Policy Update
Riddhi Suthar
Background
Space is no longer a purely scientific domain; it has become a strategic theatre of competition. Modern warfare depends heavily on satellites for communication, navigation, intelligence gathering, missile warning, surveillance and precision targeting. The policy trajectory emerged in response to the growing military use of outer space by major powers, particularly after China’s 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) test.
For India, the concern was particularly acute because China has integrated space capabilities into its military doctrine and investing heavily in surveillance satellites, electronic warfare systems, and counter-space technologies. India’s space security strategy seeks to strengthen military command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and develop credible deterrence against adversarial counter-space capabilities.
The militarisation of space is increasingly shifting from missile-based ASAT weapons to more sophisticated capabilities such as Satellite Jamming, Co-orbital Weapons, Electronic Warfare Systems, Cyber Attacks on Satellites, and Space Surveillance Networks. The real significance of space militarisation for India lies in ensuring the resilience of more than a hundred national satellites and protecting critical infrastructure that underpins both economic growth and military operations, thereby preventing strategic vulnerability.
Table 1: Evolution of India’s Military-Space Architecture (2008–Present)
| Year | Development |
| 2008 | Proposal for an Integrated Space Cell under the Integrated Defence Staff to coordinate military space activities. |
| 2010 | Establishment of the Integrated Space Cell to enhance coordination among defence agencies and space institutions. |
| 2018 | Creation of the Defence Space Agency (DSA) to integrate military space operations across the armed forces. |
| 2019 | The successful conduct of Mission Shakti, India’s first anti-satellite (ASAT) test, demonstrated the capability to destroy a satellite in low Earth orbit. |
| 2020-Present | Expansion of space surveillance, satellite-based intelligence, secure communications, and counter-space capabilities. |
Source: Compiled by the author from the Ministry of Defence (Government of India), Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), Ministry of External Affairs (Mission Shakti Briefing), and secondary literature on India’s military space programme.
Functioning
Integrated Institutional Framework: The Ministry of Defence (MoD), Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), Defence Space Agency (DSA), Defence Space Research Organisation (DSRO), and Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) collaborate to establish a standard for India’s military-space architecture.
Satellite-Based Military Operations: India relies on 130+ operational satellites. Defence satellites such as GSAT-7 and GSAT-7A provide secure, encrypted communications between commanders and deployed forces. EMISAT, which is India’s electronic intelligence (ELINT) satellite that detects, intercepts, and analyses electromagnetic signals emitted by enemy radars, communication systems, and military equipment. CARTOSAT satellites provide detailed daytime imagery of terrain and infrastructure, and RISAT satellites ensure surveillance continues even under cloud cover or at night.
Navigation and Strategic Communications: India’s indigenous NavIC system provides PNT services, reducing reliance on foreign satellite navigation systems like the U.S. GPS. This ensures that critical military and civilian operations can continue even if access to foreign systems is restricted during a conflict.
Counter-Space Capability: India became the fourth nation after the US, Russia, and China to successfully demonstrate a direct-ascent Anti-Satellite (ASAT) capability through Mission Shakti (March 27, 2019), intercepting the 740 kg Microsat-R satellite at an altitude of approximately 300 km.
Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and Private Sector Participation: India is expanding its Space Situational Awareness network to monitor satellites, orbital debris, and potential threats to national space assets. Organisations such as IN-SPACe and NewSpace India Limited (NSIL) facilitate greater private-sector participation in satellite manufacturing, launch services, and defence-space innovation, following the space-sector reforms of 2020
International Cooperation: India collaborates with strategic partners, including the United States, France, Japan, and Australia, through bilateral agreements and the Quad to strengthen satellite surveillance, information sharing, and maritime domain awareness.
Research and Technological Development: Research on cutting-edge technologies like directed-energy systems, cyber resilience, electronic warfare, artificial intelligence, and non-kinetic counter-space capabilities is conducted by the Defence Space Research Organisation (DSRO) and DRDO.
Figure 1. India’s Military and Dual-Use Satellite Architecture Supporting National Security
Source: Author’s illustration based on information from ISRO, Ministry of Defence (Government of India), DRDO, and Ministry of External Affairs.
Performance
The recent government initiatives indicate a gradual strengthening of indigenous capabilities, public-private partnerships, and strategic preparedness in the space sector, while India still lacks a standalone military space doctrine. The Government has consistently increased allocations to the Department of Space. The Budget Estimate increased from ₹13,042.75 crore in 2024–25 to ₹13,416.20 crore in 2025–26.
However, the Parliamentary Standing Committee observed that actual utilisation has lagged behind allocations. As of 31 January 2026, only ₹9,739.72 crore (about 78.23% of the revised allocation) had been spent. One of the most notable developments has been the rapid expansion of India’s commercial space ecosystem. According to the Government of India, Department of Space 2026, the Indian space economy is expected to grow from approximately US$8 billion to US$44 billion, with a 10% share of the global space market over the coming years.
This growth is supported by regulatory reforms and increased private-sector participation. More than 250 space start-ups are operational in India. IN-SPACe has authorised more than 100 private entities for space-related activities. India has signed more than 60 international cooperation agreements in space with agencies worldwide while actively cooperating with NASA, CNES (France), JAXA (Japan), European Space Agency (ESA), and Australia.
The Department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee acknowledged the Department of Space’s historically high utilisation rates (generally 96–98% in previous years) but expressed concern over slower expenditure in 2025–26. It also highlighted shortages of skilled personnel and recommended filling 2,383 vacant posts by December 2026 to sustain India’s expanding space programme. India’s Network for Space Objects Tracking and Analysis (NETRA) monitors more than 34,000 trackable objects in Earth’s orbit (using international and indigenous data). Supporting India’s expanding Space Situational Awareness (SSA) capability.
Impact
India’s evolving military-space architecture has had a significant impact on national security, strategic deterrence, technological self-reliance, and the commercialisation of the space sector. Anti-Satellite (ASAT) capability test established India’s ability to protect critical space assets and signalled technological parity with major space powers in an increasingly contested space environment.
This increasing centrality of space assets in India’s defence planning is reflected through the government’s approval of a Space-Based Surveillance Phase-III programme involving a constellation of 52 surveillance satellites intended to provide persistent monitoring across terrestrial and maritime domains.
The investments in strategic space infrastructure have generated spillover benefits for innovation, employment generation, technology development, and commercial competitiveness. India’s growing role within the Quad’s technology and security framework reflects its increasing significance in Indo-Pacific space governance and security discussions.
Emerging Issues
India’s military-space architecture operates through multiple institutions, but lacks a publicly articulated military space doctrine. Ambiguity remains regarding escalation management and integration with cyber and conventional warfare. Moreover, fragmented institutional responsibilities may hinder rapid decision-making during crises.
Although NETRA monitors more than 34,000 trackable objects, the increasing congestion of Earth’s orbit presents growing challenges. Space debris and hostile satellite manoeuvres could threaten India’s operational satellites. Therefore, the high-value satellites remain vulnerable to anti-satellite weapons, cyberattacks, electronic jamming, spoofing, and co-orbital threats.
Shortages of highly skilled scientists, engineers, and cybersecurity experts could constrain future growth. The Parliamentary Standing Committee identified 2,383 vacant posts within the Department of Space. Despite increased budgetary allocations, expenditure utilisation remained at 78.23% of the revised allocation as of January 2026, indicating implementation delays.
India’s reliance on dual-use satellites enhances cost efficiency in peacetime but creates a strategic vulnerability in conflict, where the same asset may become a single point of failure for both national security and civilian governance. The rapid growth of private-sector participation requires greater clarity for the issues related to licensing, liability, data security, and military-civil fusion.
Way forward
The Ministry of Defence should formulate a comprehensive National Military Space Doctrine and establish clear principles governing deterrence, space security, and crisis management. Additionally, the government should develop joint operational protocols for space-based military operations. It is crucial to strengthen cybersecurity frameworks for space infrastructure.
India should expand indigenous SSA infrastructure through additional radar and optical tracking systems, strengthen international data-sharing arrangements, and develop real-time threat assessment and collision-avoidance capabilities. ISRO and the government should jointly take the initiative to accelerate recruitment and capacity-building initiatives, expand partnerships between universities, research institutions, and the space sector. Meanwhile, specialised programmes should be introduced in space security, space law, and military space studies.
There is a need to increase the number of dedicated defence satellites and improve project monitoring and financial management systems. Establishing a comprehensive space regulatory framework by developing clear guidelines for private-sector involvement in defence-space activities that would strengthen oversight mechanisms while encouraging innovation. Overall, India should maintain credible deterrence while supporting responsible space governance.
References
- Council on Foreign Relations. (n.d.). India’s space policy: Between strategic autonomy and alignment with the United States. https://www.cfr.org/articles/indias-space-policy-between-strategic-autonomy-and-alignment-united-states
- Defence Research and Development Organisation. (n.d.). Conceptual guide to torpedo system design and development. https://drdo.gov.in/drdo/en/documents/publications/monograph/conceptual-guide-torpedo-system-design-and-development
- Defence Research and Development Organisation. (n.d.). Mission Shakti. https://drdo.gov.in
- Embassy of India, Paris. (n.d.). Overview of the Indian space sector. https://www.eoiparis.gov.in/page/overview-of-the-indian-space-sector/
- Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre. (n.d.). Publications. https://www.inspace.gov.in/inspace?id=inspace_publications
- Indian Space Research Organisation. (2023). Indian Space Policy 2023. https://www.isro.gov.in/media_isro/pdf/IndianSpacePolicy2023.pdf
- Indian Space Research Organisation. (2025). Annual report 2024–25. https://www.isro.gov.in/media_isro/pdf/AnnualReport/Annual_Report_2024_25_Eng.pdf
- Indian Space Research Organisation. (n.d.). Official website. https://www.isro.gov.in/
- Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. (2019, April 2). Mission Shakti: What next?https://idsa.in/publisher/idsa-comments/mission-shakti-what-next
- Ministry of External Affairs. (2019, March 27). Frequently asked questions on Mission Shakti: India’s anti-satellite missile test conducted on 27 March 2019. https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases?dtl/31179/Frequently_Asked_Questions_on_Mission_Shakti_Indias_AntiSatellite_Missile_test_conducted_on_27_March_2019
- Ministry of Finance. (2025). Detailed demands for grants summary 2025–26. https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/doc/eb/dgsum.pdf
- NewSpace India Limited. (n.d.). Annual reports. https://www.nsilindia.co.in/annual-reports
- NewSpace India Limited. (n.d.). Official website. https://www.nsilindia.co.in/
- Press Information Bureau. (2008, June 10). Integrated Space Cell was established to coordinate military space activities. https://www.pib.gov.in/newsite/Printrelease.aspx?relid=39503
- Press Information Bureau. (2019, March 27). Mission Shakti: India demonstrates anti-satellite capability. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1573610
- Press Information Bureau. (2025). Government initiatives for the growth of India’s space economy. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=2106162
- Press Information Bureau. (2025). India’s space economy and future growth prospects. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2248424
- Press Information Bureau. (2024, October 24). Cabinet approves ₹1,000 crore venture capital fund for space sector startups. https://static.pib.gov.in/WriteReadData/specificdocs/documents/2024/oct/doc20241025423501.pdf
- Rajya Sabha. (2025). Unstarred question No. 4461 on the space sector. https://sansad.in/getFile/annex/270/AU4461_dSwx7C.pdf
- ResearchGate. (2019). Mission Shakti, aka Project XSV-1: India’s first anti-satellite test (ASAT). https://www.researchgate.net
About the Contributor
Riddhi Suthar is a researcher and policy enthusiast with interests in public policy, governance, international relations, maritime affairs, and strategic studies. Their work focuses on evidence-based policy analysis, geopolitical developments, and emerging global challenges, with particular attention to India’s strategic and developmental priorities. She is engaged in analytical writing, policy research, and academic discussions related to governance, security, and international affairs.
Acknowledgement
The author extends sincere gratitude to the IMPRI team for their expert guidance and constructive feedback throughout the process.
Reviewed by Lubina Dua and Shreeya Dixit.
Disclaimer
All views expressed in the article belong solely to the author and not necessarily to the organisation.
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