Regional Proxy Competition And The Constraints Of Global Governance In Sudan

Varisha Sharma

Introduction

The African Continent has been marred by civil wars for a long time but none as severe as the ones in Sudan that since its independence in 1956 has witnessed 20 military coup attempts. However, the most recent civil war that started in 2023 and has continued till present is also one of the worst humanitarian crises ever faced by Sudan with over 13.6 million people currently displaced, 20 million people in need of health assistance and estimated 21 million people facing food insecurity (WHO, 2026).

It has not only caused mass displacement, the collapse of healthcare services and an economic crisis but has also led to the death of more than 15, 500 people according to official estimates (ICNACSJ, 2024). Despite such devastating havoc being wrecked, the international community remains largely helpless. In April 2024, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres stated plainly that both the parties had ‘made a bet on a military situation’ and that explains why all mediation attempts- by the African Union, IGAD and others have been a failure (UN, 2024).

What remains a larger question is why are all attempts at international mediation failing. The answer to this lies in the strategic interests of both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) that directly impacts the strategic interests of countries within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Opposing proxy interests of Egypt and the UAE have produced a neutrality trap in the United Nations that has transformed formal multilateral actions like sanctions or embargoes into ineffective ceasefire calls that impose no costs on either the SAF or the RSF.

The Sudan case also exposes the limits of Keohane’s assumption that member states of international organisations like the United Nations will generally subordinate short-term interests to the long-run benefits of institutional cooperation (Keohane, 1984). However when it comes to Sudan, member states have active, material interests in opposing conflict parties. Therefore the cooperative logic of institutions dissolves into competitive management of information and resolutions.

The current situation of Sudan can be understood via the theories of proxy warfare developed by Daniel Byman (2005) and Andrew Mumford (2013), which describe conflicts in which external actors support local factions to pursue strategic interests without engaging in direct confrontation.

From Internal Power Struggle to Regional Proxy War

The immediate cause of the 2023 civil war was a dispute over the terms of integrating the RSF into the formal SAF command structure, a requirement of the internationally supported democratic transition that followed Omar al-Bashir’s removal in 2019. The RSF, under General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), insisted on a ten-year integration timeline but the SAF, under Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, demanded two years.

The trigger, however, was the RSF’s deployment of hundred armed vehicles to Merowe Air Base on 12 April 2023. This base had served as the RSF’s primary logistics hub for gold exports and where Egyptian forces were conducting joint exercises. When SAF sought to incorporate Merowe into a joint command structure with Egypt, Hemedti understood what was at stake was RSF’s financial independence. (Eledinov, 2026). Fighting broke out on 15 April 2023. Within weeks, the conflict had spread from Khartoum to Darfur and beyond. What began as a struggle between two military factions quickly assumed a regional dimension.

Egypt makes a lot of strategic gains by supporting the SAF. It views a SAF-controlled Sudan as essential to its Nile water security architecture, given its ongoing dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. A fragmented Sudan would undermine Egypt’s bargaining position against Addis Ababa and increase the number of refugees coming to Egypt (Ibrahim, 2025). Egypt has consistently used its diplomatic leverage to resist UNSC measures that would constrain the SAF’s operational capacity.

There has been mounting evidence regarding UAE’s involvement with the RSF provided by both the U.S. and the United Nations, however, UAE has maintained its claim to neutrality as a humanitarian actor. The UAE’s interests are different but equally strategic. Rather than prioritising security concerns, Abu Dhabi views Sudan primarily through the lens of economic opportunity, particularly access to gold resources, agriculture, and the Red Sea. (Ibrahim, 2025). Sudan produces over 80 tonnes of gold annually, majorly in RSF controlled areas of Darfur and South Kordofan.

According to Swissaid, citing UN Comtrade data, the UAE imported 29 tonnes of gold directly from Sudan in 2024, up from 17 tonnes the previous year in addition to volumes routed through Chad (18 tonnes) and Libya (9 tonnes), both described as ‘exit points’ for RSF controlled gold (Swissaid, 2025).

These competing external interests fundamentally altered the nature of the conflict. Sudan was no longer simply a civil war; it had become an arena where regional powers pursued their own geopolitical and economic objectives through local actors.

The United Nations and the Neutrality Trap

The United Nations has repeatedly attempted to broker peace in Sudan through ceasefire resolutions, diplomatic initiatives, and humanitarian appeals. However, these efforts have consistently failed to produce meaningful outcomes.

Mapping UNSC action against Egyptian and UAE proxy activity from 2023-2026 reveals a stark, repeating pattern: every time the UNSC has approached real enforcement- ceasefire monitoring, arms embargoes, sanctions, the measure gets watered down, blocked, or passed without any evidence of implementation. Russia vetoed a UK/Sierra Leone ceasefire resolution in November 2024; Resolution 2724’s March 2024 Ramadan ceasefire was violated the very next day when Egyptian jets struck Khartoum in support of SAF operations; Resolution 2736’s demand that the RSF halt its siege of El Fasher went unheeded, culminating in the city’s fall in October 2025 and the massacre of an estimated 30,000 civilians.

Egypt leverages its Arab League and AU ties, and sympathy from Russia and China on sovereignty grounds, while the UAE’s leverage is financial and reputational, framing its involvement as humanitarian rather than being conflict enabler. Together, this produces a neutrality trap: resolutions that call on both sides to stop fighting without attaching any consequence for non-compliance. Even the Responsibility to Protect framework has been affirmed rhetorically but never operationalised.

Structural Constraints faced by Regional Bodies

With the UNSC deadlocked, the burden shifted to the African Union and IGAD, both of which have failed to deliver a ceasefire despite genuine effort. The AU’s Expanded Mechanism, launched in May 2023, proposed a ceasefire, humanitarian corridors, and inclusive dialogue, but Sudan’s post-coup suspension from AU organs limits engagement, Egypt’s AU membership shapes deliberations in the SAF’s favour, and overlapping frameworks dilute coherence, leaving the AU “doomed to failure” on process over outcomes (El-Affendi, 2023).

IGAD fared no better: Sudan rejected its proposed regional protection force in 2023, calling it an enemy force (Al Jazeera, 2023), then suspended its own IGAD membership in January 2024 after the bloc invited Hemedti to a summit, which Sudan called a violation of its sovereignty (Al Jazeera, 2024). Regional failure simply mirrors global failure: institutions built from states with clashing interests can’t produce consensus.

The shortcomings of both organisations demonstrate that regional institutions are not insulated from the same geopolitical rivalries that constrain global governance. When member states possess competing strategic interests, institutional consensus becomes increasingly difficult to achieve.

Policy Recommendations

While a comprehensive political settlement remains elusive, several policy directions emerge from the analysis. First, greater aid localisation is essential. Sudan’s Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs) demonstrated remarkable effectiveness in reaching vulnerable populations where international organisations could not operate, yet they continue to receive limited international funding (Noe, 2025).

Further, where UNSC consensus remains unattainable, coalitions of willing states could pursue targeted financial sanctions against illicit gold networks that sustain the conflict. Finally, any durable peace process must recognise that Egypt and the UAE possess legitimate strategic interests that cannot simply be ignored. Sustainable diplomacy will require engaging both states in a framework that aligns regional security concerns with humanitarian objectives rather than treating them solely as external spoilers.

Conclusion

The Sudan crisis highlights the limits of global governance in the face of competing interests of its member states. In Sudan, one can find a consistent relationship between regional proxy competition and multilateral paralysis. Egypt’s backing of the SAF and the UAE’s alleged support for the RSF have produced a diplomatic environment in which meaningful enforcement measures become politically difficult to adopt.

Every major international initiative from the Jeddah Declaration to the AU mediation efforts have been rendered ineffective because the principal external stakeholders remain invested in different outcomes. Sudan’s tragedy highlights how global governance falters when competing geopolitical interests prevent institutions from acting collectively.

References

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Al Jazeera. (2024, January 20). Sudan suspends membership in IGAD regional bloc. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/20/sudan-suspends-membership-in-igad-regional-bloc

Byman, D. (2005). Deadly connections: States that sponsor terrorism. Cambridge University Press.

Eledinov, S. (2026, March). Sudan’s war was not a breakdown – it was the system working. African Arguments. https://africanarguments.org/2026/03/sudans-war-was-not-a-breakdown-it-was-the-system-working/

El-Affendi, A. (2023, June). Misunderstanding and mismanaging the Sudanese crisis. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/6/7/misunderstanding-and-mismanaging-the-sudanese-crisis

Ibrahim, E. (2025, January 29). Unlikely foes: Egypt and the UAE’s hidden battle for Sudan. Responsible Statecraft Organisation. https://responsiblestatecraft.org/sudan/

ICNA Council for Social Justice (2024, July 10). The Sudan crisis explained. https://icnacsj.org/the-sudan-crisis-explained/?gad_source=1&gad_campaignid=20148539957&gbraid=0AAAAAB-MX4N6aynIWL4VCeJlYduYwCwYv&gclid=CjwKCAjwqubPBhBOEiwAzgZX2srUa8i-ZAQFZGVe-jLE0oEKTSb1e9AJDXI7VWA_xDRG0mFq2sS6GRoCZ0sQAvD_BwE

Keohane, R.O. (1984). After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy. Princeton University Press.

Mumford, A. (2013). Proxy warfare. Polity Press.

Noe, N. (2025, September 19). Accelerating Localization: A Roadmap for The Sudan Humanitarian Fund. Refugees International. https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports-briefs/accelerating-localization-a-roadmap-for-the-sudan-humanitarian-fund/

Swissaid. (2025, November 4). United Arab Emirates: More than ever a hub for conflict gold. Swissaid. https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/

United Nations. (2024, April 15). Secretary-General’s press encounter on Sudan. United Nations Secretary-General. United Nations. https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/press-events/2024-04-15/secretary-generals-press-encounter-sudan-scroll-down-for-arabic

World Health Organization. (2026, January 9). Sudan: 1000 days of war deepen the world’s worst health and humanitarian crisis. https://www.who.int/news/item/09-01-2026-sudan-1000-days-of-war-deepen-the-world-s-worst-health-and-humanitarian-crisis

About the Contributor

Varisha Sharma is a research intern at IMPRI and as of 2026, a final year student of Political Science Hons at Miranda House, University of Delhi. Intellectually driven and curious, her interest in International Relations stems from her love for traveling and learning about new cultures.

Acknowledgement

I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to the team at IMPRI India as well as the mentors for the Diplomacy, Foreign Policy & Geopolitics Youth Fellowship 3.0 for their guidance and support.