Policy Update
Anushree Khare
Background
“In the midst of a panic, to hesitate is to be lost, but to advance boldly and lend freely on all sound collateral, at an interest rate sufficiently high to deter mere speculative borrowing, is the true path of safety.” This enduring observation by Walter Bagehot in Lombard Street (1873) captures the immutable dilemma of systemic liquidity crises, a principle that echoes across the evolution of modern financial systems.
Across advanced emerging economies, the development of these systems have evolved into a system where banks no longer control the flow of credit. Credit creation has moved out of banks’ traditional loan portfolios and into the open markets. Under classical banking theories, maturity transformation occurs when deposit taking and lending banks have direct access to their country’s central bank discount window, or have government guaranteed deposit insurance. Over the last forty years, Non-Bank Financial Institutions broadly termed as Shadow Banking Systems by Paul McCulley and formally defined by economists Gary Gorton and Hyun Song Shin have taken on the majority of secondary credit creation in the absence of a sovereign backstop.
India’s corporate bond architecture has suffered from a severe structural flaw in its ability to create a stable secondary corporate bond market in this environment. Primary issuance growth was driven by corporate spending and funding needs of non-banking financial institutions (NBFI), but there were few secondary market participants for any investment grade rating below AAA-rated quasi-government securities and financial institution securities. All other corporate bonds had limited participation due to lack of liquidity, fragmentation, and order based pricing.
These structural flaws led to two consecutive and significant systemic disruptions:
- The IL&FS Failure (Fall 2018): It exposed large asset/liability mismatch issues within many non-banking financial institutions (NBFI) which resulted in the closing of commercial paper (CP) rollovers for a short term.
- The Franklin Templeton Crisis (April 2020): At the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, Franklin Templeton India closed six open ended debt mutual fund schemes holding greater than INR 25,000 crore.
As redemptions for units increased, the price of corporate debenture paper rated low/medium deteriorated. Due to excessive bid ask spreads, fund managers were unable to sell underlying paper in the secondary market to satisfy unit holder redemption requests without sustaining unacceptable fire sale prices.
This crisis illustrated that open-end debt mutual funds functioned under the exact same assumptions of the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) bank run model. Redeeming investors can withdraw par value prior to closure of fund operations using liquid assets held by the fund. Investors who choose not to withdraw remain with claims that are illiquid and marked to market.
Recognizing this form of coordination failure, both the Indian Government and SEBI undertook efforts to establish an institutional secondary market backstop, ultimately resulting in the formal regulation of the Corporate Debt Market Development Fund (CDMDF) by SEBI in June 2023.
Functioning
The institutional architecture that supports the functioning of the CDMDF has been designed within a two-tiered legal framework.
- The first tier includes Chapter III-C of the SEBI (Alternative Investment Funds) Regulations, 2012
- The second tier provides the legal foundation for the Guarantee Scheme for Corporate Debt (GSCD) which was developed by the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA), Ministry of Finance.
Capital Structure and Capitalization
The vehicle is structured as a close-ended Category II AIF. It will have a 15-year term. The manager of this AIF is SBI Funds Management Ltd. The vehicle uses a capitalization model that utilizes collective self-insurance combined with government guarantees (sovereign leverage):
- Mutual Fund Participation: Open ended debt-based mutual funds must provide 25 basis points (0.25% of AUM) of their assets toward the vehicle’s initial capitalization.
- Asset Management Company (AMC) Contribution: AMCs participating in the program make commitments in respect of 0.02% of their related, specified debt assets. These contributions help to align the incentives of the AMCs participating in the program with those of investors who may purchase shares issued by the vehicle.
- Sovereign Leverage GSCD (Guarantee Scheme for Corporate Debt): Based on an estimated initial equity contribution of approximately INR 3,300 crores, the fund can leverage up to a factor of ten using bank borrowing. As part of its guarantee obligations, the NCGTC administers the Guarantee Scheme for Corporate Debt (GSCD) so it stands behind up to INR 30,000 crores worth of borrowing by the fund. Therefore, when added together with the initial capital provided by the mutual funds and AMCs, the total amount available to support purchases by the fund exceeds INR 33,000 crores.
Dual-Regime Operational Statuses
In terms of investment activity, the vehicle can operate in one of two distinct operating states:
- Normal Market Status: During normal times, CDMDF is restricted from acquiring secondary corporate debt. The capital invested by the fund during these periods remains invested in low risk and highly liquid investments in sovereign and money markets such as Government Treasury Bills, Tri-party repo (TREPS) transactions supported by Government Securities, and short-term repurchase agreements with maturities of less than seven days based upon investing in sovereign debt.
- State of Market Dislocation: The fund is permitted to acquire secondary corporate debt only after the SEBI board officially determines that a state of market dislocation exists. The determination of whether or not a state of market dislocation exists is made objectively based upon specific criteria (excessive widening of secondary bid/ask spreads, abnormally high redemption to AUM ratios, etc.)
Execution Mechanism and Qualifying Assets: Once the SEBI board determines that a state of market dislocation exists, CDMDF purchases eligible secondary corporate debt securities through RFQ platforms on registered exchanges. To be considered qualified for purchase by CDMDF, an asset must satisfy all of the conditions below under the SEBI framework:
- Must be an exchange listed corporate debt security with a minimum credit rating (investment grade) of BBB- or higher.
- Residual maturity must be no greater than five years.
- Excludes any paper with either a credit rating downgrade watch listing or any ongoing restructuring proceedings or default related litigation.
Eligible securities are purchased at prices consistent with values determined through a standard valuation matrix used by CDMDF.
Performance
The performance of the Corporate Debt Market Development Fund (CDMDF) is limited because there has been no acute domestic fixed-income crisis requiring a SEBI “dislocation” declaration since the 2023 announcement. The operational success of the CDMDF must be assessed on the basis of both verified capital mobilization and expected ex-ante institutional deterrents.
Capital Mobilization and Operational Rollout
The operational rollout has met all of its major objectives regarding capital:
- The total amount of subscribed funds from participating mutual fund companies and AMCs was received by the CDMDF. Therefore, the CDMDF was able to begin operations using an equity base in excess of INR 3,300 crores.
- All formal agreements required for testing the contingency loan channel to the extent of INR 30,000 crores with respect to the National Credit Guarantee Trustee Company (NCGTC), clearing corporations, SBI AMC (the primary asset manager) and commercial lenders and syndicates were completed. (Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI). (2023). Framework for Corporate Debt Market Development Fund (CDMDF). Circular No. SEBI/HO/IMD/IMD-PoD-1/P/CIR/2023/128, July 27, 2023.)
- In normal times, all investments made by the CDMDF were consistent with the mandates, which restrictively permitted only investment into sovereign T-bills, overnight TREPS to preserve capital and provide instant liquidity. (Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs (DEA). (2023). Guarantee Scheme for Corporate Debt (GSCD). Notification G.S.R 559(E), Government of India, July 26, 2023.)
Target Zone and Ex-Ante Deterrent Effects
An implicit backstop is intended to create an environment where it is less likely for market participants to require use of the backstop. In this context, the ability of a market maker of last resort or liquidity backstop to act as such creates an ex-ante deterrent effect among market participants (Krugman, 1991):
- Redemption Volatility: Institutional treasurers and high-net-worth individuals are aware that there is a declared second-round buyer ready to buy up illiquidity shocks when they occur. Therefore, the framework aims to eliminate the first-mover advantage to withdraw funds from an open-ended credit unit when they believe that some form of macroeconomic stress may arise.
- Spread stabilization: This is expected to reduce the structural liquidity premium associated with secondary AA and A-rated debt versus G-Sec yields. As such, markets should theoretically no longer reflect an unhedged risk premium associated with the possibility of secondary market closures during end-of-quarter balance sheet contractions.
Impact
The systemic presence of the CDMDF changes corporate treasury strategies and game-theoretic incentives at both the micro-level and firm level.
Resolution of the Run Using Mutual Fund Game Theory
Diamond-Dybvig (1983) and Morris-Shin (1998, 2004) describe how a mutual fund’s liquidity run behaves like a game with strategic complements in that all N investors are unit holders who have claims to a pool of assets A of nominal value C0.

Figure 1: Diamond Dybvig Consumer Liquidity Preference Curve
Source: Academistan
The absence of a secondary market backstop leads to a self-fulfilling equilibrium where each investor has a dominant strategy to withdraw their funds. In this way, by establishing the CDMDF, the ‘market maker of last resort’ provides a minimum liquidating price for the portfolio, thereby severing the strategic complementarity of the run, and restoring the Nash equilibrium to the cooperative “hold” equilibrium.
Corporate Debt Maturity Profiling
Treasurers at firms must make decisions based on two conflicting objectives described as the maturity tradeoff or the risk or reward tradeoff in Flannery (1986) and Stiglitz-Weiss (1981). This conflict can be defined using expected profit maximization:

Prior to 2023, companies that had a rating less than AAA were at significant risk of being unable to roll over existing debt obligations in the domestic debt markets. If open-ended funds gated then secondary demand for medium-term paper would disappear as well. As such, chief financial officers (CFOs) would have been forced to rely on ultra-short 91-day commercial paper (Ds) while holding defensive cash reserves.
The CDMDF reduces the market closure tail-risk which in turn compresses the probability factor associated with the rollover hazard E[{I{Rollover Failure}], towards zero. This structural assurance is theoretically expected to allow all corporate borrowers that are not AAA rated to lengthen the maturity of their outstanding debt obligations. By doing so, they can shift their issuance programs from volatile short term CP rollovers toward longer-duration non-convertible debentures (NCDs) (DL). This will reduce the corporate cost of capital and extend their capital expenditure horizons.
Emerging Issues
The creation of the backstop has created new forms of agency costs, moral hazards, and friction in regulation.
Moral Hazard and the Loss Waterfall
An ex-post backstop creates an incentive for asset managers to pursue yields at a cost to the investor through concentration of the portfolio in higher-yielding papers with lower ratings (i.e., BBB+ or A-) as they anticipate the government will provide liquidity support to secondary markets during times of financial crises. The framework provides a mechanism to reduce this dynamic through a three-tier loss waterfall.
- First Tier: Directly absorbed by the mutual fund scheme that sold the asset to CDMDF up to 10%.
- Second Tier: Absorbed by the combined equity commitments of all participating mutual funds and asset management companies. Total approximately Rs. 3,300 crores.
- Third Tier: Absorbed by the Indian Government via the GSCD credit guarantee up to Rs. 30,000 crores.
In essence, while the first-loss tranche creates Individual Skin In The Game, the second-loss pool creates collective action problems; conservative fund managers who have historically focused solely on liquid AAA assets are now required to pool their credit risk with aggressive peer managers who invest in higher-yield assets.
Fiscal Risk Exposure
As previously mentioned, while the structure is off-balance sheet via a SEBI-registered Category II alternative investment fund, there remains a fiscal link to the public purse. A correlated solvency crisis across corporate debt issuers will trigger the third tier of the loss waterfall thereby converting private credit defaults to sovereign liabilities.
BBB- Threshold Effect
The regulatory mandate limits securities eligible under CDMDF to those rated BBB- or higher, thus creating a potential cliff edge dynamic. If a distressed issuer is downgraded from BBB- to BB+, it is immediately excluded from CDMDF Eligibility. Market participants will therefore have strong incentives to stage preemptive runs on credits which are on the margins prior to such a downgrade occurring, and may therefore exacerbate distress within secondary markets for marginal investment grade papers.
Way Forward
For sustained long-term stability and greater efficiency as India’s debt market continues to evolve, policymakers should consider four structural enhancements as follows:
- Risk Weighted Contribution Framework: The current flat 25 bps contribution on specified debt fund (AUM) should be replaced with a dynamic, risk-weighted contribution regime. For example, schemes holding longer durations and larger proportions of less liquid corporate paper should pay a proportionally higher amount of capital, directly correlating insurance premiums with the generation of systemic risk.
- Wider Coverage of Contributing Entities: The boundaries for participants should be widened to include large institutional investors, namely insurers regulated by IRDAI and pension funds (PFRDA, EPFO), as both are potential sources of additional capital contributions and subsequent liquidity support.
- Graduation Bands for Downgraded Issuers: SEBI should establish a transition window allowing issuers whose ratings decline from BBB- to BB+ sufficient time to access limited liquidity support under calibrated higher haircuts to preclude abrupt cliff-edge dynamics during broader rating migrations.
- Transparency Protocols Relating to Operations: SEBI should publish specific, measurable criteria establishing when market dislocation is formally declared (i.e. the backstop is activated). This will eliminate discretionary ambiguity and anchor investor expectations ex-ante.
Conclusion
The CDMDF presents a new model for the structure of India’s capital markets. It does not act as a “buyer of last resort” by purchasing bad debt. Rather, it acts as a “market maker of last resort.” By providing Bagehot-style liquidity to good collateral during crises, it is able to break down Diamond-Dybvig coordination failures without bailing out insolvent firms. In fact, the ultimate test of the CDMDF’s effectiveness and credibility will be how well it can withstand political and public pressures to extend its authority, maintain its investment grade (BBB-), purchasing standards, and ensure that all losses are borne privately when confronted with its first large-scale financial crisis.
References
Government of India & Regulatory Authorities
- Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance (GSCD Notification & Scheme Details): NCGTC Guarantee Scheme for Corporate Debt (GSCD) Portal & Operational Guidelines (Gazette Notification G.S.R. 559(E) dated July 26, 2023)
- Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI AIF Second Amendment Regulations, 2023): SEBI (Alternative Investment Funds) (Second Amendment) Regulations, 2023 — Gazette Notification
- Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI Mutual Funds Amendment Regulations, 2023): SEBI (Mutual Funds) (Amendment) Regulations, 2023 — Gazette Notification SEBI/LAD-NRO/GN/2023/134
- Securities and Exchange Board of India (Operational Circular on CDMDF): SEBI Circular No. SEBI/HO/IMD/PoD2/P/CIR/2023/128 — Framework for Corporate Debt Market Development Fund (CDMDF)
- Securities and Exchange Board of India (Board Agenda & Memorandum): SEBI Board Meeting Documents: Framework for setting up of Corporate Debt Market Development Fund (March/June 2023)
- Reserve Bank of India (RBI Financial Stability Reports): Reserve Bank of India Financial Stability Reports Portal
Academic Literature
- Bagehot, W. (1873): Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market Online Library of Liberty — Full Text Access
- Diamond, D. W., & Dybvig, P. H. (1983): “Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity.” Journal of Political Economy, 91(3), 401–419. https://doi.org/10.1086/261155
- Flannery, M. J. (1986): “Asymmetric information and risky debt maturity choice.” The Journal of Finance, 41(1), 19–37. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb04491.x
- Gorton, G., & Metrick, A. (2012): “Securitized banking and the run on repo.” Journal of Financial Economics, 104(3), 425–451. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.016
- Holmström, B., & Tirole, J. (1998): “Private and public supply of liquidity.” Journal of Political Economy, 106(1), 1–40. https://doi.org/10.1086/250001
- Krugman, P. R. (1991): “Target zones and exchange rate dynamics.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(3), 669–682. https://doi.org/10.2307/2937922
- Morris, S., & Shin, H. S. (1998): “Unique equilibrium in a model of self-fulfilling currency attacks.” American Economic Review, 88(3), 587–597.
About The Contributor
Anushree Khare is a Research & Editorial Intern at the Impact and Policy Research Institute (IMPRI). She holds a B.A. (Hons) degree in Economics with Research. Her academic and professional interests lie in the domains of finance, quantitative research, data-driven policy analysis, and business strategy.
Acknowledgement
The author extends sincere gratitude to the IMPRI team for their guidance and support along with the reviewers Ms. Anamika P K and Ms. Lahari their valuable feedback and insights.
Disclaimer
All views expressed in the article belong solely to the author and not necessarily to the organisation.
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