Policy Update
Ninchen Tamang
Background
The Teesta is a 414-kilometre transboundary river originating from the Pahunri (Teesta Kangse) glacier in the Sikkim Himalaya. It flows through Sikkim and West Bengal before entering Bangladesh, where it eventually joins the Brahmaputra. The river is joined by tributaries such as the Rangeet. The Teesta is a fast-flowing Himalayan river characterised by high velocities, heavy sediment loads and seasonal fluctuations in discharge.
The Indian portion of the basin covers approximately 9,855 sq. km across Sikkim and West Bengal, while the entire basin covers around 12,540 sq. km across India and Bangladesh. Most rainfall occurs during the monsoon, mainly between May and early October, with July generally being the wettest month (Central Water Commission [CWC]). Approximately 83% of the catchment lies in India and 17% in Bangladesh, although estimates vary according to how the basin is defined (Observer Research Foundation [ORF], 2016).
The central dispute concerns the allocation of water during the dry season. From approximately October or November to April, river flows decline sharply, while irrigation demand rises in both countries. The issue is therefore how to allocate inadequate lean-season flows while protecting agriculture, ecosystems and infrastructure. Bangladesh sought 50% of the Teesta’s dry-season flow, particularly between December and May, while India claimed 55% (ORF, 2016).
The dispute predates Bangladesh’s independence. India and East Pakistan discussed Teesta development during the 1950s and 1960s. After Bangladesh became independent, the India-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission (JRC) was established in 1972 as the bilateral mechanism for cooperation on shared rivers. Technical and ministerial discussions led to an ad hoc arrangement in 1983, under which India received 39%, Bangladesh 36%, and 25% remained unallocated. The arrangement was temporary and never became a treaty (Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO], 1983).
In 2011, the two countries reportedly developed a proposed interim formula allocating 42.5% to India, 37.5% to Bangladesh and 20% unallocated. The proposal was not signed because of opposition from the West Bengal government (Ministry of External Affairs [MEA], 2011).
The Teesta remains economically and politically important. In Bangladesh, it supports irrigation and rural livelihoods, particularly in Rangpur. In India, it is linked to irrigation, hydropower and regional development in Sikkim and northern West Bengal. The dispute has therefore become a bilateral issue shaped by India’s federal political structure. Despite improvements in India-Bangladesh relations, no Teesta water-sharing agreement has been concluded overall.
Functioning
The mechanism for the Teesta dispute is the India-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission (JRC), established in 1972. The JRC provides a forum for discussing shared rivers, exchanging information and considering possible water-sharing arrangements. Its consensus-based approach has kept negotiations open, but it lacks an enforcement mechanism to impose a settlement or overcome domestic objections.
Teesta negotiations operate at several levels. Experts and officials have examined river flows, irrigation requirements and allocation principles, while water-resources secretaries and ministers have considered draft arrangements politically. At the 37th JRC meeting in March 2010, both countries presented principles for interim dry-season sharing and agreed that their water-resources secretaries would examine them further (MEA, 2010).
The 1983 arrangement was an interim measure rather than a treaty. It allocated 39% of the water to India, 36% to Bangladesh and left 25% unallocated while studies were conducted. Later negotiations sought a durable framework. The 2011 proposal was intended to operate as a 15-year agreement, but it was never signed and therefore acquired no legal force.
Subsequent engagement produced commitments but no treaty. In 2021, Bangladesh again requested the conclusion of the interim Teesta agreement, while Prime Minister Narendra Modi reiterated India’s continuing efforts to reach an agreement in consultation with stakeholders. (MEA, 2021).
Data exchange has also been part of the process. The MEA recorded that India and Bangladesh exchanged Teesta flow data at Dalia and all Gazaldoba during a technical meeting. However, data cooperation has not resolved disagreements over the allocation formula. Outstanding issues include the period covered, measurement stations, environmental requirements and the management of shortages during exceptionally low-flow years (MEA, 2013).
The Teesta process can therefore be described as institutionally continuous but substantively inconclusive. The JRC and associated technical forums have sustained diplomatic engagement, but they have not produced a binding treaty, a permanent minimum-flow guarantee or an enforceable monitoring mechanism. The negotiations thus represent a failure of outcome rather than a failure of diplomacy.
Performance
The Teesta issue has yet to result in a legally binding water-sharing agreement between India and Bangladesh. Consequently, its performance cannot be measured through treaty implementation or compliance. Instead, it can be evaluated by examining the progress of negotiations and the effectiveness of interim and cooperative measures. The 1983 arrangement provided for temporary dry-season water distribution, but it was not developed into a permanent agreement. Negotiations in 2010–2011 also produced a draft framework. However, the proposed arrangement was never finalised or implemented.
The prolonged negotiations have therefore fallen short of delivering a predictable and enforceable system for managing dry-season flows. Political opposition within India, particularly from West Bengal, has been a significant factor behind the continuing impasse. In response, Bangladesh has maintained its demand for a more equitable and reliable allocation while also considering alternative approaches, including cooperation with China on the Comprehensive Management and Restoration of the Teesta River Project.
More recently, the discourse has expanded beyond the question of water allocation to broader river-basin management and conservation. India has indicated willingness to provide technical assistance and engage through expert-level consultations. The Teesta question has also increasingly been discussed within the wider framework of India–Bangladesh water cooperation, including the future of the 1996 Ganges Water Treaty.
Despite progress in other areas of bilateral relations, the unresolved Teesta question continues to create friction and public mistrust. For Bangladesh, the river is closely connected to agriculture, livelihoods, food security and climate vulnerability, making the dispute both a resource-management challenge and a wider political and developmental concern.
Source: Compiled by the author from FAOLEX, PIB and MEA
Impact
Bangladesh
The absence of a dry-season arrangement creates uncertainty for Bangladesh’s Teesta Barrage Project and farmers in the districts. Its performance depends on the volume and timing of water entering Bangladesh. Reduced dry-season flows and monsoon flooding increase pressure on agriculture and livelihoods.
The dispute has political and perceptual consequences. In northern Bangladesh, water scarcity is often framed in terms of upstream control and “water aggression”. Public criticism links the Teesta to livelihood insecurity and concerns about India’s river management. These perceptions matter diplomatically, although the causes of changing flows remain contested.
India
In India, impacts are concentrated in Sikkim and northern West Bengal. The West Bengal government identifies the Teesta Barrage Project as having irrigation potential of 9.22 lakh hectares and 67.50 MW of hydropower potential from canal falls (Department of Irrigation and Waterways, Government of West Bengal). These interests explain resistance to arrangements that could reduce supplies.
The challenge reflects concerns over irrigation, regional development and cost distribution within West Bengal. A larger Bangladeshi share would require mechanisms for managing shortages in northern Bengal.
Chinese angle
China’s involvement adds another dimension. In June 2026, Bangladesh and China agreed to strengthen cooperation on Teesta management and support experts in expediting a feasibility study for the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project (The Hindu, 2026).
This should not be characterised as a Chinese takeover or established military foothold. Chinese technical and financial involvement provides Bangladesh with an alternative channel for river-management infrastructure, while increasing India’s threat perception due to Teesta’s proximity to the Siliguri region. India’s MEA has stated that developments concerning the project will be considered within its approach to the Teesta issue (MEA, 2026).
Emerging Issues
The Teesta basin faces changing precipitation patterns, glacier and snowmelt, intense rainfall, landslides, floods and glacial-lake outburst floods (GLOFs). These risks are compounded by hydropower development, riverbank encroachment and pressure from expanding settlements and agriculture.
The October 2023 GLOF exposed the vulnerability of the basin’s hydropower infrastructure and downstream settlements. The failure of the Teesta Stage-III dam intensified flooding and raised concerns about dam-site assessment, ecological vulnerability and disaster preparedness. Sikkim has several operational hydropower projects, including the 1,200 MW Teesta Stage-III and 510 MW Teesta Stage-V, alongside projects under development. The changing geological and climatic conditions underline the need for stronger dam-safety assessments, real-time monitoring, early-warning systems and climate-resilient infrastructure planning (The Print, 2025).
Environmental and community concerns have also intensified. In July 2026, the Affected Citizens of Teesta (ACT) organised a four-day “Teesta Rights” march to highlight environmental and safety concerns associated with hydropower development. Following an accident at an NHPC project in Namchi district, ACT called for fresh Environmental and Social Impact Assessments, arguing that the 2023 GLOF had altered the basin’s ecological and geological conditions. The episode reflects growing demands for greater environmental scrutiny and community participation (The Hindu, 2026).
Meanwhile, hydrological risks remain evident downstream. On 5 August 2026, the Teesta crossed the danger mark at Dalia in Lalmonirhat, with the recorded level reaching 52.21 metres against a threshold of 52.15 metres. Persistent rainfall and upstream runoff raised concerns about flash flooding, prompting increased monitoring and preparedness measures (Dhaka Tribune, 2026).
The basin also faces competing demands from agriculture, urbanisation and industry. Expanding dry-season cultivation increases pressure on already limited lean-season flows. The response therefore cannot rely solely on allocating more water. Improving irrigation efficiency, maintaining canals, reducing conveyance losses, regulating groundwater use and promoting suitable crop patterns are equally important.
At the same time, monsoon floods cause erosion and displacement. Bangladesh’s Water Development Board data indicate significant riverbank erosion affecting communities in districts including Nilphamari, Rangpur, Lalmonirhat, Kurigram and Gaibandha (Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha, 2025). These pressures demonstrate that the Teesta requires an integrated basin-management approach rather than a narrow focus on water-sharing.
Way Forward
A durable Teesta settlement should move beyond a fixed percentage formula and establish a climate-resilient basin-management framework. The immediate objective should be an interim, reviewable agreement based on updated hydrological data. This should establish provisional shares, minimum ecological flows and specific rules for drought or exceptionally low-flow years. The reported 2011 formula can serve as a negotiating reference point, but it should not be treated as a binding or automatically renewable arrangement.
A dedicated Teesta technical mechanism under the JRC could provide continuity between political negotiations. It should meet regularly and report to the ministerial-level JRC, with a mandate covering water allocation, irrigation, hydropower, floods, sediment, groundwater and ecological requirements.
Both countries should also establish a joint hydrological data system. Automated gauges at agreed locations, including Gazaldoba and Dalia, should be standardised and linked to a shared monitoring platform. During floods, operational data should be exchanged in near real time, while regular flow data should be shared during normal periods. Independent verification and, where security considerations permit, public disclosure would improve trust. Previous data exchanges demonstrate that cooperation is possible, but information-sharing must now support a jointly accepted allocation framework.
Cooperation should also extend beyond water allocation. Joint flood forecasting, sediment management, wetland conservation, fisheries protection and climate-risk mapping could generate immediate benefits while negotiations continue. Benefit-sharing mechanisms could include irrigation-efficiency investments, hydropower cooperation and jointly developed infrastructure.
Local participation is equally important. Farmers, water-user associations, local governments, environmental groups and technical experts from Sikkim, West Bengal and northern Bangladesh should have a structured role in consultations. This would improve the domestic legitimacy of any eventual agreement and make implementation more responsive to local needs.
The central lesson is that the Teesta cannot be stabilised through allocation percentages alone. A workable settlement must combine predictable minimum flows, transparent data, adaptive drought provisions, efficient water use, local participation and cooperation on floods and ecological restoration. Such an approach could transform the Teesta from a recurring source of diplomatic friction into a practical model of transboundary river-basin governance.
References
Central Water Commission. (n.d.). About basins: Teesta Basin. Government of India. https://www.cwc.gov.in/tbo/about-basins
Department of Irrigation and Waterways, Government of West Bengal. (n.d.). Teesta Barrage Project. https://iwd.wb.gov.in/Teesta_Barrage_Project
Government of India. (n.d.). [Lok Sabha document on interim sharing of Teesta River waters]. Parliament Digital Library. https://eparlib.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/582094/1/86517.pdf
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (2010, March 19). India–Bangladesh 37th Joint Rivers Commission. https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/1122/IndiaBangladesh+37th+Joint+Rivers+Commission
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (2011, September 5). Media briefing by Foreign Secretary on Prime Minister’s visit to Bangladesh. https://www.mea.gov.in/outoging-visit-detail.htm?3017/Media+Briefing+by+Foreign+Secretary+on+PMs+visit+to+Bangladesh
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (2013, February 16). External Affairs Minister’s media statement following the 2nd meeting of the India–Bangladesh Joint Consultative Commission. https://www.mea.gov.in/speeches-statements.htm?dtl/21180/External_Affairs_Ministers_media_statement_following_the_2nd_meeting_of_the_IndiaBangladesh+Joint+Consultative+Commission
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (2021, March 27). Joint statement issued on the occasion of the visit of Prime Minister of India to Bangladesh. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents?dtl/33746/
The Hindu. (2026, July 3). We will factor all related developments in overall approach to Teesta issue: MEA. The Hindu.
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. (1983). Agreement on ad hoc sharing of the Teesta waters. FAOLEX. https://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/bi-17927.pdf
ORF. (2016, September 21). The Teesta water dispute: Geopolitics, myth and economics. Observer Research Foundation. https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-teesta-water-dispute-geopolitics-myth-and-economics
The Business Standard. (2026, July 2). China reiterates support for Teesta project; envoy says Beijing’s position unchanged. https://www.tbsnews.net/foreign-policy/china-reiterates-support-teesta-project-envoy-says-beijings-position-unchanged
The Diplomat. (2026, May 19). With an “obstacle” gone, will the Indian government finally seal the Teesta deal with Bangladesh?https://thediplomat.com/2026/05/with-an-obstacle-gone-will-the-indian-government-finally-seal-the-teesta-deal-with-bangladesh/
The Hindu. (2026, June 25). Bangladesh–China agree to strengthen cooperation on Teesta river management: Report. https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/bangladesh-china-agree-to-strengthen-teesta-river-management-report/article71145876.ece
The Hindu. (2024, June 30). What is holding up the Teesta treaty?https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/what-is-holding-up-the-teesta-treaty-explained/article68349392.ece/amp/
The Hindu. (2026). Sikkim green group announces ‘Save Teesta’ foot march. The Hindu.https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/sikkim/sikkim-green-group-announces-save-teesta-foot-march/article71257891.ece
United News of Bangladesh. (2026, June 26). China to support Bangladesh’s Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project. https://unb.com.bd/category/Bangladesh/will-support-bangladeshs-teesta-river-comprehensive-management-restoration-project-china/189204
Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha. (2025, October 30). Northern agriculture faces threat due to severe water scarcity in Teesta. https://www.bssnews.net/news/326671
The Times of India. (2026). Urgent flood threats from Teesta River in India and Bangladesh during monsoon season. The Times of India.
The Print. (2026). Teesta River floods: Sikkim, West Bengal, climate change. ThePrint.
Dhaka Tribune. (2026, August 5). Teesta flows above danger level in Lalmonirhat; flash flood feared within 48 hours. Dhaka Tribune.
https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/nation/416796/teesta-flows-above-danger-level-in-lalmonirhat
The Wire. (2026, May 12). Hope to revive Teesta deal rekindled as BJP forms government in West Bengal. https://thewire.in/diplomacy/hope-to-revive-teesta-deal-rekindled-as-bjp-forms-government-in-west-bengal
About the Contributor
Ninchen Tamang is a Research & Editorial intern at Impact and Policy Research Institute (IMPRI). She holds a Master’s degree in Political Science, with primary research interests spanning geopolitics, international relations, foreign policy, and South Asian studies.
Acknowledgement
The author extends sincere gratitude to the Impact and Policy Research Institute (IMPRI) team for their expert guidance and constructive feedback throughout the process.
Disclaimer
All views expressed in the article belong solely to the author and not necessarily to the organization.
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