India-Vietnam–Naval Capacity Building: Anchoring Stability In The Indo-Pacific

Policy Update
Arushi Jain

Background

The Indo-Pacific region today is more than a geographic construct; it is a critical arena where great power rivalries intersect with global trade. At the heart of this region lies the South China Sea, a vital maritime route through which nearly one-third of global trade passes annually. For Vietnam, this waterway represents not only economic lifelines but also a daily struggle to safeguard its sovereignty against persistent incursions by Chinese coast guard vessels and harassment of its fishermen.

For India the Indo Pacific region is a litmus test of its Act East Policy and its SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) vision. In order to retain secure sea lines of communication, a stable South China Sea is necessary and to ensure New Delhi continues to be recognised as an Indo-Pacific power in the eyes of others.

The history of engagement between the two countries has decades of grounding. Vietnam has supported India within the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and India supported Vietnam’s unification during its wars in the 1960s and 70s. Vietnam established formal diplomatic relations with India in 1972 which has since yielded an ever deepening engagement. A most significant advance in relations took place in 2016, when the two nations signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, placing defence and maritime cooperation as central to their partnership.

Policy Mandate and Framework

ndia–Vietnam naval ties have steadily moved from goodwill to concrete action. The Defence Cooperation Agreement of 2000 opened the door for training and exchanges, but it was the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of 2016 that put defence at the heart of the relationship.

The real breakthrough came in 2022, when both sides signed the Joint Vision Statement (2022–2030) and the MoU on Mutual Logistics Support. Together, these deals gave structure to future cooperation and, more importantly, granted Indian warships access to Vietnamese ports like Cam Ranh Bay. For India, this meant a foothold in the South China Sea; for Vietnam, a partner with reach across the Indian Ocean.

Financial support has reinforced this framework. The $100 million Line of Credit (2014) delivered 12 patrol boats by 2021–22, now patrolling Vietnam’s coastlines. The larger $500 million LoC (2016), though slower to use, signalled India’s long-term commitment to Vietnam’s defence needs.

On the operational side, India has trained Vietnamese crews since 2013 in submarine operations, supporting the induction of six Kilo-class submarines by 2017. Joint PASSEX drills, first held in 2020, and Indian ship visits — such as INS Delhi (2022) and INS Sahyadri (2023) — show that agreements are being translated into action at sea.

Together, these steps demonstrate a partnership that is no longer symbolic but anchored in shared capabilities and a clear regional purpose.

Performance: Early, Current, and Emerging Cooperation

Early Cooperation (1990s–2019)

India’s naval engagement with Vietnam commenced at a minimal scale in the 1990s when Indian teams were performing hydrographic surveys in Vietnam’s maritime domain. Soon after, cooperation evolved into training. Officers from Vietnam were sent to Indian naval and air force academies to gain knowledge to build their burgeoning navy.
The Defence Cooperation Agreement (2000) had provided a structure for this cooperation to flourish. A decade later, India undertook the training of Vietnamese sailors, who were being inducted into their new Kilo-class submarines, in Visakhapatnam. By 2017, Vietnam had inducted its complete fleet of six submarines, each crew partially trained by Indian instructors, a significant contribution to Hanoi’s deterrent posture.
The $100 million Letter of Credit in 2014 for patrol boats was another landmark. The boats, built by Larsen & Toubro in India, and by Hong Ha Shipyard in Vietnam, are indicative not only of defence sales but also joint co-production.

Current Cooperation (2020–2025)

In these last five years, cooperation has matured into a more strategic and operational phase.

Patrol Boats Delivered (2020-2022): By 2022 all 12 patrol boats, as part of the patrol boat project were delivered and now operationally deployed with Vietnam’s Border Guard Command. The vessels are now built and ready for operational use in patrolling contested waters; they will intercept smugglers and surveil Chinese behaviour.
Joint Vision 2022-2030: Signed during Indian Home Minister Rajnath Singh’s visit to Hanoi in 2022, the Joint Vision was a long term defence cooperation between the countries. It focused on expanding training, collaboration in strengthening defence related industries, and expanding maritime cooperation.
Logistics Support MoU (2022): The signing of the MoU from India’s perspective, opens an opportunity to access the Cam Ranh Bay which represents an extended reach in the South China Sea. For Vietnam, it enables the Government of India to maintain and support its maritime fleet.
Exercises and Port Calls: The naval exercises conducted from the year 2022 such as PASSEX, visits from INS Kiltan (2020) and INS Delhi (2022) are ceremonial. These actions create actual interoperability.
Regional Platforms: Vietnam has become part of India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI). This gives momentum to the ongoing bilateral defence cooperation to form a broader multi-lateral platform.

This phase marks a change as India is no longer only training Vietnamese but it is now allowing Vietnam to exert its own resilience.

Emerging Cooperation (2025 and beyond)

As we look to the future, discussions are being held about joint shipbuilding projects, deeper engagement with India’s Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) and greater training in cyber, UAV operations and maritime law enforcement. The idea of Vietnam purchasing the BrahMos supersonic missiles has been in talks for years. And hence, the next stages are less about talks and more about sustained, predictable collaboration.

Impact

The effects of this partnership has benefited both the countries in specific time periods and within diplomacy.

Enhanced Maritime Security (2014-22): The twelve patrol vessels handed over under the $100 million Line of Credit were operational by 2021-22, patrolling disputed waters, and allowing the protection of fisheries. Vietnamese authorities attested to illegal trawlers that were intercepted by them, deterring repeated maritime violations.
Submarine Capability and Deterrence (2013-17): The training that India conducted allowed Vietnam to induct all six Kilo-class submarines by 2017, which are all now stationed at Cam Ranh Bay, thus constructing an undersea deterrence capability over possible undersea incursions.
India’s Operational Reach (2022-23): After concluding the Logistics Support MoU (2022), Indian warships were able to make extended port calls in Vietnam, such as when the INS Delhi in 2022 or INS Sahyadri in 2023 were allowed to spend days in Vietnam. The ability to trek vessels into Vietnam, essentially extended India’s operational presence (and degree of commitment) in the South China Sea through its available logistics and services.
Signalling and Joint Exercises (2020-) PASSEX drills have been conducted since 2020 in these contested waters, demonstrating both tactical maritime obsession as well as political resolve behind it, signalling that these will be defended jointly through collective issuance of a unilateral statement.
Diplomatic Resonance (2016-23): Following on from the establishment of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2016, there has not been a single time that the Vietnam administration has not shown support for Indian position on ASEAN forums. India presented the proposition for freedom of navigation at the East Asia Summit 2023 that was signed-off by Hanoi, demonstrating the specific strategic credibility accrued from doing defence activities with Vietnam .

The impact is two-fold. For Vietnam, cooperation has meant greater ability to guard fisheries, secure energy projects, and push back against coercion. For India, it has turned its Act East vision into tangible presence in the South China Sea.

Challenges to the Partnership

China’s ambition in the South China Sea continues to loom over any Indo-Vietnam initiative. Each Vietnamese naval exercise or defense memorandum risks China responding with a retaliatory action which further puts pressure on Vietnam and dilutes the potential of India’s regional diplomatic ambition.

Both India and Vietnam have national capability constraints as well. Vietnam’s defense budget is relatively small in comparison to their needs and India’s navy is committed to multiple maritime arenas, from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific, which limits opportunities for sustained collaboration.

There is a technology barrier as well. Vietnam’s equipment are predominantly Russian, while Indian navy’s alignments with increased Western and Russian defence equipment, creates interoperability gaps slowing the pace for shared training and operations.

Financing has also been uneven. The $500 million Line of Credit established in 2016 remains half-spent and is hampered by bureaucratic priorities and variations in conditions on the ground, which raises questions about how quickly documented commitments actually translate into a capital asset.

Finally, the regional strategic context itself has inherent uncertainty. Divisions in ASEAN on the prioritisation of China and the balancing of U.S. engagement in the Indo-Pacific also disturbs the space in which India and Vietnam have grown their respective partnership.

Way Forward

For this partnership to be successful, three areas need to be addressed.

Expedited Defence Credits: Until these credits get into desirable outputs, there is a stagnation of goodwill. Hence expediting the defence credit pathway is must.
Expanded Exercises: Transition from PASSEX to scheduled monthly joint exercises to build confidence
Investment in Co-production: Joint shipbuilding or transferring technologies will make this partnership more sustainable.

This is not a race to equal ships with China. It is simply about building resilience and trust. For Vietnam, that means protecting their sovereignty, whereas for India, this means anchoring its role in the Indo-Pacific. At the end of the day, India–Vietnam naval cooperation is a reminder that in an uncertain region, small steps that build confidence are more valuable than grand pronouncements. Together, India and Vietnam are demonstrating that partnerships that are based on trust can be an anchor for stability in turbulent waters.

References

Naidu, G. V. C. (2021). India–Vietnam strategic partnership in the emerging Indo-Pacific construct. India Quarterly, 77(2), 189–205. https://doi.org/10.1177/09749284211005010
Vo, X. V. (2017). Vietnam–India maritime cooperation. Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India, 13(1), 27–38. https://doi.org/10.1080/09733159.2017.1315888
That, V. V., Lam, L. T., & Trung, T. Q. (2023). Maritime security policy of India in early 21st century: Vietnam’s perception of its implication on the Asia-Pacific region. Journal of International Studies, 19(2), 85–100. https://e-journal.uum.edu.my/index.php/jis/article/view/18161
The Hindu. (2022, June 9). Rajnath Singh hands over 12 high-speed guard boats to Vietnam. The Hindu. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/rajnath-singh-hands-over-12-high-speed-guard-boats-to-vietnam/article65509690.ece
The Indian Express. (2022, June 8). India, Vietnam sign joint vision on defence partnership as Rajnath Singh holds bilateral talks. The Indian Express. https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-vietnam-defence-partnership-rajnath-singh-7958663/
India Strategic Staff/Agency. (2025, July 26). The Indian Navy’s Eastern Fleet ships arrive at Da Nang, Vietnam – Deepening maritime ties and advancing maritime cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. India Strategic. https://www.indiastrategic.in/the-indian-navys-eastern-fleet-ships-arrive-at-da-nang-vietnam-deepening-maritime-ties-and-advancing-maritime-cooperation-in-the-indo-pacific/

About The Contributor: Arushi Jain is a Research Intern at the Impact and Policy Research Institute (IMPRI) and is in the final year of her Master’s degree in International Studies from Symbiosis School of International Studies, Pune. Her interest lies in analysing the domestic and foreign policies of countries globally.

Acknowledgement: The author sincerely thanks the whole IMPRI team for their valuable support.

Disclaimer: All views expressed in the article belong solely to the author and not necessarily to the organisation.