Policy Update
Anushree Khare
Background
“It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.” — Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1776)
The architecture of credit distribution in developing economies has traditionally exhibited an enduring structural duality: the capacity of commercial banks to provide low-cost, safe capital due to institutional deposit bases versus the localized information networks that enable non-banking financial companies (NBFCs) to efficiently assess and distribute capital.
Historically, this division created friction in intermediating credit to the productive economy, particularly toward micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) and retail consumers residing in tier-3 and tier-4 cities. While commercial banks maintain extremely stable liabilities through current account and savings account (CASA) deposits, their rigid underwriting models and high operating costs prevent deep penetration at the final delivery tier. Conversely, NBFCs successfully bridge physical distance and informational gaps, yet remain structurally vulnerable to volatile wholesale funding rates and stringent asset-liability management (ALM) requirements.
Recognizing these complementary limitations, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) transformed the traditional paradigm by introducing the Co-Lending Model (CLM) in November 2020, replacing the earlier 2018 Co-Origination Guidelines. This regulatory construct establishes a shared balance sheet combining bank liquidity with NBFC origination expertise, while mitigating moral hazard by mandating a minimum 20% risk retention by the NBFC. By 2023–2025, this regulatory experiment evolved into a primary pillar supporting credit expansion. Propelled by FinTech API syndication and rigorous oversight of escrow accounts, digital lending, and default loss guarantees (DLGs), co-lending transitioned from a limited partnership model into a systematic channel for priority sector lending and financial inclusion.
However, as co-lending scales rapidly, critical vulnerabilities emerge regarding risk-transfer frictions, regulatory arbitrage, and systemic contagion across shadow banking networks. As macroeconomic liquidity tightens, a fundamental regulatory question emerges: How can banks and non-banking financial companies expand credit distribution through collaborative models without compromising risk accountability, regulatory consistency, or financial stability?
Introduction
The co-lending model represents an advanced institutional mechanism where two distinct categories of financial intermediaries combine their comparative advantages. Rigorous economic analysis of this model requires looking past aggregate loan origination volumes to focus on two core operational and theoretical dimensions:
- A. Risk Harmonization: The institutional and economic reconciliation of credit underwriting standards, risk exposure limits, monitoring frameworks, and provisioning policies across lenders with disparate risk appetites, funding structures, and regulatory mandates.
- B. FinTech Syndication: The integration of technology-enabled platforms, digital underwriting algorithms, alternative data streams, and automated loan servicing rails that minimize transaction costs and enable real-time portfolio monitoring between banks and non-banking financial companies (NBFCs).
Performance
The regulatory architecture governing co-lending was refined significantly in its operational execution between 2023 and 2025. While the foundational November 2020 guidelines established the parameters for joint credit creation, subsequent RBI clarifications addressed critical operational frictions including escrow account management, digital lending restrictions, and loss-sharing arrangements (particularly those intersecting with the 2022 Digital Lending Guidelines on Default Loss Guarantees).
- November 2020: The RBI published its Co-Lending Model (CLM) guidelines, which formalized joint credit creation for Priority Sector Lending (PSL) by mandating that NBFCs retain a minimum 20% risk share on their balance sheets alongside partner commercial banks.
- September 2022: The RBI introduced comprehensive Digital Lending Guidelines restricting unbacked Default Loss Guarantees (DLG) to a maximum of 5%, thereby curbing synthetic credit guarantees and reshaping FinTech-NBFC-bank risk-transfer mechanisms.
- 2023–2024: The expanded adoption of Account Aggregator (AA) frameworks and automated escrow mechanisms scaled co-lending operations into micro-MSME and housing finance.
- 2025: Regulatory consolidation via the Draft RBI (Co-Lending Arrangements) Directions, prioritized uniform asset classification, transparent customer disclosures, and stringent oversight of third-party outsourcing and vendor ecosystems.
Table:1 Institutional Roles in Co-Lending
| Dimension | Scheduled Commercial Banks (SCBs) | Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs) |
| Primary Funding Source | Low-cost retail deposits, wholesale bonds, CASA | Wholesale borrowings, debentures, bank term loans, equity |
| Underwriting Responsibility | Macro risk governance, portfolio caps, final credit policy concurrence | Last-mile customer acquisition, physical verification, local credit appraisal |
| Risk Allocation | Typically 80% share of the joint loan portfolio | Minimum 20% mandatory retention on balance sheet |
| Loan Servicing & Operations | Oversight, regulatory reporting, ultimate escrow management | Direct borrower interface, collection management, grievance redressal |
Impact: Risk Harmonization and FinTech Syndication
A. Risk Harmonization: The economic viability of co-lending hinges on resolving fundamental information asymmetries and institutional misalignments between banks and non-banking financial companies (NBFCs).
Banks possess superior funding cost advantages compared to NBFCs due to their access to deposit insurance and liquidity backstops. However, they face higher informational friction when evaluating the unorganized-sector borrowers that NBFCs typically serve.
Conversely, NBFCs hold a distinct informational advantage regarding localized borrower assessment. Through localized screening and relational lending, they mitigate friction, but this model also subjects NBFCs to higher costs of capital and increased liquidity volatility.
When these institutions co-originate credit, differences in underwriting stringency can generate moral hazard and adverse selection. If an NBFC originates loans with the expectation that the bulk of the credit risk will be transferred to a partner bank, its incentive to conduct rigorous ex-ante screening is diminished—a classic principal-agent problem.
To formally describe this incentive structure, let R represent the return on a co-originated loan, and let e denote the unobservable screening effort exerted by the NBFC to assess borrower creditworthiness. This screening effort carries a private cost function represented by C(e) = ½ ce2.
As per the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) mandate, the NBFC retains a mandatory minimum risk fraction, α = 0.20 (20%), while the partner bank absorbs (1 – α) = 0.80 (80%).
The NBFC therefore determines the optimal screening effort e required to maximize its expected return, governed by the optimization condition:

The optimal screening effort satisfies the first-order condition:


Figure 1: Principal-Agent Screening Effort and NBFC Risk Retention (α) Source: Authors’ illustration based on the Reserve Bank of India Co-Lending Model (CLM) framework and Stiglitz-Weiss credit rationing parameters.
To mitigate moral hazard in banking by imposing “skin in the game” through mandatory risk retention (α = 0.20 or 20%), the RBI has created a framework aligning the NBFC’s residual risk exposure with the partner bank’s risk tolerance. Furthermore, risk harmonization requires the synchronization of Non-Performing Asset (NPA) recognition timelines, provisioning norms, and recovery mechanisms to eliminate arbitrage opportunities arising from regulatory differences between institutions.
B. Fintech Syndication: Technology is the catalytic agent enabling scalable co-lending by transforming the traditional bilateral lending agreement structure involving high transaction costs, manual reconciliations, and delayed dissemination of relevant information. FinTech syndication accomplishes this through APIs, the IndiaStack, and the Account Aggregator (AA) ecosystem.
By way of example, co-lenders are able to use automated underwriting systems to simultaneously analyze a borrower profile based upon current financial status, including all available cash-flow data, current GST returns, and verified bank statements. As a result, processing time decreases from weeks to minutes and reduces operational expenses.
Additionally, the co-lender has complete visibility of its loan portfolio in real time. Although technology facilitates scalability, there remains significant risk associated with over-reliance upon algorithms when evaluating borrowers. The primary risks include model risk, data errors, and a lack of transparency regarding operations during economic downturns. Therefore, effective co-lending operations require strong human oversight and robust regulatory audit trails.
Effect Upon India’s Financial System & Broader Economy
The structural expansion of co-lending has resulted in meaningful systemic effects across multiple dimensions of India’s macroeconomic landscape:
- Financial Inclusion & MSME Credit: Co-lending provided formal credit access to productive MSMEs that previously relied exclusively upon informal credit markets charging interest rates that are unusually high. The combination of bank liquidity with NBFC distribution has allowed credit flows to reach underserved manufacturing and service clusters.
- Capital Efficiency and Balance Sheet Optimization: Co-lending provides banks with a capital-efficient route to meet stringent PSL targets without increasing fixed branch infrastructure costs. For NBFCs, co-lending relieves constraints on their balance sheets, allowing them to rapidly turn over capital through originations without suffering chronic liquidity bottlenecks.
- Monetary Policy Transmission: The integration of decentralized NBFC networks into the formal banking grid results in more uniform monetary policy transmission across geographic regions and asset classes.
- Financial Stability Considerations: While there may be improvements in systemic efficiency due to increased inter-institutional connections, these same connections also increase the likelihood of contagion risks. Disruptions to the operations of a major NBFC partner or technological failures within shared API infrastructure can cause simultaneous disruptions to commercial banks.

Figure 2: Inter-Institutional Contagion Pathways in the Indian Co-Lending Market Source: Authors’ illustration based on the Reserve Bank of India Co-Lending Model (CLM) framework.
Emerging Issues
Although there is considerable operational scale-up that has occurred in the co-lending market between 2023 and 2025, this space remains operationally vulnerable at a systemic level regarding risk harmonization, data governance, and operational accountability.
The primary economic frictional issue arising within the co-lending model stems out of deep-rooted cultural and structural differences in how commercial banks and non-bank financial companies (NBFCs) operate. Commercial Banks are viewed as deposit-taking institutions, thus they are heavily regulated to ensure responsible lending practices. If an institution seeks to achieve high yields by increasing the number of loans made with compromised collateral standards, it will increase the exposure on the institution’s balance sheet to adverse selection and moral hazard. As such, each commercial bank has a very conservative credit committee that requires all loans originating through co-lending be evaluated against very strict risk criteria.
On the other hand, NBFCs use local data gathering capabilities, flexible origination methods and lower operating costs to generate rapid growth in lending. The contrasting business models used by commercial banks and NBFCs creates several operational bottlenecks. When an NBFC makes a loan, it is typically reviewed again at a later stage by the underwriters employed by the commercial banking partner. In cases where the commercial banking partner determines the loan was too risky to approve based on the institution’s own internal models regardless of the NBFC’s earlier approval decision, the misalignment in these decisions results in extended delays throughout the entire life cycle of co-originating loans.
Figure 3: Stiglitz-Weiss Credit Rationing Under Information Asymmetry Showing the backward-bending expected return curve where higher interest rates/risk thresholds induce adverse selection, forcing conservative bank credit committees to impose strict quantitative cutoff rules rather than clearing the market through pricing
Way Forward
The Co-Lending ecosystem will continue to expand only if its structural resilience is maintained and this can happen when policy and institutional frameworks evolve in the following ways:
- Standardized Digital Underwriting Processes: Industry-wide open standards for data verification and validation must be developed to minimize bilateral negotiation costs between banks and NBFCs.
- Technological Interoperability Across All Entities: Robust, cloud-native API middleware (Like the Reserve Bank-Backed Account Aggregator [AA] framework) must be implemented to secure real-time financial information flows based upon consumer consent and automated escrow reconciliation without manual ingestion friction.
- Explicit Regulatory Guidelines Regarding Operational Accountability: Clear demarcation of accountability for both parties for any outsourced collection practices and grievance redressal process.
- Real Time Monitoring Dashboards: Dynamic portfolios jointly monitored by banks and NBFCs to track asset quality over vintages 30-plus day and 90-plus day delinquencies, Portfolio at Risk (PAR), vintage wise default curves, sectoral concentration limits and collection efficiencies.
Conclusion
The evolution of the RBI Co-Lending Model between 2023 and 2025 shows that in order for financial innovations in credit markets to work beyond just being technological disruptions, they require robust institutional architecture. Ultimately, the long term success of co-lending cannot be gauged solely by how many loans originated or how many active partnerships there were.
Rather than the above, its ultimate success will depend upon whether banks, non-banking finance companies (NBFCs), and technology platforms can develop and sustain an integrated credit ecosystem that incorporates funding efficiency, technology, strict risk alignment, and borrowing protections which all exist in balance. When appropriately aligned with institutional cooperation it may also serve as a bridge across structural gaps in financial intermediation thereby creating a risk-resilient, inclusive, and stable credit economy.
References
- Reserve Bank of India (RBI). (2020). Circular on Co-Lending Model (CLM) by Banks and NBFCs-HFCs. RBI/2020-21/63 FIDD.CO.Plan.BC.No.8/04.09.01/2020-21. RBI Circular
- Reserve Bank of India (RBI). (2022). Guidelines on Digital Lending. DOR.CRE.REC.66/21.04.048/2022-23. RBI Digital Lending Guidelines
- Reserve Bank of India (RBI). (2024–2025). Financial Stability Report (FSR). RBI FSR Reports
- Harvard University / Harvard Business School. (2021). FinTech Lending and the Economics of Banking Partnerships. Working Paper Series on Financial Intermediation and Credit Markets.
- Yale School of Management. (2023). Institutional Design in Shadow Banking and Credit Intermediation. Economic Policy Research Discussion Papers.
- Princeton University, Department of Economics. (2022). Information Frictions and Credit Allocation in Developing Economies. Academic Research Insights.
- The Hindu. (2024). RBI reviews co-lending guidelines to ensure tighter risk controls and borrower transparency. Business Desk. The Hindu Coverage
- The Indian Express. (2025). FinTech-bank co-lending partnerships scale up amid tighter liquidity norms. Economy & Markets Analysis. The Indian Express Coverage
About The Contributor
Anushree Khare is a Research & Editorial Intern at the Impact and Policy Research Institute (IMPRI). She holds a B.A. (Hons) degree in Economics with Research. Her academic and professional interests lie in the domains of finance, quantitative research, data-driven policy analysis, and business strategy.
Acknowledgement
The author extends sincere gratitude to the IMPRI team for their guidance and support along with the reviewers Ms. Khushi and Ms. Gowri Kodali for their valuable feedback and insights.
Disclaimer
All views expressed in the article belong solely to the author and not necessarily to the organisation.
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