Policy Update
Aditya Chavan
Background
India’s security environment has grown more complex, with threats now surfacing across land, maritime, air, cyber and space domains at the same time. This has raised the importance of jointness and integration among the Army, Navy and Air Force. The three Services have traditionally run largely separate operational structures, coordinating through higher-level mechanisms rather than a unified command. That model has served specialised service capabilities well, but modern warfare increasingly demands the rapid integration of capabilities across domains.
This institutional push gained real momentum with the creation of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) in 2019–20(Prime Minister’s Office, 2019) . The CDS was tasked with promoting jointness in operations, logistics, training, communications and resource use, while the DMA was specifically mandated to drive the restructuring of military commands, including joint and theatre commands.
The next major step was the Inter-Services Organisations (Command, Control and Discipline) Act, 2023, which came into force in May 2024(Press Information Bureau, 2024) . It gave commanders of notified inter-service organisations disciplinary and administrative authority over personnel from all three Services , an important legal foundation for deeper integration that still leaves the Army, Navy and Air Force’s distinct identities intact. Rules under the Act followed in May 2025.
The Government went on to name 2025 as the “Year of Reforms” in the Ministry of Defence, placing jointness, integration and the establishment of Integrated Theatre Commands (ITCs) squarely among its reform priorities(Ministry of Defence, 2025c ). The agenda also covered multi-domain operations, cyber and space capabilities, inter-service training and shared operational requirements.
That momentum has carried into 2026. General N. S. Raja Subramani took over as India’s third CDS on 31 May 2026(Ministry of Defence, 2026b) , succeeding General Anil Chauhan, and named enhanced jointness, integration and synergy across the Defence Forces as priorities on assuming office.
Against this backdrop, the proposed Integrated Theatre Commands amount to more than an organisational reshuffle. They aim to move India’s military architecture away from service-centric planning and toward commands organised around geography and function instead. Government material (Ministry of Defence, 2026d) points to possible structures built around land borders, maritime operations, and joint or integrated air defence, though the final configuration is still being worked out as part of the ongoing reform process.
The real policy question, then, is not simply whether India should create theatre commands, but whether organisational integration can actually deliver greater operational effectiveness, faster decision-making, and more efficient use of India’s defence resources.
Table 1. Key Milestones in India’s Journey Towards Integrated Theatre Commands
| Year | Milestone | Significance |
| 2019 | Creation of the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) | Established a senior institutional mechanism for promoting jointness among the Services |
| 2020 | Department of Military Affairs (DMA) established | Provided an institutional framework for military integration and restructuring |
| 2023 | Inter-Services Organisations Act passed | Created a legal framework for unified command, control and discipline across Services |
| 2024 | Inter-Services Organisations Act brought into force | Enabled commanders of notified inter-service organisations to exercise authority over personnel from different Services |
| 2025 | Year of Reforms in the Ministry of Defence | Gave renewed emphasis to jointness, integration, multi-domain operations and theatreisation |
| 2026 | General N. S. Raja Subramani assumes charge as CDS | Renewed institutional focus on jointness, integration and synergy among the Services |
(Compiled by the author from Ministry of Defence and Press Information Bureau releases.)
Functioning
An Integrated Theatre Command brings capabilities from multiple military Services together under one operational command for a defined geographical or functional theatre. Rather than each Service planning and running operations largely through its own chain of command, an integrated commander would coordinate whatever capabilities are needed to meet shared operational objectives.
The proposed model aims to draw a clearer line between operational functions and the administrative Raise-Train-Sustain (RTS) responsibilities that stay with individual Services. That would free operational commanders to focus on security and mission objectives, while Service Headquarters continue handling force generation, training and administration.
The idea goes beyond simply placing Army, Navy and Air Force units under one commander. Making theatreisation work requires common doctrines, interoperable communication systems, integrated intelligence, joint logistics and coordinated procurement , which ties it closely to wider reforms across India’s defence architecture.
The proposed commands are meant to support operations across multiple domains at once. Traditional land, sea and air capabilities would increasingly work alongside cyber and space assets, backed by digitised, data-centric command-and-control systems. The Government has pointed to the Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS), the Defence Communication Network and other joint mechanisms as tools for strengthening real-time coordination(Press Information Bureau, 2025) .
Theatreisation does not mean the three Services disappear. Theatreisation is meant to combine their specialised capabilities within an integrated operational framework while keeping service-specific expertise, training and institutional identities intact.
In the end, the model’s success will hinge less on standing up new headquarters than on whether India can build a genuinely joint military culture, interoperable systems and unified operational planning.
Figure 1. From Service-Centric to Integrated Command Structures
| Traditional Service-Centric Approach | Integrated Theatre Command Approach |
| Army, Navy and Air Force operate through separate command structures | Forces coordinated under a unified operational command |
| Service-specific operational planning | Joint operational planning |
| Separate logistics and support structures | Greater sharing of logistics and infrastructure |
| Domain-specific coordination | Multi-domain operations |
| Coordination between Services required during operations | Jointness incorporated into command structure |
| Service-level resource allocation | Resources aligned with theatre-level operational priorities |
| Primarily land/sea/air-centric | Land + Maritime + Air + Cyber + Space |
(Compiled by the author based on Ministry of Defence and Press Information Bureau material on jointness, integration and theaterisation (Ministry of Defence, 2025a).)
Implementation Progress
India’s move toward Integrated Theatre Commands has come in stages rather than through one sweeping overhaul. The CDS and DMA established institutional leadership for jointness, while the Inter-Services Organisations Act, 2023 supplied a legal framework for unified command over personnel across Services. The Government has also stood up three Joint Logistics Nodes, at Mumbai, Guwahati and Port Blair, showing that integration is already underway in specific functional areas(Ministry of Defence, 2026d).
Theatreisation has since focused on shaping an appropriate command structure. Government documents point to studies on potential land-border, maritime and joint or integrated air-defence commands, aimed at organising capabilities by geography and function. These remain part of an ongoing reform process, not an already-finalised theatre structure(Ministry of Defence, 2026d).
The change in military leadership during 2026 has added fresh momentum. General N. S. Raja Subramani took charge as the third CDS on 31 May 2026(Ministry of Defence, 2026b) , succeeding General Anil Chauhan, and specifically flagged enhanced jointness, integration and synergy among the Defence Forces as priorities on taking office.
The appointment of Air Marshal Tejinder Singh as Chief of Integrated Defence Staff to the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, on 1 July 2026(Ministry of Defence, 2026a) , has further strengthened the institutional machinery driving tri-service integration.
The reform agenda reaches beyond command structures too. Joint training, integrated logistics, common communication networks, cyber and space capabilities, and data-centric warfare are increasingly treated as prerequisites for theatreisation to work. The Government has stressed that ITCs should eventually move the forces from mostly single-domain operations to multi-domain operations, coordinating capabilities across land, sea, air, cyber and space(Ministry of Defence, 2025a) .
India’s current approach, in other words, is best described as progressive institutional integration , the final theatre structure will emerge from reforms already underway rather than being built from scratch in isolation.
Strategic Impact
The main strategic advantage of Integrated Theatre Commands lies in their potential to replace service-centric planning with a unified, mission-oriented approach. A theatre commander could draw on capabilities from multiple Services based on what a particular operational theatre needs, rather than working through separate service chains of command.
That could speed up decision-making during conflict. Modern operations often call for simultaneous action across several domains, which makes coordinating between separate headquarters increasingly difficult. A joint command structure could cut duplication and let commanders allocate assets according to operational priorities.
The reform could also improve resource use. India works with finite defence resources, and separate Service structures often mean duplicated logistics, infrastructure and support systems. Greater integration could let common facilities, logistics networks and specialised capabilities be shared more efficiently , the Government’s existing Joint Logistics Nodes already point to this kind of benefit(Ministry of Defence, 2026d.
The strategic case extends to newer domains as well. Cyber and space capabilities matter more to military operations than before, and battlefield information keeps becoming more data-intensive. Government discussions on theaterisation have accordingly linked ITCs to digitisation, data-centric warfare, and folding cyber and space capabilities into conventional operations(Ministry of Defence, 2025a).
That said, how well theatreisation works will ultimately come down to capability integration rather than organisational integration alone. A new command headquarters cannot, by itself, create interoperability, shared situational awareness or a joint operational culture , those have to be built through training, communications infrastructure, doctrine and sustained cooperation between Services.
Emerging Issues
The strategic case of integrated theatre commands is highly compelling when it comes to the aspect of National Security but it also poses certain challenges with respect to the implementation, effective integration and interoperability across defence systems and assets.These are not objections to the commands themselves but rather a deep understanding of how the reshaping of existing institutional practice can avoid being undermined to internal institutional friction.Four issues stand out as particularly consequential for the reform’s eventual success.
i. Balancing Jointness with Service Expertise
The three Services have distinct operational cultures, capabilities and doctrines. Push centralisation too far and specialised expertise could get diluted; integrate too little and theatre commands risk becoming largely administrative. The challenge is achieving joint operational effectiveness without giving up what makes each Service’s capabilities valuable.
ii. Command and Control
How authority is split between the CDS, theatre commanders and individual Service Headquarters will matter a great deal. Ambiguity over operational control, force allocation and administrative responsibility could undercut the very efficiency theatreisation is meant to deliver.
iii. Air Power Allocation
Air power is a particularly tricky problem, since aircraft and air-defence assets can be needed in multiple theatres at the same time. Permanently assigning limited, high-value assets to geographical commands could reduce flexibility, while keeping them under central control could weaken theatre commanders’ autonomy.
iv. Integration Beyond Structures
Perhaps the toughest challenge is cultural. Jointness needs common training, interoperable systems, shared intelligence and a genuine willingness to plan operations together. The Government itself has made the point that jointness and integration are prerequisites for functional ITCs, not outcomes that follow automatically from creating them .
Theatreisation, then, should be seen not as the endpoint of defence reform but as the institutional framework through which deeper operational integration can actually happen.
Way Forward
Moving to Integrated Theatre Commands should be treated as a phased process of operational integration rather than a purely structural reorganisation. The goal should be making sure new command structures produce measurable gains in preparedness, interoperability and combat effectiveness.
First, India needs clear command-and-control responsibilities in place before the final theatre structure goes live. The relationship between the CDS, theatre commanders and Service Headquarters has to be unambiguous, especially around operational control, force allocation and administrative responsibility. The Inter-Services Organisations framework offers an important legal foundation, but more institutional clarity will be needed as theatre commands take shape.
Second, joint doctrine, training and exercises should come before and alongside structural changes, not after them. The Government’s reform agenda already emphasises shared operational requirements and inter-service cooperation, and the joint doctrines released in 2025 covering cyberspace, multi-domain operations and military space give this a foundation that can be builtinto operational training over time.
Third, India should prioritise interoperable communication, intelligence and logistics systems. Initiatives already in place, such as the Defence Communication Network, the Integrated Air Command and Control System and the Joint Logistics Nodes, show that technological and logistical integration can move forward alongside command reforms. Scaling these up across theatres will be essential for genuinely networked operations.
Fourth, theatreisation needs to leave room for strategic flexibility in the allocation of scarce capabilities , particularly air power, long-range precision systems, cyber assets and space-based capabilities. These may have to support several theatres at once, so they should not end up unnecessarily locked into individual geographical commands.
Finally, implementation should come with regular independent evaluation. Metrics like joint exercise performance, mobilisation time, interoperability, logistics efficiency and decision-making speed can help show whether theatreisation is actually delivering. General N. S. Raja Subramani’s appointment as CDS in May 2026, followed by Air Marshal Tejinder Singh taking charge as CISC in July 2026, gives the reform agenda renewed institutional leadership to carry it forward.
In the end, how well Integrated Theatre Commands succeed will depend less on the number of commands created and more on whether India’s armed forces develop the doctrine, technology, institutional culture and operational capabilities required to function as one integrated force.
References:
Ministry of Defence. (2025c, January 1). The Ministry of Defence declares 2025 as ‘Year ofReforms’. Press Information Bureau, Government of India. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2089184&lang=2®=3
Ministry of Defence. (2025b, May 28). Govt notifies Rules under Inter-Services Organisations (Command, Control & Discipline) Act 2023 enabling greater jointness and command efficiency in Armed Forces. Press Information Bureau, Government of India. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2131856&lang=2®=48
Ministry of Defence. (2025a, September 17). Armed Forces shape future roadmap at Combined Commanders’ Conference 2025. Press Information Bureau, Government of India. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2167585®=48&lang=2
Ministry of Defence. (2026d, January 1). Year of Reforms 2025: MoD records significant progress in implementing wide-ranging reforms. Press Information Bureau, Government of India.https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2210549&lang=2®=48
Ministry of Defence. (2026c, May 9). Lieutenant General NS Raja Subramani (Retd) appointed as Chief of Defence Staff. Press Information Bureau, Government of India. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2259242&lang=1®=6
Ministry of Defence. (2026b, May 31). General NS Raja Subramani assumes charge as Chief of Defence Staff & Secretary, Department of Military Affairs. Press Information Bureau, Government of India. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2267339&lang=2®=3
Ministry of Defence. (2026a, July 1). Air Marshal Tejinder Singh takes over as CISC. Press Information Bureau, Government of India.https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2279750&lang=2®=48
Prime Minister’s Office. (2019, December 24). Cabinet approves creation of the post of Chief of Defence Staff in the rank of four star General. Press Information Bureau, Government of India. https://www.pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1597425®=48&lang=2
Press Information Bureau. (2024, May 10). Inter-Services Organisations (Command, Control and Discipline) Act notified through Gazette Notification. Government of India.https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2020222&lang=2®=48
Press Information Bureau. (2025). Major Government-led coordination efforts among the Armed Forces. Government of India.https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2129453&lang=1®=3
About the Contributor
Aditya Chavan is an Economics undergraduate student at Symbiosis School of Economics, Pune, with research interests spanning public policy, MSME development, financial inclusion, and economic governance. His work focuses on analysing government policies and institutional reforms aimed at fostering inclusive and sustainable economic development.
Acknowledgement
The author is grateful to IMPRI – Impact and Policy Research Institute for the opportunity to prepare this policy update, and acknowledges the guidance and feedback received during the review process, which helped strengthen the quality of this article
Disclaimer
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of IMPRI or any affiliated institution.
Reviewers: Shruti Sethi and Sairaj Patil
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