Policy Update
Akshat Jangid
Introduction
The South Caucasus is a strategic region that has traditionally been shaped by competition among Russia, Turkey, Iran, and Western powers. However, in recent years, India has established a more visible presence in the region through its rapidly expanding relations with Armenia. The partnership has attracted particular attention because it coincides with growing political and military cooperation among Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Pakistan. Consequently, a conflict once understood primarily as a territorial dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan is increasingly linked to broader geopolitical rivalries, defense partnerships, and competing Eurasian connectivity projects.
India’s engagement with Armenia should not simply be interpreted as New Delhi choosing one side in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Armenia provides India with an important market for domestically manufactured weapons, a potential gateway to the wider Eurasian region, and a partner that shares concerns regarding the Azerbaijan axis. Armenia, meanwhile, views India as an alternative defense supplier at a time when its traditional dependence on Russia has become increasingly uncertain.
The India–Armenia partnership, therefore, represents more than a series of arms transactions. It reflects India’s ambition to become a significant defense exporter and strategic stakeholder in the South Caucasus. Nevertheless, New Delhi must balance its growing relationship with Armenia against its economic and connectivity interests involving Azerbaijan, Iran, Russia, and Central Asia.
Background: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict
Nagorno-Karabakh, a mountainous region in the Caucasus, has been the center of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan for nearly three decades. Although the region had a predominantly ethnic-Armenian population, it was internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan. Tensions intensified during the final years of the Soviet Union, when the region’s Armenian population sought unification with Armenia. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Armenia and Azerbaijan fought the First Nagorno-Karabakh War between the late 1980s and 1994.
Armenian forces gained control of Nagorno-Karabakh and several surrounding Azerbaijani districts during the conflict. A ceasefire ended the fighting but did not produce a permanent political settlement. Azerbaijan continued to regard the territories as being under illegal occupation, while ethnic Armenians argued that their security and right to self-determination required separation from Azerbaijani rule.
Over the last few years, the region has experienced considerable change because of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020. Turkey played a key role in providing Azerbaijan with weapons. Azerbaijan recovered large areas that Armenian forces had previously controlled. Turkish military assistance, training, and drone technology contributed to Azerbaijan’s battlefield advantage. Russia subsequently brokered a ceasefire and deployed peacekeepers to the region, but the agreement did not permanently resolve the dispute.
In September 2023, Azerbaijan launched an aggressive military operation and established full control over Nagorno-Karabakh. More than 100,000 ethnic Armenians subsequently fled the region for Armenia. The development posed a major humanitarian challenge for Armenia and fundamentally altered the conflict’s territorial dimensions.
Figure 1: Nagorno-Karabakh Region
Source: The Economist
A significant diplomatic breakthrough followed in August 2025, when Armenia and Azerbaijan initiated negotiations on a peace agreement and interstate relations. The European Union described the development as an important step towards ending decades of conflict, while emphasizing the need for the treaty to be formally signed, ratified, and implemented. Progress towards peace has reduced the immediate risk of another war over Nagorno-Karabakh. Still, unresolved questions involving borders, transport routes, displaced populations, and regional influence continue to affect relations.
Armenia’s Search for New Security Partners
For much of the post-Soviet period, Armenia was solely dependent on Russia for military equipment, economic support, and security guarantees. Armenia hosted Russian forces and participated in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, or CSTO. This arrangement allowed Yerevan to maintain close security relations with Moscow while facing a wealthier and more heavily armed Azerbaijan. Over the last two decades, Azerbaijan has heavily invested in its military. Armenia, on the other hand, has not been able to keep up with Azerbaijan’s military expenditure.
However, Armenia’s confidence in Russia weakened after the 2020 war and subsequent confrontations with Azerbaijan. Armenian policymakers increasingly believed that Russia and the CSTO had failed to provide sufficient assistance when Armenia’s security was threatened. Russia’s war in Ukraine also reduced its capacity to devote political and military resources to the South Caucasus.
In February 2024, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced that Armenia had effectively frozen its participation in the CSTO, arguing that the organization had failed to fulfill its security responsibilities. Armenia subsequently reduced its involvement in CSTO activities and began pursuing closer relations with several alternative partners, particularly India, France, the United States, and the European Union.
Figure 2: Azerbaijan vs Armenia military expenditure
Source: IMF Data
This shift does not necessarily reduce Armenia’s dependence on Russia. Instead, Yerevan is attempting to diversify its foreign relations so that no single country possesses excessive influence over its national security. India has emerged as an attractive partner within this diversification strategy because it can provide relatively affordable military systems without imposing the same political conditions that may accompany assistance from larger Western powers.
The Azerbaijan–Turkey–Pakistan Partnership
India’s relationship with Armenia must also be understood in the context of growing military and political cooperation among Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Pakistan. Although the three countries do not constitute a formal military alliance, they have developed a visible strategic alignment based on defense cooperation, political support, and shared regional interests.
Turkey and Azerbaijan possess the most developed relationship within this grouping. Their partnership is often expressed through the phrase “one nation, two states,” reflecting close linguistic, cultural, and historical ties. Turkey was a major supporter of Azerbaijan during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war and has contributed to the modernization of Azerbaijan’s armed forces through joint exercises, military training, and defense technology.
Azerbaijan is also strategically important to Turkey because it provides access to the Caspian Sea and connects Ankara with the wider Turkic world in Central Asia. Energy pipelines and transport corridors passing through Azerbaijan have strengthened Turkey’s position as a bridge between Europe and Asia.
Pakistan has consistently supported Azerbaijan’s position on Nagorno-Karabakh and has not established diplomatic relations with Armenia. Azerbaijan, in turn, has regularly supported Pakistan’s position on Kashmir and other matters involving India. Pakistan and Azerbaijan have also expanded defense cooperation, military exercises, and high-level political engagement.
The partnership became more institutionalized through trilateral meetings involving the leaders of Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Pakistan. At their second trilateral summit in Lachin in May 2025, the three governments emphasized cooperation in defense, trade, investment, connectivity, counterterrorism, and regional security.
Nevertheless, the grouping should not be described as a NATO-style alliance. Its members do not have a formal collective-defense obligation that requires each country to enter a war on behalf of another. It is more accurately understood as an expanding strategic partnership in which political solidarity is supported by military cooperation and overlapping geopolitical interests.
Functioning: India–Armenia Defense Cooperation
Defense cooperation has become the most visible component of the India–Armenia relationship. One of the earliest major agreements emerged in 2020, when Armenia reportedly purchased four Indian-made Swathi weapon-locating radar systems for approximately US$40 million. The systems, developed by India’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and manufactured by Bharat Electronics Limited, are designed to identify the location of incoming artillery fire.
The agreement was important for both countries. Armenia acquired equipment relevant to an artillery-intensive security environment, while India secured a significant foreign customer for a domestically produced defense system. The purchase also marked India’s recent rise as a defense exporter and demonstrated that Indian equipment could compete with established Russian and European alternatives in international markets.
Figure 3: India’s Rise as an Arms Exporter to Armenia
Source: SIPRI Data
The defense relationship subsequently expanded beyond radar systems. Public reporting has linked Armenia to purchases of Indian Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launchers, artillery systems, ammunition, anti-tank weapons, air-defense equipment, and counter-drone technology. Armenia has also reportedly acquired or expressed interest in the Indian Akash surface-to-air missile system. Because defense contracts are frequently confidential, reported negotiations and anticipated deliveries should be distinguished from officially confirmed and completed transactions.
For Armenia, Indian weapons offer several advantages. They are more affordable than Western systems, while India may be able to provide faster deliveries than Russia under present conditions. Acquiring weapons from India also allows Armenia to reduce its dependence on Russian supply chains and diversify the technology used by its armed forces.
India benefits economically and strategically from these transactions. Successful exports provide international validation of Indian-made systems and support the government’s objective of developing India into a major defense manufacturing and exporting country. Defense sales can also foster long-term relationships involving ammunition, maintenance, spare parts, upgrades, and military training.
Armenia is therefore more than a one-time customer. It can serve as an important test of India’s ability to become a dependable, long-term security partner capable of supporting exported systems throughout their operational lives.
Possible Issues
India officially maintains that its relations with individual countries are based on their own merits. Nevertheless, the Azerbaijan–Turkey–Pakistan relationship inevitably influences Indian strategic calculations. Pakistan’s support for Azerbaijan and Baku’s diplomatic support for Pakistan on Kashmir have created political friction between India and Azerbaijan. Turkey’s frequent criticism of India’s policies in Kashmir and its close defense relationship with Pakistan have similarly complicated India–Turkey relations.
Supporting Armenia allows India to develop influence in a region where Turkey and Pakistan are becoming more active. It also creates a form of indirect strategic balancing: states that support Pakistan’s position against India must consider that India can develop political and military partnerships with their regional competitors. It is important not to reduce India–Armenia relations entirely to an anti-Pakistan or anti-Turkey arrangement, as that would be misleading. India also has independent commercial interests in defense exports and seeks greater influence across Eurasia. Armenia wants security diversification, investment, and technological cooperation regardless of India’s disputes with Turkey and Pakistan.
India must consequently avoid allowing symbolic geopolitical competition to replace a coherent regional strategy. An openly confrontational approach towards Azerbaijan could damage Indian commercial interests and push Baku even closer to Pakistan. A carefully managed partnership with Armenia would strengthen Armenian deterrence without requiring India to support renewed territorial confrontation.
India’s Eurasian Ambitions
India’s growing involvement in the South Caucasus is also connected to its search for reliable access to Central Asia, Russia, and Europe. India’s direct land access to Eurasia is limited by its strained relations with Pakistan. As a result, Iran has become critical to Indian connectivity initiatives.
The International North–South Transport Corridor is a multimodal network involving maritime, railway, and road transportation between India, Iran, Russia, and other parts of Eurasia. India’s Ministry of External Affairs describes the INSTC as an important initiative created through an intergovernmental agreement among India, Russia, and Iran. Chabahar Port in Iran similarly provides India with access to Afghanistan and Central Asia while avoiding Pakistani territory.
Armenia is interested in connecting its own transport infrastructure to these projects. A route passing through India, Iran, and Armenia could provide an additional pathway to the Black Sea and Europe. Such connectivity would reduce Armenia’s economic isolation and increase India’s presence in the South Caucasus.
However, India’s regional calculations are complicated by the fact that Azerbaijan is itself central to the principal western route of the INSTC between Iran and Russia. New Delhi, therefore, cannot treat Armenia and Azerbaijan as mutually exclusive partners. India may support Armenia’s defense modernization while still requiring functional relations with Azerbaijan for trade, transportation, and energy cooperation.
The instability surrounding Iran creates an additional limitation. Sanctions, regional conflict, and uncertainty surrounding Chabahar could delay India’s Eurasian connectivity plans. India’s strategy must therefore include multiple transport options rather than relying entirely on a single route.
Potential Risks and Policy Challenges
India’s expanding engagement with Armenia offers considerable opportunities but also carries several risks. First, arms transfers may improve Armenia’s capacity for deterrence, but they can also intensify a regional security dilemma. If Azerbaijan interprets Armenian rearmament as preparation for future confrontation, it may respond by acquiring additional Turkish, Israeli, or Pakistani weapons.
Second, weapon purchases cannot by themselves resolve Armenia’s security challenges. Azerbaijan has a larger population, higher energy revenues, and strong military partnerships. Armenia requires institutional reforms, improved training, secure communications, surveillance capabilities, and a sustainable defense doctrine alongside new equipment.
Third, India must preserve room for diplomacy with Azerbaijan. An excessively partisan policy could damage India’s role in the INSTC, strengthen Azerbaijan’s alignment with Pakistan, and reduce New Delhi’s ability to contribute constructively to regional stability.
Finally, the developing Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process may transform the nature of India–Armenia relations. If lasting peace is achieved, a relationship focused almost exclusively on weapons could lose momentum. India should therefore expand cooperation into information technology, pharmaceuticals, education, agriculture, infrastructure, cybersecurity, space technology, and renewable energy.
Policy Recommendations
India should continue defense cooperation with Armenia, but accompany equipment sales with training, maintenance, spare parts, and responsible end-use arrangements. This would improve Armenia’s defensive capabilities while establishing India as a reliable long-term supplier.
New Delhi should also pursue a balanced South Caucasus policy by maintaining diplomatic and commercial engagement with Azerbaijan. Defense cooperation with Armenia need not require hostility towards Baku.
Furthermore, India should integrate Armenia into a broader Eurasian connectivity strategy that involves Iran, the INSTC, the Black Sea, and Central Asia. Commercial infrastructure would give the relationship greater durability than defense sales alone.
Finally, India should publicly support the peaceful settlement and implementation of agreements between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Its long-term interest lies in a stable South Caucasus that permits trade and connectivity, not in an indefinite arms race.
Conclusion
India’s partnership with Armenia reflects a wider transformation of the South Caucasus. Armenia is diversifying away from excessive dependence on Russia, while India is emerging as an increasingly credible defense exporter and Eurasian stakeholder. The relationship also provides New Delhi with a means of balancing, without directly confronting, the expanding Azerbaijan–Turkey–Pakistan partnership.
Moreover, it is essential that India not view Armenia solely through the lens of rivalry with Pakistan and Turkey. Its long-term influence will depend on combining defense cooperation with economic investment, connectivity, diplomacy, and technological partnership. A balanced strategy would allow India to strengthen Armenia’s sovereignty while preserving relations with Azerbaijan and supporting lasting regional stability. India’s emergence in the South Caucasus will therefore be determined not merely by the weapons it sells, but by whether it can convert defense transactions into a coherent and sustainable regional policy.
Disclaimer: All the views expressed in this article are solely those of the author. IMPRI is not responsible for any sentiments hurt.
References
“Armenia/Azerbaijan: Statement by the High Representative on Behalf of the European Union on the Initialing of the Armenia–Azerbaijan Peace Treaty.” Council of the European Union, 8 Aug. 2025.
“Armenia Freezes Participation in Russia-Led Security Bloc—Prime Minister.” Reuters, 23 Feb. 2024.
“India–Iran–Armenia Trilateral Consultations.” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 9 Sept. 2025.
“International North–South Transport Corridor.” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 8 Dec. 2023.
“Lachin Hosted Summit of Azerbaijani President, Turkish President, and Pakistani Prime Minister.” President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 28 May 2025.
“Refugees Find Safety in Armenia, but the Future Remains Uncertain.” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 20 Oct. 2023.
“Armenia’s New Swathi Radar and Defense Imports from India: Eurasian Geostrategy or Technology Interface?” PONARS Eurasia, 2021.
“UN and Partners Appeal for US$97 Million to Respond to Urgent Needs of Refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh.” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 7 Oct. 2023.
“India Wins Defense Deal with Armenia.” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 1 June 2020. Accessed 15 July 2026.
About the Author
Akshat Jangid is an undergraduate Economics student from Rutgers University with an interest in public policy, rural development, governance, and evidence-based policy analysis. He is currently a Research & Editorial intern at IMPRI.
Acknowledgements
The author gratefully acknowledges the reviewer(s) and IMPRI for providing their guidance, comments, and suggestions during the review and writing process.
Reviewers:
Arya Gupta & Anuska
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