Policy Update
Yashkirti Pal
BACKGROUND
Left-Wing Extremism (LWE) has historically posed one of the most persistent and potent challenges to India’s internal security fabric. Characterised by protracted guerilla warfare across the mineral-rich but socio-economically marginalised tribal tracts of the “Red Corridor”, the movement long resisted fragmented, state-level law enforcement interventions. To achieve the Ministry of Home Affairs strict statutory mandate of making India entirely “Naxal-free”.
The state’s defence architecture shifted toward highly aggressive, intelligence-led kinetic containment. This strategy culminated in Operation Black Forest, a massive 21-day joint offensive launched on April 21, 2025. Focused squarely on the Karreguttalu Hill (KGH) axis and the dense Abujhmad forest network along the porous Chhattisgarh-Telangana border, the operation represents a fundamental doctrine shift from localised containment to the decisive breakdown of the leadership network.
FUNCTIONING
The operational execution of Operation Black Forest relied on an unprecedented multi-jurisdictional joint command structure. Moving away from localised state-bound combing operations, the Ministry of Home Affairs synchronised the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), elite Commando Battalions for Resolute Action (CoBRA), the Chhattisgarh Police’s District Reserve Guard (DRG), and the Telangana Special Task Force. This interstate coordination was logistically anchored by the Ghalgam Forward Operating Base (FOB). Established originally in 2022 as a remote security outpost, the Ghalgam FOB was transformed during the 21-day campaign into a high-tech tactical command hub, allowing security forces to maintain uninterrupted operational momentum and real-time intelligence feeds despite triple-canopy forest degradation and severe 45°C summer heatwaves.
The primary tactical rationale behind Operation Black Forest was leadership decapitation and territorial denial. Security forces moved away from chasing low-level cadres, shifting instead toward deep-forest saturation to strike at the hidden military headquarters of the CPI-Maoist. To navigate the heavily mined, un-surveyed terrain of the Karreguttalu mountains, the tactical framework leveraged a precise mix of human intelligence from localised tribal scouts and advanced technology. This included long-endurance micro-Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for forward reconnaissance, foliage-penetrating thermal imagery, and real-time GIS mapping to plot and avoid Improvised Explosive Devices pressure grids, allowing coordinated combat teams to cut off escape routes and converge directly on the guerrilla sanctuaries.
PERFORMANCE
The quantitative indicators recorded over the course of the 21-day offensive and its immediate aftermath reveal a severe blow to the structural viability of the Naxalite insurgency. Official statements from the Ministry of Home Affairs confirmed that Operation Black Forest concluded with the neutralisation of 31 Maoists, including top-tier regional military commanders. Most, notably, the operation achieved major milestones in three decades of counter-insurgence by neutralising Nambala Keshav Rao, the long-standing General Secretary of the CPI-(Maoist) and the apex mastermind behind the movement’s guerilla warfare tactics, jungle combat training, and nationwide IED network.
Beyond active combat neutralisations, the sustained operational pressure triggered a massive collapse in cadre morale across neighboring states. The operation directly led to 54 high-value arrests and 84 formal surrenders of armed cadres across Chhattisgarh, Telangana, and Maharashtra tribal borders. Furthermore, joint teams completely dismantled four active insurgent technical units and crude weapons-manufacturing hidden facilities, recovering massive stocks of military-grade explosives, wireless communication sets, and automatic weapons. By mid-2026, the geographic footprint of active naxalism had constricted down to just a handful of isolated pockets across six primary districts, down from over 126 affected districts a decade prior.
IMPACT
A situational analysis of Operation Black Forest highlights a deep transformation in both regional security dynamics and state legitimacy across the central borderlands. By successfully sanitizing and clearing the Karreguttalu Hill stronghold, the state has permanently broken the geographical insulation that allowed the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army to safely plan cross-border strikes and run a lucrative parallel extortion economy. The removal of the insurgent apex leadership has effectively shattered vertical command-and-control loops, making it nearly impossible for surviving regional committees to execute synchronised tactical offensives.
Socially, the security umbrella established by the operation has cleared the way for immediate saturation governance. The state has leveraged the physical security dividend to rapidly roll out the Dharti Aaba Janjatiya Utkarsh Abhiyan, a comprehensive development project aimed at delivering 100 percent saturation of basic services–including clean water, rural electricity, brick-and-mortar public banks, and 4G mobile towers–to over 15,000 isolated tribal villages. By replacing a long-standing security vacuum with immediate institutional presence, the policy has successfully disrupted the insurgent recruitment pipeline, changing the regional narrative from a cycle of ideological conflict to one of rapid economic reintegration.
EMERGING ISSUES
Despite the clear successes of Operation Black Forest, several critical operational and administrative bottlenecks have surfaced as the policy enters its final consolidation phase.
The primary operational concern centers on the “FOB Exposure and Kinetic Over-Extension Risk”. While the rapid deployment of forward bases like Ghalgam has successfully broken the insurgents’ spatial sanctuary, it has left these isolated outposts highly vulnerable to asymmetric retaliation. The local state police forces, unlike the CAPF and CoBRA, lack the independent night-vision equipment, mine-protected vehicles, and specialised tactical training required to aggressively patrol the surrounding forest vacuums.
Another hurdle is the implementation lag in socio-economic land entitlements. While military operations and physical infrastructure expansion move at an accelerated pace to meet political deadlines, the underlying structural grievances that originally fueled radicalisation remain unresolved. In several cleared sectors, the legal distribution of Community Forest Resources rights and land titles under the Forest Rights Act faces severe bureaucratic delays due to state public works departments prioritising industrial clearances over indigenous land claims. This legal delay risks keeping local discontent alive, providing surviving underground ideologies with potent propaganda to exploit against the state.
Finally, the policy faces an administrative retail bottleneck within the Surrender-and-Rehabilitation pipeline due to complex identity verification procedures at the district level. Between 2019-2021, a total of 1,462 Maoist surrendered, only 113 of these were actually sent to the state Screening and Rehabilitation Committee (SRC) for screening, and only 47 were found fit enough to receive the benefits under the surrender and rehabilitation scheme. Thus, only 3% of the Maoists who had surrendered passed the screening of the SRC.These delays slow down voluntary village level surrenders, as active cadres hesitate to cross over without a seamless guarantee of immediate financial needs and physical safety.
WAY FORWARD
Operation Black Forest marks a critical turning point in India’s internal security strategy, demonstrating the high efficacy of unified cross-border military execution. By successfully penetrating “No–Go Zones” like the Karreguttalu Hills and dismantling insurgent base camps, the joint campaign has proven that inter-agency coordination can effectively neutralize deep-forest terrain disadvantages. However, as the Ministry of Home Affairs nears its zero-violence targets, the long-term success of this policy will depend upon its capacity to convert temporary military dominance into permanent trust-based institutional stability. Military victories like these do not automatically translate into lasting state legitimacy.
To ensure this transition is sustainable, the security framework must evolve a clear exit strategy for central forces. The MHA must make future central paramilitary de-escalation conditional by ensuring a verified, milestone-linked buildup of state police capacities. While elite central units like CoBRA are highly effective territorial clearing, long-term territorial protection and community policing must be handed over to trained state cadres who possess local language skills and cultural familiarity.
Concurrently, the state must address administrative bottlenecks by updating their criminal records and deploying direct biometric-linked digital dashboards to automate rehabilitation fund disbursals to surrendered youth. By securing immediate financial survival and physical security, especially for lower-rung tribal cadres, the state can actively dismantle the trust -deficit that complicates mass surrenders. Ultimately, the future of these resource-rich tribal belts depends on making sure that the complete elimination of insurgent networks leads to permanent, unyielding state commitment to tribal equity, robust local resource rights, and shared economic benefits.
REFERENCES
ANI News (2026, February 18). Chhattisgarh: Security forces launch Operation Black Forest 2 against Naxals in Karreguttalu hills. ANI News National.
https://www.aninews.in/news/national/general-news/chhattisgarh-security-forces-launch-operation-black-forest-2-against-naxals-in-karreguttalu-hills20260218191651/
ANI News. (2026, February 18). Operation Black ‘Operation Black Forest 2’ against Naxals begins on Karreguttalu hills in Chhattisgarh, over 2000 security forces engaged. ANI News National.
https://www.aninews.in/news/national/general-news/operation-black-forest-2-against-naxals-begins-on-karreguttalu-hills-in-chhattisgarh-over-2000-security-forces-engaged20260218222128/
Hindustan Times. (2018, February 21). How Chhattisgarh police’s ‘surrender’ policy for Maoists violates human rights. Hindustan Times Opinion.
https://www.hindustantimes.com/opinion/how-chhattisgarh-police-s-surrender-policy-for-maoists-violates-human-rights/story-hnVKb075DCCoO41vyewNSK.html
Hindustan times. (2021, October 21). Dichotomy between Maoist surrender and rehab numbers.
Manohar Parrikar Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses. (2024). India’s internal security: Role of state governments in counter-insurgency and structural rehabilitation. IDSA Security Studies Series.
www.idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Indias-Internal-Security-PDas-Book.pdf
Ministry of Home Affairs. (2023). Guidelines for Surrender-cum-Rehabilitation Scheme of Left Wing Extremists in the affected states. Left Wing Extremism Division, Government of India.
https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/2023-01/SCRLWEDIVISION_10012023_0.pdf
Ministry of Home Affairs. (2025, May 14). Achieving a historic success in the resolve of a ‘Naxal-free India’, security forces kill 31 Naxalites in the biggest-ever operation against Naxalism at Karreguttalu Hill (KGH) on Chhattisgarh-Telangana border. Government of India.
https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2128736®=48&lang=2
Press Information Bureau. (2025, August 14). Union Home Minister and Minister of Cooperation Shri Amit Shah meets and felicitates the CRPF, Chhattisgarh Police, DRG and Cobra jawans who successfully carried out ‘Operation Black Forest’ on Karreguttalu hill. Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India.
https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2163233®=3&lang=2
The Times of India. (2026, March 31). Deadline day sees dozens of Maoists lay down arms. The Times of India, Raipur Edition.
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/deadline-day-sees-dozens-of-maoists-lay-down-arms/articleshow/129936309.cms
CONTRIBUTOR
This policy update article was written by Yashkirti Pal, a Research and Editorial Intern at IMPRI.
Disclaimer
All views expressed in the article belong solely to the author and not necessarily to the organization.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The author would like to thank the IMPRI faculty for giving her this platform and opportunity to share her work.
Reviewers – Asmatwali and Riddhi Suthar
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