ sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Wading through these global and regional cross-currents to build up stability and continue to maintain high growth rates, India has to circulate through these multilateral institutions. In this effort, India made good use of the SCO summit meeting at Tianjin.

Srikanth Kondapalli is Professor in Chinese Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University.

The article was first published in The New Indian Express as Wading through global and regional cross-currents: India and the SCO summit on September 16, 2025.

Disclaimer: All views expressed in the article belong solely to the author and not necessarily to the organisation.