Making China Great Again? Why G2 Resets India’s Calculus

Srikanth Kondapalli

When Donald Trump flew to Beijing for a three-day visit in May 2026, most of the world watched it as a US-China diplomatic moment. But for India, it was something more uncomfortable — a signal that the world’s two biggest powers are moving toward a cozy partnership, and that doesn’t bode well for New Delhi.

The idea being floated is essentially a “G2” — where the US and China together call the shots on global affairs, leaving everyone else, including India, with less room to manoeuvre. This isn’t a new concept. It was first floated by American strategist Brzezinski and briefly tried under Obama in 2009, when a joint US-China statement even mentioned both countries taking charge of South Asian security. India wasn’t consulted. History is now rhyming uncomfortably.

For the past two decades, India had benefited from a US foreign policy that saw China as a strategic rival. That rivalry created space for India — its geography, its growing market, and its democratic credentials made it an attractive partner for Washington. The US-India relationship grew significantly during this period precisely because the US needed a counterweight to China in Asia. Now, with Trump choosing deals over competition, that strategic logic is being quietly shelved.

China has clearly read the room. It’s using an old playbook — an ancient Chinese stratagem called “befriend the far to counter the near” — which basically means charming a distant power to gain leverage over nearby rivals. It worked with the Clinton administration when China used good ties with the US to tighten its grip over South Korea and Japan. Now, Beijing is dangling trade deals, investments, and technology cooperation in front of Trump to gain influence over the Indo-Pacific — India’s backyard.

The consequences are already showing up. China’s foreign minister Wang Yi skipped the BRICS foreign ministers’ meeting in New Delhi — which happened to fall exactly during Trump’s Beijing visit — and sent a lower-level envoy instead. It was a pointed snub, and the timing was hardly coincidental. It signalled that Beijing feels comfortable enough in its US relationship to openly sideline India on the global stage.

On the Pakistan front, things look even more concerning. During the India-Pakistan conflict in May 2025, China armed Pakistan while the US moved closer to Pakistan’s army chief. A stronger US-China understanding gives Beijing even more cover to deepen its “all-weather” friendship with Pakistan — and India needs to be prepared for that relationship to become more assertive and aggressive in the region.

Economically, the G2 dynamic threatens to undo some of India’s recent gains. The “China+1” strategy — where global companies were encouraged to diversify supply chains away from China and into countries like India — had been picking up momentum. If Trump and Xi reach agreements that ease trade tensions between their two countries, that incentive weakens considerably. Several multinational companies have only recently begun shifting operations to India, and there’s real concern that investment and technology flows could slow down if the US stops pushing for supply chain diversification.

China is also tightening the screws more directly. It has already restricted exports to India of rare earth minerals and tunnel-boring machines — critical inputs for India’s infrastructure and technology sectors. Beijing appears content to keep the India-China economic relationship firmly on its own terms: India as buyer, China as seller, with a trade deficit that suits Beijing just fine.

At sea, the picture is equally sobering. China has overtaken the US as the world’s largest naval force and is now conducting operations deep into the Indian and Pacific Oceans. With the Strait of Hormuz currently disrupted by conflict, China is sending naval fleets to escort its oil tankers through the region. This is a direct bid to establish control over critical sea lanes — not just Hormuz, but the Red Sea, Suez Canal, Malacca Straits, and beyond. If this happens with American acquiescence, India’s ability to project influence in the Gulf region shrinks considerably.

So what can India actually do? The article argues that New Delhi isn’t without options, but it needs to be smart and proactive. On the trade front, India has made real progress — signing agreements with the EU, UK, UAE, Oman, and New Zealand, which reduces its dependence on any single relationship. It also needs to aggressively diversify its supply chains away from China and invest in building its own capabilities in critical sectors. And diplomatically, India’s strongest card remains its voice in the Global South — convening summits, building coalitions, and positioning itself as the genuine representative of the developing world’s interests.

The bottom line is this: a warming US-China relationship isn’t neutral news for India. It closes doors that were previously open and forces New Delhi to work harder and smarter to protect its strategic space — in its own neighbourhood and beyond.