India in the Pacific: The Forum for India–Pacific Islands Cooperation (FIPIC) (2023)

Policy Update

Lubina Dua

 Background

The fourteen Pacific Island Countries (PICs) occupy less than 0.4% of the world’s land area, yet their combined Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) cover close to one-fifth of the Earth’s surface. Their strategic location astride critical sea lanes, their vast maritime resources, and their fourteen votes in the United Nations General Assembly have transformed a region once considered peripheral into one of the most actively contested diplomatic spaces of the decade. It is in this region that India has built the Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation (FIPIC), its principal institutional vehicle for engagement with the Pacific (ICWA, 2023). 

FIPIC was launched in November 2014, when Prime Minister Narendra Modi met the heads of state and government of all fourteen PICs in Suva, Fiji, and proposed a regular summit-level dialogue as part of India’s Act East Policy (Ministry of External Affairs [MEA], 2023). The grouping comprises India and the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.

India’s connection with the region predates FIPIC by more than a century. Indian indentured labourers were taken to Fiji by British colonial administrators in the nineteenth century, and persons of Indian origin today constitute a substantial share of Fiji’s population, giving India a durable cultural anchor in the region. Yet for most of the post-independence period, the Pacific ranked low in India’s foreign policy priorities, and engagement remained largely confined to Fiji.

The third FIPIC Summit, held in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, on 22 May 2023 and co-hosted by Prime Minister Modi and Prime Minister James Marape, marked the most substantive upgrade of this relationship to date. At the summit, Prime Minister Modi announced a 12-point action plan spanning health, education, technology, renewable energy, and small enterprise development (MEA, 2023).

Notably, the summit took place on the same day that the United States held its own high-level engagement with Pacific leaders in the same city, underlining that India’s outreach is unfolding within a wider great-power contest for influence in the Pacific triggered in large part by China’s expanding presence, including the China-Solomon Islands Framework Agreement on Security Cooperation signed in April 2022 (Indian Council of World Affairs [ICWA], 2023).

Functioning

FIPIC functions as a summit-driven development partnership rather than a treaty-based organisation. It has no permanent secretariat; momentum is sustained through periodic leaders’ summits, foreign ministers’ meetings on the margins of the UN General Assembly, and project-level implementation through India’s development cooperation instruments.

Table 1: Institutional Evolution of FIPIC

Source: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India (2023); Indian Council of World Affairs (2019); Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Fiji (2025)

The centrepiece of FIPIC’s current work programme is the 12-point action plan announced at Port Moresby:

Table 2: The FIPIC III 12-Point Action Plan (2023) 

Source: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India (2023); Prime Minister’s Office (2023)

Beyond the action plan, India’s engagement operates through the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme for training and scholarships, Grant-in-Aid community development projects in each PIC, Lines of Credit for infrastructure and renewable energy, hydrographic and maritime cooperation through the Indian Navy, and scientific collaboration such as the Sustainable Coastal and Ocean Research Institute (SCORI) established at the University of the South Pacific in Fiji with Indian assistance (MEA, 2023). India also set up a dedicated Indo-Pacific Wing in the Ministry of External Affairs in April 2019, giving the Pacific a distinct bureaucratic home within Indian foreign policy (ICWA, 2019).

Performance

Assessed against its own stated objectives, FIPIC’s performance presents a mixed but improving picture.

The forum’s most visible achievement has been the continuity of high-level political engagement. Three leaders’ summits, a dedicated leaders’ meeting at the 2019 UN General Assembly, and a Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on the margins of UNGA80 in September 2025 have kept the Pacific on India’s diplomatic agenda for more than a decade. At the September 2025 meeting in New York, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar stated that the 12-point action plan was progressing well and described it as people-centric, with a focus on health, technology, capacity building, and training (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fiji, 2025).

The meeting also reflected growing regional confidence in India’s development partnership. Fiji’s Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs noted that Fiji leads the Pacific in the number of India-funded collaborations and projects (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fiji, 2025).

Implementation of earlier commitments provides a partial record of delivery. The USD 12 million grant announced in 2019 (USD 1 million per country) was designed to support country-selected high-impact development projects, while the USD 150 million concessional Line of Credit was earmarked for renewable energy and climate-related initiatives (ICWA, 2019). Under the FIPIC framework, India has supplied election materials to Fiji and Papua New Guinea, established Centres of Excellence in Information Technology, delivered anti-retroviral drugs worth USD 3 million to Papua New Guinea, and provided computers and peripherals worth USD 760,000 to the Government of Papua New Guinea under regional grant assistance (MEA, 2023).

Despite these achievements, the gap between announcements and implementation remains FIPIC’s principal performance challenge. There is no publicly available consolidated implementation report tracking the 12-point action plan, and summit scheduling has been irregular. FIPIC III, originally envisaged for 2020, was held only in 2023, while no date for FIPIC IV had been formally announced as of mid-2026. India’s annual trade with the fourteen Pacific Island Countries also remains modest at approximately USD 300 million, significantly lower than the region’s trade with Australia and China (FICCI, 2015).

Impact

Strategic positioning in a contested region

FIPIC’s most significant impact has been in strengthening India’s strategic presence in the Pacific. China’s signing of the Security Cooperation Framework Agreement with the Solomon Islands in April 2022 heightened concerns among regional and extra-regional powers and accelerated diplomatic competition across the Pacific (ICWA, 2023). Between 2006 and 2022, Chinese lending to Pacific Island states exceeded USD 1 billion, raising concerns over debt sustainability in several recipient economies.

Against this backdrop, India has deliberately positioned FIPIC as a non-conditional, demand-driven development partnership. This distinction was evident during the Port Moresby summit in May 2023, where India’s announcements on health and social sector cooperation were received positively, while the parallel US engagement, centred on a defence cooperation agreement with Papua New Guinea—triggered student protests (ICWA, 2023).

Global South leadership

FIPIC has also emerged as an important instrument of India’s broader Global South outreach. Pacific leaders participated in the Voice of the Global South Summit convened by India in January 2023 (MEA, 2023). India has consistently highlighted Pacific concerns, particularly climate vulnerability, in multilateral forums, including through the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI) and the International Solar Alliance.

Diplomatic returns

India’s approach has generated tangible diplomatic goodwill. During FIPIC III, Fiji and Papua New Guinea conferred their highest civilian honours on the Indian Prime Minister, reflecting the strength of bilateral relations (MEA, 2023). Pacific Island Countries have also consistently supported India’s multilateral aspirations, including its candidature for non-permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council (MEA, 2023).

Reinforcement of Indo-Pacific coalitions

FIPIC also complements India’s wider Indo-Pacific strategy. It reinforces India’s participation in the Quad, whose May 2023 Leaders’ Summit announced Pacific-focused initiatives such as an Open Radio Access Network in Palau, while aligning closely with the objectives of India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (MEA, 2023).

Emerging Issues

1. The announcement-implementation gap. FIPIC’s credibility increasingly depends on visible delivery of the 12-point action plan, yet there is no standardised public reporting on project status, disbursement, or completion timelines. In a region saturated with competing donor promises, undelivered commitments carry reputational cost. 

Suggestion: The MEA’s Indo-Pacific Division should publish an annual FIPIC implementation report with project-wise status, expenditure, and completion timelines, mirroring the transparency practices of India’s Development Partnership Administration.

2. Irregular summit rhythm and absent institutional machinery. Three summits in twelve years, with an eight-year gap between the second and third, reflect the absence of institutionalised machinery. FIPIC has no secretariat, no sectoral working groups, and no standing officials’ track between summits. 

Suggestion: Institutionalise FIPIC as a biennial summit supported by annual senior officials’ meetings and standing working groups on climate resilience, health, digital cooperation, and maritime security.

3. Scale asymmetry with competing partners. India’s annual trade of about USD 300 million with the PICs (FICCI, 2015) and grant outlays in the low tens of millions are modest compared to the resources deployed by China, Australia, and the United States. India cannot win a spending contest and should not attempt one. 

Suggestion: Concentrate resources on domains where India enjoys comparative advantage and high visibility per rupee spent: pharmaceuticals and affordable healthcare, digital public infrastructure, space-based remote sensing services, and capacity building, rather than capital-intensive infrastructure.

4. Climate credibility as the entry price of Pacific diplomacy. For PICs, climate change is not one issue among many but the existential frame through which all partnerships are judged. India’s renewable energy initiatives are well received, but its coal-dependent energy profile invites scrutiny. 

Suggestion: Front-load climate-facing deliverables, including expanded International Solar Alliance projects, early-warning systems under the India-UN Development Partnership Fund, and disaster-resilient infrastructure support through CDRI, and report their outcomes prominently at each FIPIC meeting.

5. Maritime domain awareness and security expectations. As illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing and transnational trafficking grow in the PICs’ vast EEZs, demand for maritime domain awareness support is rising. India has relevant capabilities, including satellite remote sensing and the Information Fusion Centre-Indian Ocean Region. Still, its security footprint in the Pacific is minimal, and PICs are wary of securitised partnerships. 

Suggestion: Offer maritime domain awareness as a civilian, capacity-building service, including satellite data access, hydrography, and coast guard training, delivered bilaterally on request, avoiding the securitised framing that has generated local resistance to other powers’ initiatives.

6. Absence of a dedicated Pacific development window. FIPIC commitments are financed through general MEA aid budget lines, which limits predictability and multi-year planning.

Suggestion: Create a dedicated Pacific window within India’s development partnership budget with a protected multi-year allocation, enabling PIC governments to plan against assured Indian commitments.

Way Forward

FIPIC has given India something it lacked before 2014: a standing institutional presence in a region that has become a live theatre of strategic competition. The forum’s people-centric, non-conditional model is well matched to Pacific sensibilities and clearly differentiated from both Chinese lending and Western security-first engagement. The 12-point action plan, if delivered visibly and on time, can consolidate India’s reputation as a reliable partner at comparatively modest cost.

The honest assessment, however, is that FIPIC remains a promising framework operating below its potential. Its summits are too infrequent, its delivery too opaque, and its resourcing too thin to match the intensity of the contest now underway in the Pacific. The measures that would change this are institutional rather than financial: a regular summit calendar, a standing officials’ track, transparent implementation reporting, and a protected budget line.

The Pacific Island Countries have made clear that they do not wish to choose between suitors; they seek partners who respect their priorities, deliver what they promise, and treat them, in Prime Minister Modi’s formulation at Port Moresby, as large ocean states rather than small island states. India’s advantage in this contest lies not in outspending its competitors but in the credibility of its delivery. Converting FIPIC from a summit series into a functioning institution is the single most consequential step India can take to secure its place in the Pacific.

References

Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry. (2015). Business Accelerator for the Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation (FIPIC). https://ficci.in

Indian Council of World Affairs. (2019, November). India’s outreach to the island nations: Summits with CARICOM and the FIPIC. https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=4777&lid=2803

Indian Council of World Affairs. (2023). FIPIC III: Enhancing India’s engagement with Pacific Islands. https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=9468&lid=6142

Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (2023, May 22). English translation of Prime Minister’s opening statement at the FIPIC III Summit. https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/36587

Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (2023, May 22). English translation of Prime Minister’s closing statement at the FIPIC III Summit. https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/36588

Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (2023, May 20). Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/36571

Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (2023, October). India-Papua New Guinea bilateral brief. https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/PNG-bilateral_brief-2023.pdf

Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (2023, October). India-Federated States of Micronesia bilateral relations. https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-_Federated_States_of_Micronesia_Otober_23.pdf

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Fiji. (2025, September 25). Fiji was represented at the Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation (FIPIC) meeting at the UNGA80. https://www.foreignaffairs.gov.fj/fiji-represented-at-the-forum-for-india-pacific-islands-cooperation-fipic-meeting-at-the-unga80/

National Maritime Foundation. (2025, June). Leveraging FIPIC for India’s Indo-Pacific ambitions. https://maritimeindia.org/leveraging-fipic-for-indias-indo-pacific-ambitions/

News On Air, Prasar Bharati. (2025, September 25). EAM S. Jaishankar hosts FIPIC Foreign Ministers Meeting in New York. https://www.newsonair.gov.in/eam-s-jaishankar-hosts-fipic-foreign-ministers-meeting-in-new-york/

Ministry of External Affairs Official Portal: https://www.mea.gov.in

Prime Minister’s Office, India: https://www.pmindia.gov.in

About the Contributor

Lubina Dua has a strong interest in public policy and governance. She has represented India at the Harvard Conference on Asian and International Relations (HPAIR) and participated in the World Bank Youth Summit. Her work focuses on institutional design, welfare delivery, and evidence-based policymaking. 

Acknowledgement:

The author extends sincere thanks to the IMPRI team for their guidance.

Disclaimer:

All views expressed in the article belong solely to the author and not necessarily to the organization.

Reviewed by:

Shruti Chandra,  Neha Kumari

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