Policy Update
Pragya Raghav
Background
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) emerged from the Shanghai Five Mechanism established in 1996 by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to address border disputes and build mutual trust. It was formally established as the SCO in June 2001 after Uzbekistan joined. Its founding framework focused on combating terrorism, separatism and extremism, while promoting political, security, economic and connectivity cooperation across Eurasia (Al Jazeera, 2026).
India became a full SCO member at the Astana Summit in 2017, alongside Pakistan. Iran joined in 2023 and Belarus in 2024, taking the organisation’s membership to 10: China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Belarus. The SCO also includes observer states and dialogue partners across West Asia and Southeast Asia (PM India, 2026).
For India, the SCO provides a platform for direct engagement with Central Asia, Russia and China, particularly on security, Afghanistan and regional connectivity. Through mechanisms such as the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), India participates in counter-terrorism cooperation while also pursuing greater access to Central Asian markets, energy resources and transport corridors (MEA, 2026).
The 26th Meeting of the Council of Heads of State was hosted by Kyrgyzstan in Bishkek from August 31 to September 1, 2026, coinciding with the SCO’s 25th anniversary. The summit brought together more than a dozen heads of state and government, including Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin and Narendra Modi, against the backdrop of the Ukraine conflict, US-Iran tensions and trade disputes involving the United States, India and China (Al Jazeera, 2026). Modi travelled to Bishkek via Tashkent and highlighted India’s priorities of security, connectivity and opportunity, while reiterating New Delhi’s opposition to double standards in addressing terrorism (PIB, 2026; MEA, 2026).
Functioning and Implementation of SCO Cooperation
SCO Summit 2026, Agenda and Key Deliberations
1. Date, venue and host: The 26th Meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of State was held in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, from August 31 to September 1, 2026, under President Sadyr Zhaparov. The summit marked the SCO’s 25th anniversary and brought together more than 20 heads of state and government and representatives of international organisations, including UN Secretary General António Guterres (PM India, 2026; Al Jazeera, 2026).
2. Central theme: The summit focused on strengthening cooperation in security, connectivity, trade and technology amid the Ukraine conflict, tensions between Iran and the United States, and new US tariffs affecting India and China (Al Jazeera, 2026).
3. Major issues: Discussions covered counter terrorism, Afghanistan, regional security, connectivity, trade, digitalisation, nuclear and physical security, drug trafficking and reform of global governance institutions, including the UN (PIB, 2026; Al Jazeera, 2026).
4. Key outcomes: The ten members adopted the Bishkek Declaration, reaffirming the UN Charter and supporting a more representative and multipolar international order. Around 28 other documents were approved, covering climate action, nuclear safety, energy conservation, narcotics control and emergency assistance. The summit also approved a Universal Centre for Countering Security Challenges and Threats and the Executive Committee of the SCO Anti Narcotics Centre, along with a drug control programme for 2026 to 2030 (PIB, 2026; MEA, 2026).
India’s Priorities at the SCO Summit 2026
1. Security and counter terrorism: Modi called for dismantling terrorist financing, recruitment, radicalisation and safe havens, stressing that there should be no double standards in combating terrorism (MEA, 2026; PIB, 2026).
2. Connectivity: India reiterated that connectivity initiatives must respect national sovereignty and territorial integrity, reflecting its concerns over projects such as CPEC passing through Pakistan occupied Kashmir (MEA, 2026).
3. Trade and economic cooperation: Modi highlighted India’s 7.8% GDP growth and called for stronger intra SCO trade and greater representation for the Global South in international institutions (PIB, 2026).
4. Energy: Energy cooperation featured in India’s bilateral discussions, including the India Uzbekistan framework for long term uranium supplies and the Modi Putin talks on energy, defence and trade (MEA, 2026; PIB, 2026).
5. Digital cooperation: India supported greater digital cooperation within the SCO and highlighted its Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI), including UPI, as a potential area for knowledge sharing and cooperation with Central Asian countries. However, DPI and UPI remain Indian proposals for cooperation rather than established SCO-wide programmes (MEA, 2026).
6. Afghanistan and regional stability: India supported the use of the SCO Regional Anti Terrorist Structure (RATS) for counter terrorism cooperation and highlighted concerns over security threats linked to Afghanistan (MEA, 2026).
India’s Engagement with SCO Members
1. Russia: Modi met Vladimir Putin on the summit’s sidelines, discussing defence, energy, trade and space cooperation. Modi also called for a peaceful resolution to the Ukraine conflict. The leaders discussed Putin’s forthcoming visit to India for the BRICS Summit (PM India, 2026; MEA, 2026).
2. Uzbekistan and Central Asia: Before travelling to Bishkek, Modi visited Tashkent, where India and Uzbekistan elevated their relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. They set a $5 billion bilateral trade target for 2030 and agreed on uranium supplies, mining, education and connectivity cooperation. In Bishkek, Modi also met Kyrgyz President Sadyr Zhaparov to strengthen their Strategic Partnership (PM India, 2026; MEA, 2026).
3. China: Modi and Xi Jinping interacted publicly at the summit, marking their first encounter since Tianjin in 2025. India again emphasised sovereignty and territorial integrity in its connectivity position (MEA, 2026).
4. Pakistan: No bilateral meeting took place between Modi and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. India’s engagement with Pakistan centred on Modi’s remarks on terrorism and counter terrorism cooperation (MEA, 2026).
5. Other engagements: Modi also held meetings with the leaders of Iran and Armenia on the sidelines, using the summit to advance India’s wider regional diplomatic engagement (PM India, 2026).
Performance
1. Security cooperation: The Regional Anti Terrorist Structure (RATS), based in Tashkent since 2002, is the SCO’s main counter terrorism mechanism. It maintains databases on terrorist suspects and banned organisations and supports intelligence sharing and joint exercises. India chaired the RATS Council from October 2021 and hosted the Manesar Anti Terror Joint Exercise in 2021. However, assessments by the Observer Research Foundation have highlighted limitations in RATS’ ability to address terrorism linked to the Pakistan Afghanistan region, an issue India continues to raise (Indian Defence Review, 2026; ORF, 2026).
2. Economic and trade cooperation: The SCO represents around 40% of the world’s population and about 30% of global GDP, but economic integration remains limited. India’s trade with Central Asia remains modest, prompting New Delhi to pursue bilateral initiatives such as the $5 billion India Uzbekistan trade target for 2030. During India’s 2022 to 2023 SCO chairship, it organised 134 meetings and 14 ministerial level gatherings and introduced new areas of cooperation covering startups, traditional medicine, digital inclusion and youth (WION, 2026; MEA, 2026; PIB, 2023).
3. Connectivity: Chabahar Port remains central to India’s effort to improve access to Central Asia and Russia through the International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC). Container traffic increased from around 9,000 TEUs in FY2023 to more than 64,000 in FY2024 and around 80,000 in FY2025. However, delays in the Chabahar Zahedan railway project demonstrate the continuing gap between connectivity plans and implementation (Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways, 2025).
4. Institutional mechanisms: India has strengthened its institutional engagement through the SCO Startup Forum, the Special Working Group on Startups and Innovation, and cooperation on traditional medicine and digital technologies. The Startup Forum has held three editions since 2020, creating a sustained platform for interaction among entrepreneurs and policymakers from SCO countries (DPIIT, 2026).
5. Overall implementation: India’s engagement shows stronger progress in institutional and people centred initiatives than in physical connectivity and security outcomes. Platforms such as the Startup Forum and new SCO cooperation pillars have developed steadily, while projects linked to the INSTC and Chabahar railway remain incomplete. Similarly, limitations in RATS’ response to cross border terrorism continue to constrain security cooperation (MEA, 2026; ORF, 2026).
Impact on India’s Regional Strategy
1. Eurasian engagement: The Bishkek summit reinforced the SCO as a key platform for India to engage Russia, China and Central Asia within a single forum. Modi’s “Security, Connectivity, Opportunity” approach builds on the SECURE framework adopted during India’s 2023 SCO chairship (MEA, 2026; PIB, 2026).
2. Strategic autonomy: India’s SCO participation reflects its multi alignment strategy. While maintaining ties with Russia, India continues to strengthen partnerships such as the Quad. Its engagement with both Western and Eurasian groupings allows New Delhi to protect its strategic interests without aligning exclusively with any bloc (Vision IAS, 2026).
3. Central Asian outreach: The summit strengthened India’s long standing Connect Central Asia Policy, launched in 2012. The elevation of India Uzbekistan relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, alongside a $5 billion trade target and uranium supply framework, indicates a shift towards more substantive economic and strategic cooperation (MEA, 2026; PM India, 2026).
4. Connectivity and market access: India continues to oppose connectivity projects that do not respect sovereignty and territorial integrity, particularly China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Through Chabahar Port and the International North South Transport Corridor, India seeks direct access to Central Asian and Russian markets without relying on routes through Pakistan (MEA, 2026; MoPSW, 2025).
5. Energy security: The uranium supply framework with Uzbekistan broadens India’s nuclear fuel partnerships, while continued energy cooperation with Russia supports diversification of India’s energy sources. Together, these initiatives strengthen India’s energy security and strategic flexibility (MEA, 2026; PM India, 2026).
6. Global governance: India’s support for UN reform and a more representative and multipolar international order at the Bishkek summit extends its broader Global South agenda into the SCO. This strengthens India’s effort to position itself as a voice for developing countries in global institutions (PIB, 2026; MEA, 2026).
Emerging Issues
1. India China tensions: Despite the 2024 understanding on disengagement and the resumption of the Kailash Manasarovar Yatra, India has maintained that some issues along the LAC remain unresolved. Modi’s emphasis on sovereignty in connectivity at Bishkek also reflected continuing differences over CPEC and the Belt and Road Initiative (MEA, 2026).
2. India Pakistan differences: No bilateral meeting took place between Modi and Shehbaz Sharif at Bishkek. India’s emphasis on eliminating terrorist financing, recruitment and safe havens reflected its continuing concerns over Pakistan’s role in cross border terrorism. These differences limit the scope for bilateral cooperation within the SCO’s security mechanisms (MEA, 2026).
3. Divergent interests: SCO members have different strategic priorities. Russia and China favour stronger multipolar and non Western positioning, while India avoids bloc politics and Central Asian states generally prioritise sovereignty, stability and economic interests. These differences can limit consensus on contentious geopolitical issues (Al Jazeera, 2026).
4. Connectivity constraints: India’s access to Central Asia remains restricted by the lack of transit through Pakistan, increasing its dependence on routes through Iran. Chabahar and the International North South Transport Corridor provide alternatives, but delays in the Chabahar Zahedan railway continue to affect their effectiveness (MoPSW, 2025).
5. Limited economic integration: Despite the SCO’s large combined economic weight, intra SCO trade remains relatively limited for India. There is no SCO wide free trade agreement, with most economic cooperation proceeding through bilateral arrangements such as India’s $5 billion trade target with Uzbekistan by 2030 (MEA, 2026).
6. Implementation gaps: The SCO’s consensus based structure can make implementation slower than the adoption of declarations. Security cooperation through RATS continues alongside unresolved concerns over cross border terrorism, while several connectivity commitments remain incomplete. This highlights the gap between SCO commitments and their delivery on the ground (ORF, 2026; MEA, 2026; MoPSW, 2025).
Way Forward
India should deepen practical engagement with Central Asian members by building on the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership established with Uzbekistan in 2026. Regular foreign minister level coordination with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan can help sustain cooperation between high level visits and translate political engagement into long term economic and strategic partnerships (MEA, 2026).
Connectivity should be made more efficient by accelerating the Chabahar Zahedan rail project and expanding the use of Chabahar Port. India should also work with partner countries to simplify customs procedures and improve logistics along the International North South Transport Corridor, strengthening access to Central Asian and Russian markets (MoPSW, 2025; MEA, 2026).
India should expand energy, trade and technology cooperation across the SCO. The uranium supply framework with Uzbekistan could support similar partnerships with other resource rich members, while India’s experience with the SCO Startup Forum and Digital Public Infrastructure can be developed into wider regional cooperation. A common framework for tracking trade, investment and technology initiatives would also improve outcomes (MEA, 2026; DPIIT, 2026).
Finally, the SCO should focus more strongly on implementation. India can advocate measurable timelines, annual reviews and clearer accountability for commitments under the Bishkek Declaration. Strengthening RATS cooperation on terrorist financing and safe havens, while monitoring progress on connectivity and economic initiatives, would help narrow the gap between SCO declarations and outcomes (ORF, 2026; MEA, 2026; PIB, 2023).
References
Al Jazeera. (2026, September 3). Kyrgyzstan hosts a pivotal SCO summit amid global geopolitical shifts. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/3/kyrgyzstan-hosts-pivotal-sco-summit-amid-global-geopolitical-shifts
Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade, Government of India. (n.d.). SCO Startup Forum. Startup India. https://www.startupindia.gov.in/content/sih/en/sco.html
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (2026, January). Brief on India–Uzbekistan bilateral relations. https://meacms.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-Uzbekistan-jan-2026.pdf
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (2026, September 1). English translation of Prime Minister’s statement at the 26th SCO Summit, September 1, 2026. https://www.mea.gov.in/speeches-statements?dtl/41726/English_Translation_of_Prime_Ministers_Statement_at_the_26th_SCO_Summit_September_1_2026
Observer Research Foundation. (2021). India’s unaddressed concerns from the SCO RATS summit. https://www.orfonline.org/research/indias-unaddressed-concerns-from-the-sco-rats-summit
Press Information Bureau, Government of India. (2026, September 1). Prime Minister participates in the 26th SCO Summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseDetail.aspx?PRID=2305735
Prime Minister’s Office, Government of India. (2026, August 30). Visit of PM to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyz Republic (29 August–1 September 2026). PM India. https://www.pmindia.gov.in/?p=16912158
Prime Minister’s Office, Government of India. (2026, August 31). The Prime Minister meets the President of the Russian Federation in Bishkek. PM India. https://www.pmindia.gov.in/?p=16915322
Prime Minister’s Office, Government of India. (2026, August 30). PM holds official talks on his state visit to Uzbekistan. PM India. https://www.pmindia.gov.in/?p=16912969
About the Contributor
Pragya Raghav is pursuing a B.A. (Hons.) in History at Mata Sundri College for Women, University of Delhi, with a minor in Political Science. She is passionate about public policy, international relations, governance, climate policy, and sustainable development. Through research and policy analysis, she aims to contribute to evidence-based policymaking and create meaningful social impact.
Acknowledgement
I sincerely thank IMPRI (Impact and Policy Research Institute) for providing me with the opportunity to work on this policy update on the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and India’s engagement with the Eurasian region. I am grateful to the mentors and the IMPRI team for their valuable guidance, feedback and encouragement throughout the research process. This experience has helped me strengthen my research, analytical and policy writing skills while deepening my understanding of India’s role in regional and multilateral affairs.
Disclaimer : The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policies, or positions of IMPRI (Impact and Policy Research Institute) or any other affiliated organisation.
Reviewers: Kaustav Majumdar and Divya Natarajan
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