Punargeham (2019): Evaluating Coastal Erosion Rehabilitation and Climate-Induced Displacement in Kerala

Policy Update
Ayana N K

Background 

Punargeham is Kerala’s flagship relocation programme for fisher families living within 50 metres of the High Tide Line (HTL). Implemented by the Fisheries Department under the broader LIFE Mission housing framework, its core premise is simple: where the sea keeps taking land, the state should help families move rather than rebuild in the surf zone.

The idea took shape after Cyclone Ockhi (2017). In April 2018, the state announced Rs 6 lakh for land and Rs 4 lakh for a house to families willing to relocate from erosion-prone areas. The Chief Minister later said nearly a thousand coastal homes were partly or fully destroyed between 2016 and 2019. In December 2019, the state approved a Rs 2,450 crore project for 18,685 families identified through a Fisheries Department survey across nine coastal districts.

The programme offers families several pathways: building individual homes on land they identify themselves in, forming groups to jointly purchase land, or moving into government-constructed apartment complexes . Each beneficiary receives up to Rs 10 lakh in financial assistance . The government later extended eligibility to 355 families who already own land beyond 200 metres from the HTL but currently live within the danger zone; they receive Rs 4 lakh each .

Functioning 

Governance and Implementation Pathway: The Fisheries Department is the nodal agency. A district-level committee chaired by the District Collector, with elected representatives as members, selects beneficiaries for flats. The Harbour Engineering Department supervises flat complexes such as Muttathara, where the Uralungal Labour Contract Cooperative Society (ULCCS) is the builder.

The pathway has five steps: a survey of families within 50 m of the HTL; a declaration of willingness; identification of land of 2-3 cents; committee approval and land registration; and construction. Individual-house beneficiaries find their own plot, so the pace depends on local land markets. Flats are built on government or privately acquired land. Each flat has two bedrooms, a hall, kitchen and toilet, and the units reported range from 500 to 635 sq ft.

Funding Structure: The total project cost is ₹2,450 crore, funded through the Chief Minister’s Distress Relief Fund (₹1,398 crore) and the Fisheries Department budget (₹1,052 crore). The 2026-27 budget allocates ₹64.20 crore for the scheme. Cost Comparison: The government sanctions ₹81 crore for 400 flats in Muttathara, which is an average construction cost of about ₹20.25 lakh per flat. This is notably higher than the ₹10 lakh ceiling provided as financial assistance to a family building its own house.

The 50 m Line and CRZ-III A: The 50 m cut-off also matches the No Development Zone that applies in densely populated CRZ-III A stretches such as Chellanam, after the 2019 reclassification cut it from 200 m. Relocation sits alongside physical protection: geotubes, tetrapods and diaphragm walls at ten identified erosion hot spots, and a Shoreline Management Plan for the whole coast under the Rebuild Kerala Initiative.

Performance 

Punargeham’s implementation record reveals a programme that has delivered tangible housing but remains far from its stated coverage goals. As of August 2025, the state had fully resettled 2,878 families, comprising 2,488 individual houses and 390 flats, with housing confirmed for 5,361 individuals. Completed flat complexes include Karode (128 units), Beemapally (20 units), QSS Colony in Kollam (114 units), and Ponnani in Malappuram (128 units). The flagship Muttathara “Prathyasha” complex handed over 332 flats in August 2025, with 68 more pending environmental clearance.

To assess the programme’s reach, it is necessary to clarify the denominator. The initial 2019 project plan targeted 18,685 families based on an earlier survey. However, the current official eligible pool was revised upward to 21,220 families following a 2023 survey of households within 50 metres of the High Tide Line. (This figure includes 355 families who already own land but live in the danger zone). Using this updated 2023 baseline of eligible beneficiaries, the 2,878 families resettled by August 2025 represent approximately 13.6 per cent coverage.

Even accounting for units currently under construction (1,347 individual houses and 1,136 flats), projected completion would reach only about 25 per cent of the eligible target population.

The attrition between stages explains the slow pace. Of the 21,219 eligible families tracked in the current dataset, only 9,104 expressed willingness to relocate, 4,421 secured land with committee approval, and 2,488 completed construction. This means roughly 43 per cent of eligible families opted in, about half of those who opted in found land, and 56 per cent of those who secured land finished building.

DistrictWithin 50 m 
Thiruvananthapuram 4116 families marked
Malappuram 1806 families 
Ernakulam 1638 households 
Kozhikode 3397 houses 

Impact

The hazard Punargeham responds to is large. The National Centre for Coastal Research (NCCR) found that 46 per cent of Kerala’s roughly 600 km coast—about 275 km—eroded between 1990 and 2018, while 23 per cent accreted and 31 per cent stayed stable. Kozhikode (67.7 per cent) and Alappuzha (54.1 per cent) were worst affected. Earlier NCCR assessments gave 45 per cent for 1990-2016, and Parliament was told 41 per cent in August 2021. Kerala has also been described as the only west-coast state eroding by more than 40 per cent.

For families who moved, the gain is tangible. At Muttathara, 162 of the 332 first-phase beneficiaries had been in rented accommodation, and 102 families had been living in a godown at Valiyathura before receiving flats. The scheme has delivered real shelter to people who spent years in limbo.

As a response to erosion itself, however, the scheme’s reach is limited. Roughly one in six eligible families had moved by January 2026, and relocation does nothing for the shoreline or for those who stay. Chellanam shows the contrast. The state completed a Rs 347 crore tetrapod seawall in 2023 and sanctioned a Rs 404 crore second phase in January 2026, taking public investment there to about Rs 751 crore. Moving all 1,638 eligible households at Rs 10 lakh each would cost about Rs 164 crore (author’s calculation), though the comparison is not like-for-like because a seawall also protects those who stay.

Emerging Issues

• Voluntary but unattractive. Fewer than half of eligible families have opted in. In Chellanam, where about 90 per cent of residents are fisherfolk, relocation inland threatens livelihoods and community ties. Residents also cite Ernakulam’s land prices and a rule that vacated land can be used only for agriculture or work linked to the family’s profession.

• A fixed package. The Rs 6 lakh plus Rs 4 lakh split announced in 2018 was still the ceiling in 2025. It is not indexed to local land prices, and the 2-3 cent plots leave little room for fish drying, net mending or other work done at home, much of it by women.

• Gaps in coverage. An estimated 355 families within 50 m who own land elsewhere fall outside the Rs 10 lakh package; the state was considering moving them to LIFE, which pays Rs 4 lakh. Families who opt out get no compensation for later erosion damage.

• Inconsistent numbers. The eligible pool expanded from the original 18,685 families identified in the 2018 Fisheries Department survey (sanctioned in 2019) to approximately 21,220 families cited by the government in 2023, with the current official count at 21,219. This variation reflects updated surveys, appeal applications, and changes in eligibility, including the addition of 355 land-owning families living in the danger zone. The Chief Minister said in 2021 that ₹2,450 crore had been spent to rehabilitate over 18,000 families, although that figure is the sanctioned outlay. A later Assembly reply cited 2,578 houses at that cost. Houses, flats and families are counted differently across statements, and no public dashboard exists.

• Causes left untouched. Sea walls, groynes and breakwaters already line about 400 km of the coast. The NCCR, in a study commissioned by the Kerala government, found that continuous dredging by Cochin Port has artificially deepened the seabed off Chellanam, allowing waves to gain more energy and intensify erosion. At Vizhinjam, fisherfolk have alleged that breakwater construction has accelerated shoreline erosion; the state government has disputed this, and a port-commissioned draft white paper argued the port’s impact on the Valiyathura–Shanghumugham stretch is “minimal”. Relocation shifts the cost of these interventions onto families.

Way Forward

1. Publish one tracker: A public district-wise dashboard should show families eligible, willing, land-approved, under construction, and completed, with funds released, using one counting unit. No public dashboard currently exists, and numbers shift across official statements. An independent social audit or evaluation should follow.

2. Index the package to land prices: Rs 10 lakh has been the ceiling since 2018. District-specific ceilings, especially around Kochi and Thiruvananthapuram, would address the main reason for refusals. The new government has already indicated a hike in beneficiary payments is coming.

3. Keep families near the sea: Group land purchase and flats close to landing centres suit fishing livelihoods better than dispersed plots. The World Bank’s own social risk assessment for coastal projects notes that “affecting the access of these fisher-folk to the sea… can impact their livelihoods”. Vacated land could be allowed for drying yards, net mending, and community use.

4. Close the exclusions: The 355 land-owning families deserve a defined package, and families who opt out should keep a minimum safety net for damage.

5. Triage by risk: Use NCCR shoreline data to decide where relocation is the answer and where protection is workable, and align both with the Shoreline Management Plan under the Rebuild Kerala Initiative. The state has identified 30 critical sites covering 30 km for protection measures, with World Bank and ADB funding allocated.

6. Regulate the causes: Require shoreline-impact assessments for harbours, breakwaters, and dredging. The evidence on Vizhinjam and Cochin Port suggests these structures intensify erosion, yet they face no systematic impact review. The academic literature documents how port development has “disrupted and destroyed the livelihoods of excluded groups in the name of development”.

References 

Governor’s Address to the Kerala Legislative Assembly, 20 January 2026 https://www.niyamasabha.org/codes/15kla/Session_16/Governor’s%20Address%202026_English.pdf

Kerala Fisheries Department, Punargeham success stories https://fisheries.kerala.gov.in/en/success-stories 

KSCADC, Shoreline Change Assessment for Kerala Coast https://coastal.keltron.org/index.php/shoreline-change-assessment 

Onmanorama 2019 https://www.onmanorama.com/news/kerala/2019/12/28/fisher-families-punargraham-project-sea-erosion.amp.html 

Business Standard/PTI 2018 https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/ker-wants-higher-financial-assistance-to-address-sea-erosion-118042401053_1.html 

Deccan Chronicle 6 October 2026 https://www.deccanchronicle.com/amp/southern-states/kerala/keralam-to-launch-special-housing-scheme-for-homeless-fisherfolk-1993507  

About the Contributor 

Ayana N K is a Political Science graduate from the University of Calicut. With a keen interest in public policy, international relations, and development studies.

Acknowledgement

The author extends her sincere gratitude to the IMPRI team and reviewers for their expert guidance and constructive feedback throughout the process.

Reviewed by Tanisha Hooda and Anamika P K.

Disclaimer

All views expressed in the article belong solely to the author and not necessarily to the organization.

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