Rishya Dharmani
BRICS travelled from the world of fiction to an institutional reality in 2009, with Brazil, Russia, India and China coming together. Two years later, South Africa joined this poster group of the developing world. Currently occupying a commanding position in the world economy with seven new entrants (Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Ethiopia, Egypt and Indonesia), the BRICS share in the world’s total GDP in PPP terms increased from 16.45% (1992) to 31.67% (2022) with that of G7 falling from 45.80% (1992) to 30.31% (2022). Home to nearly half of the world’s population in 29.3% of the world’s land area – BRICS account for 16% of global trade and ¼ of global GDP.
BRICS suffers from a ‘deep cleavage’ between authoritarian and democratic states. With China and Russia as ‘leading’ states within the bloc, three out of six new entrants are not democracies. Despite the group’s focus on catering to the emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs), the strengthening of participatory and responsive democratic institutions has not been an important membership criterion.
The original founding members Brazil, Russia, China and India (and South Africa later) “’are not an obvious set’. Their internal politics and economics are dissimilar. (….) Each of the four embodies distinct cultural and linguistic traditions” (Armijio, 2007, p.8). But this view confirms a sanitised Eurocentric homogenisation derived from an inordinate insistence on alliance building, thriving on commonalities that carpet differences and do not acknowledge each of these states’ unique USP and strategic priorities.
New age minilaterals, in contrast, sustain partnerships based on a narrow band of shared interests and values – in the BRICS+ case, it is advancing a Global South version of global reordering. By advocating ‘competitive multilateralism’, BRICS+ chooses ad hoc and issue-based synergies and does not develop a ‘parallel order’.
As an ‘engine of growth, ’ BRICS+ offer a formidable alternative or supplement to traditional markets’ investment opportunities and growth prospects. West retains economic preponderance, but “US companies must train their current and future managers to compete with firms in BRICS” (Jain, 2006, p. xv).
Some major manufacturing and low- to mid-level service supply chains have already shifted to Asian subregions, which has become a political and economic grievance of the Western electorate. BRICS countries individually weathered the 2008 financial crisis that battered most of the Western world and came together a year later. Their economic clout has gained political mileage too. Despite cyclical booms and slowdowns, the inherent dynamism of fast-growing economies is aided by self-confidence and peer strength from the Global South.
BRICS has successfully fathered two multilateral economic organisations – the New Development Bank and Contingency Reserve Arrangement in view of the unmet sustainable financing needs of the developing. Since the 1st Summit, multilateral reforms have been a cornerstone of key BRICS demands for improving the lot of developing countries.
With the dominance of Big Four currencies waning and bilateral currency swaps (Yuan-Rouble trade to bypass sanctions) gaining strength, claims that BRICS+ can articulate a constructive alternative agenda to become norm entrepreneurs have gained prominence. A case in point is the coordination of national positions on the implementation of R2P in the Syrian and Libyan crises to sanction multilateral interventions in failed regimes (Abdenur, 2017).
It is a moot point whether BRICS+ possess the capacity to amend the global world order as it lacks internal coherence and strategic unity to discuss and defend key common goals beyond mere rhetoric. “In an economic sense, this diversity makes BRICS economies complementary, and there is great potential for increasing cooperation (…) BRICS could develop into a trading block. Another thing that connects all the BRICS members in spite of their diversity is the fact that they have all turned their backs on the Western path to modernisation. They all have chosen their own path towards modern society” (Kupchan, 2012, p. 86-145).
Yet, geopolitical divides are hard to bridge, with several members locked on opposing sides of their regional chess boards (China-India; Saudi Arabia-Iran). “BRICS is already an institution representing some emerging states. But whether it also indicates trust between the members so that they are capable of collective action remains to be seen.
To survive as an institution, BRICS should also be flexible enough to minimise intra-coalition frictions” (Kakonen, 2014, p. 87). BRICS+ is not geolocated to specific neighbourhoods, which positively enables an expansive and inclusive agenda but also hinders a collective identity formation like in the case of NATO and the European Union; the only thing that seems to unite BRICS is its non-westernism and not anti-Westernism, according to Prime Minister Modi and later President Putin.
Scholars ascribe the success of the idea of BRICS to the inherent unique ‘informality’ in organisational structure and the acceptance of strategic autonomy in individual members’ positions (Ujvari, 2015). “BRICS is guided by ‘relational multilateralism’, a concept which includes a preference for consensual decision-making, voluntary engagement, a strict realist perspective on national sovereignty, and the absence of legally binding clauses” (Ujvari, 2015, p.1). The flexibility afforded to members to pursue strategic autonomy by even aligning with the west where alignment of interests is imminent – as India is a part of BRICS and QUAD.
In fact, many BRICS members come from a long tradition of pursuing anti-block politics in the Cold War in a non-aligned set-up. This informal grouping then reflects more of a partnership on common political, security, and trade issues as a heterogenous coalition of parties “to erode the Western hegemonic claims.” (Laidi, 2011, p.1). BRICS nations, as the leaders of the Global South, display a “sense of entitlement […] which makes them articulate [their] visions with a sense of naturalness that often baffles Western observers. The underlying message is: We should have a key role in global affairs not because of what we do, but who we are”.
Laidi maintains that BRICS is a defensive rather than offensive coalition as it merely offers a critique of the existing order and places members’ demands of respecting territorial sovereignty, independence, seeking peace and sustainable economic growth – all within the Eurocentric Westphalian system. It eschews concrete proposals for alternative solutions to whether entrenched geopolitical quagmires like West Asia or global emergencies like climate change– even as talks of a BRICS currency have fizzled out.
This vision of anti-westernism then seems a political troupe to make incremental gains and slowly build comparative power with hegemonic structures. The West is overrepresented in international institutions and lacks the will or mandate to maintain an unrepresentative ‘rules-based international order’. Further, the guardians have themselves bent the ‘rules’ innumerable times, so much so that it does not take a Trump administration to dismantle the global governance architecture.
This VUCA world further entrenches the (in)security dilemma, and emerging countries especially face this heat and cope by transitioning into “sovereignty hawks” by simultaneously leveraging globalisation and preserving their domestic socio-political-economic systems (van Ham, 2015, p.10). BRICS is not a revolutionary but a reformist organisation merely seeking a seat at the table as a matter of right – they have significantly benefitted from globalisation and multilateralism – and yet have been denied their justified place.
Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, the rapporteur of the 2012 EU’s BRICS Report, argued that BRICS has sought to remedy this by ‘soft balancing’ against Western hegemonic institutionalism, which is more of a conservative posturing than substantive positions on military and security matters. Yet, BRICS has been coordinating their meetings at the margins of major summits, offering joint statements and positions in international fora. An example was implementing a no-fly zone over Libya through UNSC Resolution 1973. Consultations in human security have trickled in, such as a joint strategy to eradicate tuberculosis, a BRICS medical journal, and a medical association.
Despite pessimistic prognostications by Western observers, the clamour for BRICS membership is a sign enough of its vitality and potentiality to reshape the global political and economic landscape. “The growing BRICS+ gives emerging markets the opportunity to align on global topics and new economic opportunities”. The annual BRICS Summits span coverage from technology, finance, energy, and development to climate issues. Second-order institutions like the BRICS Think Tank Council, Digital Economy Working Group, Payment Task Force and BRICS Business Council also deepen multi-track diplomatic engagements.
A stronger BRICS+ has some of the largest energy producers and buyers that can stabilise the global markets by coordinating action in times of crisis. It could also strengthen intra-BRICS trade links by signing FTAs and building supply chain links. Further, the NDB has only marginally supplemented IMF and WB’s role as premier lending institutions and can further percolate infrastructure and development financing initiatives in LMICs. Lastly, there are ample opportunities for scientific cooperation in AI, digitalisation, space, and healthcare innovation to bridge the tech access gap in the developing world. Overall, BRICS+ has much potential to usher in a more equitable and just global order.
References
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- Jain, S.C., (2006) ed., Emerging Economies and the Transformation of International Business (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar)
- KÄKÖNEN, J. (2014). BRICS AS A NEW POWER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS? Geopolitics, History, and International Relations, 6(2), 85–104. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26805954
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About the contributor: Rishya Dharmani is Research Scholar (Panjab University) New Delhi. She is a fellow of DFPGYF Diplomacy, Foreign Policy & Geopolitics Youth Fellowship- Cohort 2.0.
Disclaimer: All views expressed in the article belong solely to the author and not necessarily to the organisation.
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Acknowledgement: This article was posted by Shivashish Narayan, a visiting researcher at IMPRI.
