Sunaina S
In the international system, a state’s strategy is often analysed under the prism of its strategic culture. This aids in evaluating a state’s actions, policies, and strategies while steering and even limiting the choices it makes. An essay regarding India’s strategic culture written by international relations specialist George Tanham in 1992 sparked a number of academic discussions. He maintained that India’s geography, complicated civilization, and colonial past have resulted in a defensive and pragmatic stance, and that the country lacks a strategic culture and national security strategy. Following a terror attack in Pahalgam last year, India unleashed a military campaign-Operation Sindoor.
Major defence analysts claim that this operation is definitive and indicates a change in the very strategic culture. The action was a “very significant shift” from a prior attitude of restraint toward strong reprisal, according to former Army Chief General M.M. Naravane. Nevertheless, the operation did not alter the strategic culture; rather, it was consistent with the conventional methods of calibration, responsiveness, and decisive.
The repertoire did not violate the Uri, Balakot and Sindoor sequence. The tri-services carried out precise attacks deep into Pakistan’s territory during Operation Sindoor. As a result, it is frequently considered as a watershed moment where India utilised its military might to combat terrorism. This assertion is debunked by an examination of the order of the three major counterterrorism operations. In the aftermath of a terror attack in Uri in 2016, the Indian Army undertook a military operation across the Line of Control (LoC) and eliminated many terror launchpads.
India dispatched uniformed personnel across the Line of Control and publicly recognised the operation, marking significant strides in counterterrorism efforts. Although the operation had little tactical effect, it provided guidelines for subsequent operations. The Indian Air Force conducted an airstrike in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in 2019 in response to the Pulwama terror incident.
Precision guided missiles were used in the Balakot air attack to target terrorist training facilities in order to achieve deep penetration through international airspace. The strike underlined that India would resort to pre-emptive action to protect its strategic interests rather than basing its reaction on the nuclear threshold. Shortly after the airstrike, India developed a layered air defence system, integrated air-to-ground precision weapons like SCALP and HAMMER, and integrated air-to-ground missiles to further expand its capabilities. The 2025 operation was a consequence of the mutations that occurred at that point in time rather than a single occurrence.
It was a multi-domain, tri-service operation that used integrated weapon systems to wipe out terror infrastructures located deep into Pakistan’s heartland. Using multilayered air defence systems, kinetic and non-kinetic weapon systems, and an integrated command and control system, this repertoire mission was a concerted offensive operation in an expanded geographical area that targeted nine sites. An assertive diplomatic approach was maintained by engaging and informing international community despite the strikes occurring deep into Pakistani territory. However, the strategy was pre-emptive, punitive, and non-escalation. Therefore, it was more of a repertory than a change.
The evolution of the strategic culture is provided by the military operations mentioned above. These symbolise synergy at tactical, operational, and institutional synergy. India’s security implications are pertinent to Colin Gray’s strategic culture study. He maintains that strategic culture is an all encompassing environment that ought to provide an indeterministic explanation of state conduct.
According to Grey, strategic culture is susceptible to change, but these changes do not occur in isolation; rather, they are the outcome of cognitive processes, historical symbols, institutional capacities, and pre-existing strategies. This helps us comprehend that a country’s strategic culture is constructed by policies that are executed over time rather than by a single event.
Understanding a state’s varied actions amid the same issues or crises is rendered through its dynamic but continuous character. A state can use a single force in an operation or combination of forces with the goal of inflicting additional harm during another by employing the forces’ repertory action. Operation Sindoor is an excellent example for this. India’s reaction to the terror attacks were substantial, crucial and appreciated. To carry out the operation, India employed integrated military strength, cutting-edge military equipment, command and control systems, and persuasive diplomacy.
In order to achieve strategic objectives and refrain from an active military conflict, precision attacks were exclusively targeted against terror infrastructure. thereby upholding the idea of a strategic culture that is responsive and employs calibration.
Understanding a nation’s assertive strategic culture can result in destabilisation as it enhances the probability of engaging in critical errors. The interpretation of Operation Sindoor will influence subsequent interactions at regional and international forums, therefore an analysis of the operation is essential.
Considering the presence of nuclear weapons in India, this is more important. Comprehending the altered strategic culture prompts enquiries regarding potential provocations and their responses in the future. The traditional strategy of restraint and non-escalation is abandoned in the understanding of a transition toward assertive activities. This is detrimental because it undermines a notion of calibrated responses. The operations should be considered as an evolution of a consistent strategic culture that existed throughout the Balakot and Uri campaigns.
Each strike was justified by the preceding one-Uri operation broke the threshold of cross-border operations; air power was employed during the Balakot operations, and operation Sindoor made optimum use of the institutions and capabilities developed in the interim period. Every operation saw soldiers traverse farther into the enemy’s territory, employ a range of weapons and equipment, and uphold a diplomatic stance, but the fundamental objective remained neutral—non-escalation, celebration, and deliberate. Additionally, this ensures effective deterrence by strategically communicating to Pakistan that future operations will be repressive and pre-emptive when required. The same steady, coordinated, and adaptable Indian approach will reduce conflict escalation on the Eastern- Front as China observes India’s strategies towards Pakistan.
Operation Sindoor’s repertoire understanding provides a more coherent representation of India in the contested neighbourhood. It should be considered as an evolution rather than a dismissal of the long-standing strategic culture.
References
The Week. 2026. “How Operation Sindoor Brought ‘Very Significant Shift’ in India’s Approach towards Pakistan? Former Indian Army Chief Explains.” The Week, August 29. https://www.theweek.in/news/defence/2026/08/29/how-operation-sindoor-brought-very-significant-shift-in-indias-approach-towards-pakistan-former-indian-army-chief-explains.html
Tanham Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay. RAND Report R-4207. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1996. https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R4207.html
Singh, Ashish. 2025. “From Uri to Doctrine: How 2016 Changed India’s Counter-Terror Playbook.” Sunday Guardian Live. September 14. https://sundayguardianlive.com/editors-choice/from-uri-to-doctrine-how-2016-changed-indias-counter-terror-playbook-138164
War on the Rocks. “Operation Sindoor and the Evolution of India’s Military Strategy Against Pakistan.” War on the Rocks, August 2026. https://warontherocks.com/operation-sindoor-and-the-evolution-of-indias-strategy-against-pakistan
Press Information Bureau. “Press Release.” Government of India, Ministry of Defence, August 2026. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2129453®=48&lang=2
Gray, Colin S. “Clausewitz Rules, OK? The Future Is the Past—with GPS.” Review of International Studies 25, no. 5 (1999): 282–301. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Library. https://library.fes.de/libalt/journals/swetsfulltext/14965922.pdf
About the Contributor: Sunaina is a Research Scholar at the School of National Security Studies, Central University of Gujarat Diplomacy, Foreign Policy & Governance Youth Fellow at IMPRI. She completed her M.A. in Defence and Strategic Studies (2020–2022) from the Central University of Gujarat. Her research interests include defence and security policies and doctrines, strategic studies, geostrategic affairs, conflict resolution and peacebuilding policies, state behaviour, and the policies shaping the global world order, with a particular interest in non-traditional security threats faced by India. She has a strong academic foundation in India’s foreign policy, peacebuilding, and conflict resolution.
Disclaimer: All views expressed in the article belong solely to the author and not necessarily to the organisation.
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Acknowledgement: This article was posted by Vishal Kumar, a Research and Editorial Intern at IMPRI.
