Policy Update
Srishtistuti Roy
Introduction
On 9th September, 2024 India and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) adopted a Joint Action Plan for 2024-2028 to facilitate joint ventures in various sectors including energy, trade, security, agriculture, health, and food security. External Affairs Minister (EAM) S. Jaishankar, co-chairing the inaugural India-GCC Joint Ministerial Meeting for Strategic Dialogue at Riyadh with Qatar’s Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman, highlighted the critical importance of cooperation with the GCC for India.
The Gulf region holds geostrategic significance not only due to its geographic proximity to India but also because of the shared pursuit of peace and security. Additionally, it is one of India’s largest trading partners; its substantial gas and oil reserves are crucial for India’s energy security, and it hosts a large Indian expatriate community. Thus, Jaishankar’s address to the GCC members underlined three key pillars for future partnerships: People, Prosperity, and Progress.
Drawing attention to the increased volume and diversity of trade while urging the expeditious finalization of the India-GCC Free Trade Agreement (FTA), the EAM stressed upon the need to ‘invest in each other’s future and support each other’s continued prosperity.’ Jaishankar also held separate bilateral talks with his counterparts from Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, and Bahrain on the sidelines of the Strategic Dialogue.
Simultaneously, at the invitation of PM Modi, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi His Highness Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan visited India on the same day. In light of the substantial progress achieved through the India-UAE Strategic Partnership, the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), and the recent Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), the two nations signed five further pacts to strengthen bilateral ties and enhance cooperation.
Of vital significance was the MoU on Nuclear Cooperation for the ‘maintenance and operation’ of the Emirates’ first nuclear power plant; a fifteen-year agreement for the supply of liquified natural gas (LNG) to India; and an MoU on Food Parks signed between ADQ–an Abu Dhabi-based investment company–and the government of Gujarat. Furthermore, on 10th September, 2024 at a business event in Mumbai, a Virtual Trade Corridor (VTC) with the MAITRI interface was also launched between India and the UAE to boost trade and investment by reducing administrative processes, logistics, and transportation costs.
Background: India’s Foreign Policy in West Asia
Both of these events and the resultant actions stem from a persistent need for regional cooperation, and must be understood in the larger context of India’s West Asian (Middle East) policy. Mr. Anil Trigunayat, ex-ambassador of India to Malta, Jordan, and Libya, is of the view that India’s proverbial ‘Link West’ policy is in reality an ‘Act West’ policy. For decades, Pakistan had been a deciding factor for India’s foreign policy in the Middle East. However, with India’s growing dominance in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)– in part, due to its Act East and Indo-Pacific policies– the NDA government has moved beyond Pakistan and adopted a proactive regional and sub-regional approach in its West Asian policy.
Bilateralism: In the last decade, India has forged strong partnerships in the Middle East through bilateral cooperation, not only in the commonly prioritized areas of economic growth and energy security, but also in areas of untapped potential such as maritime cooperation, space, science and technology, artificial intelligence, medicine and healthcare, cyber security, food security, fertilizers, renewable energy, and climate change. In fiscal year (FY) 2022-2023, the GCC became India’s largest trading partner, taking up 15.8% of India’s total trade. Additionally, in FY 2023-2024, the volume of bilateral trade with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Israel reached record highs.
This followed in the wake of certain specific eventualities: India became part of the I2U2 (India, Israel, the UAE, the US) and the IUSU (India, the US, Saudi Arabia) which gradually gave way to the signing of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEEC) Agreement in September 2023 in the sidelines of the G20 Summit. Additionally, other bilateral partnerships that have characterized India’s foreign policy in West Asia include:
- the CEPA signed between India and UAE in 2022;
- the Strategic Partnership Council (SPC) established in 2019 between India and Saudi Arabia which convened its first meeting in 2023;
- India’s turn towards Iraq for crude oil imports following the Red Sea Crisis in 2023;
- a twenty-year deal signed in 2024 for supply of LNG from Qatar to India;
- agreements signed with the UAE and Saudi Arabia in late 2023 to collaboratively work on transitioning towards clean energy sources such as wind and solar energy by 2030;
- conducting joint military exercises such Al Nagah with Oman and Zayed Talwar with the UAE
- and periodic maritime exercises conducted by naval forces of Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE with India in the western IOR and the Arabian Sea.
De-Hyphenation: Furthermore, India has successfully maintained diplomatic ties with oft-warring states. The NDA government has broken new ground in India’s West Asian foreign policy by de-hyphenating its stand on Palestine from its bilateral ties with Israel. As the war in Gaza continues for the eleventh month– causing extreme humanitarian carnage and a potential polio outbreak–India continues to call for an independent state of Palestine, all the while continuing its shrewdly strategic partnerships with Israel.
Though initially India was the only country from the Global South to have abstained from voting against Israel at the UNGA, it later abandoned this position in December 2023 and voted for a ceasefire while also voting against the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank.
Similarly, India has maintained a de-hyphenation policy in its bilateral ties with Iran. Despite the recent tensions between Iran and Israel owing to the war in Gaza, India has continued to call for ending hostilities on both sides and engaging in diplomatic dialogue. More importantly, in May 2024, India and Iran signed a ten-year contract to develop and operate the Iranian port of Chabahar.
For this project, India has pledged to invest $120 million in infrastructure development and extend a $250 million line of credit to Iran, because it envisions this port as a strategic trade route to reach the landlocked Central Asian countries. This contract has materialized despite warnings from the US about the potential risk of sanctions on countries engaging in business with Tehran.
Furthermore, in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine war, India has actively advocated for peace in the region through dialogue and diplomacy. While it has shielded itself from the socio-economic pressures of rising oil prices caused by the conflict, India has consistently worked towards mediating a peace agreement between the two nations.
Impact: Evolution of India-GCC Relations
The first India-GCC political dialogue in 2003 marked a new era of strategic engagement. It laid the foundation for cooperation in the key areas of energy security, trade, welfare of expatriates, maritime security and the safety of sea lanes of communication (SLOC). However, in 2022 when an MoU on the Mechanism of Consultations was signed, a quantum leap in India-GCC relations materialized by further institutionalizing the partnership.
This MoU laid down the framework for conducting regular consultations between India’s EAM and the GCC-Troika. Following this, in 2023 the first India-GCC Senior Officials’ Meeting took place in Riyadh where new areas of collaboration, such as digital infrastructure and climate security, were also explored. The progress made during this meeting paved the way for the landmark India-GCC Joint Ministerial Meeting for Strategic Dialogue in September 2024.
At the Strategic Dialogue, India highlighted ongoing efforts to boost partnerships with the GCC in areas of green hydrogen, clean energy, and advanced technologies. Initiatives such as the Saudi Vision 2030 and the UAE’s Vision 2031 have opened up new avenues of cooperation as India seeks to diversify its energy sources and further invest in sustainable development. Additionally, the Joint Action Plan 2024-2028 adopted at the meeting underscored various joint activities in diverse areas including health, trade, security, agriculture, food security, transportation, energy security, and culture, inter alia.
It also focused on enhancing academic and scientific cooperation through cultural exchanges for research and development. It was also decided that other areas of cooperation can be included in the Plan later on based on mutual consensus. Furthermore, India called for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza at the Strategic Dialogue. While Jaishankar reiterated that India condemns acts of terrorism and hostage-taking, he stressed that India wants an end to the violence on innocent civilians at the earliest. The EAM also stressed upon the importance of global peace, security, and stability for mutual progress and prosperity of the member nations.
Emerging Areas of Focus
The India-GCC Strategic Dialogue reflects India’s enhanced role in the Middle East through cooperation and collaboration in multiple sectors. With various strategic partnerships underway, India must engage with the following focus areas in the future:
- Agriculture & Food Security: In light of the rising global concerns over food supply chains, strengthening agricultural ties with GCC countries for leveraging technological innovations such as climate-resilient crops and water-efficient farming methods will be vital for securing food security in India. The MoU on food parks with the UAE is a step in the right direction and India should deliberate on more such partnerships.
- E-Commerce: The India-UAE VTC launch reflects a larger proclivity towards digitalising trade processes for ease of doing business. Thus, India should invest more in e-governance and e-commerce infrastructure to fully capitalize on trade agreements like the CEPA and the IMEEC. It will also expand market access for Indian businesses abroad while providing the necessary impetus for finalizing the FTA between India and the GCC.
- Energy Transition & Green Technologies: As the world inches closer to 2030, India and the GCC countries must strengthen their cooperation to achieve energy transition goals. The UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Bahrain are all member nations of the International Solar Alliance (ISA); thus, partnerships on harnessing and sharing solar energy can hasten the process of decreasing dependency on fossil fuels. Similar initiatives on wind energy will also be strategic to this end. Therefore, knowledge-sharing platforms on green technology and actively investing in them will be a major focus area for India.
- Strategic Trade Routes & Maritime Security: Prompt conclusion of the FTA between India and the GCC is the need of the hour for long-term institutionalization of India-GCC relations. India must build on the momentum it has gained in maritime influence and build robust sea lanes for trade as well as communication, especially in the Arabian Sea and IOR. Enhancing naval cooperation to safeguard critical waterways, expanding joint military exercises, and intelligence-sharing in the region could further bolster India’s role as a peacemaker in West Asia.
- Expatriate Welfare: With approximately 8.9 million Indian workers populating the Gulf, continued efforts to safeguard their welfare remain critical. India must prioritize strong labor laws, remittance frameworks, and social security benefits for the Indian expatriate community. This will ensure that India’s ties with the GCC remain people-centric while increasing avenues for cultural exchanges.
- Balancing Geostrategic Interests: In maintaining strong partnerships with diverse actors such as Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Palestine, India walks a geopolitical tightrope on which it must traverse cautiously. Though India has played a commendable role in regional mediation efforts so far, contingency planning to shield itself from political volatility in the Middle East would be a wise move.
Conclusion
The India-GCC Joint Action Plan 2024-2028 marks a significant milestone in India’s West Asia policy, reinforcing its commitment to deepening ties with the Gulf region. The partnership’s emphasis on energy security, trade, food security, and innovation aligns with India’s long-term strategic goals.
As India seeks to diversify its energy sources, enhance its trade relations, and address global challenges such as climate change, risks to food supply chains and political instability, its collaborative ventures with the GCC offer immense potential. By fostering cooperation in emerging areas, India is poised to play a pivotal role in championing progress and prosperity–not only in India, but also in West Asia altogether. The India-GCC dynamic will not only bolster India’s influential position in geopolitics but also contribute to its broader vision of sustainable development and regional peace.
References
- Embassy of India. (n.d.) India-GCC Relations. Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
- Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Government of India (GOI). (n.d.) Visit of EAM, Dr. S. Jaishankar to Saudi Arabia for the India-GCC Joint Ministerial Meeting for Strategic Dialogue. New Delhi.
- MEA, GOI. (n.d.) Visit of His Highness Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi to India (September 9-10, 2024). New Delhi.
- Trigunayat, A. (2024). Transforming Ties: India’s Strategic Triumph in West Asia. IMPRI Impact and Policy Research Institute, New Delhi.
- Trigunayat, A. (2019). India’s Foreign Policy in West Asia. Distinguished Lectures, MEA, GOI, New Delhi.
- Ningthoujam, A. (2024). Modi 3.0 and the likely trajectory of India-West Asia ties. Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.
- ‘India-UAE launches Virtual Trade Corridor to enhance ease of doing business.’ (2024). ANI News, New Delhi.
- Press Trust of India (PTI). (2024). India, GCC discuss ways to bolster co-operation; adopt Joint Action Plan. The Economic Times, Mumbai.
- ‘‘India Deeply Pained by Death of Innocent Civilians in Gaza’: Jaishankar at GCC Summit.’ (2024). The Wire, New Delhi.
- Abbas, B.A. (2024). Analysis of India’s voting patterns on Israel-Palestine issues at the United Nations. Hindustan Times, New Delhi.
- Marsi, F. (2024). India exports rockets, explosives to Israel amid Gaza war, documents reveal. Al Jazeera, Doha.
- Pasricha, A. (2024). India seals deal to operate Iran’s Chabahar port. Voice of America (VOA), Washington DC.
- Haidar, S. (2024). Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Can India be a Peacemaker? The Hindu, Chennai.
- ‘Unrealistic Expectations: On India and Russia-Ukraine Peace.’ (2024). The Hindu, Chennai.
About the Contributor– Srishtistuti Roy is a researcher at IMPRI, New Delhi. She is an alumna of Jadavpur University, Department of International Relations. She has recently completed her postgrad in Gender Studies from the University of North Bengal and hopes to pursue a doctorate soon. Her research interests include South Asian political economy, gender & sustainable development, contemporary social movements, and cultural studies.
Acknowledgement– The author expresses her humble gratitude to Dr. Arjun Kumar, Aasthaba Jadeja, and Meenu Mohan for their valuable insights.
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