Policy Update
Pragya Raghav
Background
India and Singapore completed 60 years of diplomatic relations in 2025, evolving into a strong Indo-Pacific partnership. Singapore supported India’s Look East and Act East policies, while the 2005 CECA strengthened economic ties. Singapore is now one of India’s largest FDI sources, with investments exceeding US$170 billion over two decades (High Commission of India in Singapore, 2026). The relationship was upgraded to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in September 2024.
Singapore connects India to ASEAN through its financial, logistics and maritime networks. India offers Singapore a large market, manufacturing base and expanding clean-energy sector.
Green cooperation is becoming increasingly important. India targets 500 GW of non-fossil capacity by 2030 and net zero by 2070, while Singapore aims to peak emissions around 2030 and achieve net zero by 2050. India’s National Green Hydrogen Mission targets 5 million metric tonnes of annual production by 2030, supported by an outlay of ₹19,744 crore (MNRE).
Singapore’s strengths in green finance, carbon markets, clean technology and maritime connectivity complement India’s renewable-energy ambitions. However, cooperation is still developing and has not yet been formalised through a standalone green-economy agreement.
Functioning
The partnership runs less on one master agreement and more on five moving parts that reinforce each other: finance, energy, institutional architecture, carbon markets and technology.
1. Green Finance and Sustainable Investment
India has raised over ₹36,000 crore through sovereign green bonds since January 2023 to fund projects such as solar and wind energy (RBI). Singapore supports green finance through MAS’s Finance for Net Zero Action Plan and the Singapore-Asia Taxonomy for Sustainable Finance (MAS). Its state investors, including Temasek and GIC, have also invested in Indian renewable-energy companies (Temasek; GIC). Overall, India brings a large project pipeline, while Singapore contributes capital and financial expertise.
2. Renewable Energy and Energy Transition
India is expanding its non-fossil capacity towards its 500 GW target for 2030, led by solar energy (MNRE). Singapore, with limited land and renewable resources, focuses more on energy efficiency, imported clean power and technology (Singapore Government). Cooperation includes Singaporean investment in Indian renewable projects and technical work on areas such as grid integration. Green hydrogen is an emerging area, with India developing production capacity and Singapore offering potential demand, trading and shipping links (MNRE; Singapore MTI).
3. Green Economy Framework
India and Singapore do not yet have a standalone Green Economy Agreement like Singapore’s agreements with Australia and the UK. Instead, sustainability is included as a pillar of the CSP Roadmap adopted in September 2025(MEA). The Ministerial Roundtable, Foreign Office Consultations and working-level exchanges provide the main institutional channels for cooperation. The Green and Digital Shipping Corridor MoU is one outcome of this framework. Green economy was formally identified as a distinct area of cooperation at the fourth ISMR in August 2026, but no dedicated green-economy treaty has yet been signed (MEA).
4. Carbon Markets and Carbon Credits
Carbon-market cooperation is still at an early stage. Singapore has signed 10 Article 6 Implementation Agreements with partner countries, but none with India (Singapore MTI). India has significant potential to generate carbon credits through renewable-energy and other projects, but any future arrangement would need to fit its Carbon Credit Trading Scheme and protect credits needed for India’s own climate targets (MNRE; BEE). For now, this remains a potential area rather than active bilateral cooperation.
5. Green Technology and Innovation
Green technology cooperation is largely developing through pilot projects, research and private-sector participation. The Green and Digital Shipping Corridor combines work on low-emission marine fuels, digital documentation and joint research between Indian and Singaporean agencies (Government of India; Singapore Government). Cooperation also extends to sustainable infrastructure, green mobility and research links between universities and companies. Much of the technology collaboration is still developing, so its long-term impact remains to be measured.
Performance
1. Institutional Progress
The India-Singapore Ministerial Roundtable (ISMR) has become the main mechanism driving the partnership. Its fourth round in August 2026 reviewed the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) across six pillars advanced manufacturing, connectivity, digitalisation, healthcare, skills and sustainability and identified green economy, industrial parks, food security, digital connectivity, fintech, semiconductors and green shipping as priority areas.
High-level engagement has remained consistent. EAM S. Jaishankar, Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman and Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal met Singaporean leaders at the latest roundtable. Earlier, PM Modi’s September 2024 visit elevated ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, followed by PM Lawrence Wong’s India visit in September 2025, which produced five new agreements.(PIB)
The relationship is also moving from dialogue to implementation. The Green and Digital Shipping Corridor MoU, signed in September 2025, focuses on zero- and near-zero-emission fuels, digital cargo-data exchange and joint research, building on existing cooperation in semiconductors and digital technology.
2. Progress in Green Economy Cooperation
- Energy: India and Singapore are exploring cooperation under Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement on emissions-reduction projects and high-quality carbon credits.
- Technology: NUS and Indian partners are pursuing advanced solar research, including tandem solar cells, while platforms such as the India-Singapore Futures Forum support policy-industry collaboration.
- Sustainable infrastructure: The Green and Digital Shipping Corridor connects India’s renewable-energy and industrial capacity with Singapore’s role as a major maritime hub.
- Finance: Green finance and carbon markets remain less developed. Unlike energy and shipping, they have yet to produce a dedicated bilateral financial mechanism.
3. Investment and Economic Cooperation
Economic ties have expanded significantly under CECA. Bilateral trade increased from USD 6.7 billion in 2004–05 to USD 35.6 billion in 2023–24, with Singapore becoming India’s largest FDI source that year (MEA, Government of India). Singapore’s cumulative investment in India has also reached around USD 160 billion, according to PM Modi (PMO, Government of India).
Singaporean investors are also deepening their green-sector presence. Temasek’s India exposure has reached nearly USD 42 billion, with plans for a further USD 10 billion investment over three years. Its portfolio includes CleanMax, with around 3 GW of renewable capacity, as well as ReNew Green and Battery Smart. GIC has also invested in renewable-energy firm Greenko, showing that Singapore’s green investment in India is a longer-term trend rather than a recent development.
India’s renewable-energy sector received USD 6.14 billion in FDI equity between April 2020 and September 2023, according to data presented by the Power Ministry in Parliament (Ministry of Power, 2023).
4. Major 2023 Outcomes
2023 largely focused on building the infrastructure that later supported deeper green and digital cooperation:
- February: PayNow-UPI linkage became operational, enabling real-time cross-border retail payments.
- August: Indian and Singaporean banks piloted a paperless trade-finance transaction using TradeTrust.
- September: PM Lee Hsien Loong attended the G20 Summit in New Delhi, where energy transition and sustainable development were key themes.
- December: India reported USD 6.14 billion in cumulative FDI in renewable energy since April 2020 (Ministry of Power, 2023).
Overall, 2023 strengthened the partnership’s financial and digital foundations, while the 2025-26 agreements pushed cooperation towards green infrastructure. However, unlike Singapore’s 2022 green-economy agreement with Australia, India and Singapore still lack a dedicated bilateral Green Economy Agreement, leaving some areas particularly green finance and carbon markets-less institutionalised.
Impact
1. India’s Energy Transition
Singapore-linked investment is supporting India’s renewable-energy expansion. Temasek-backed CleanMax operates about 3 GW of solar, wind and hybrid capacity in India (Temasek). In 2025, Sembcorp signed MoUs with the V.O. Chidambaranar and Paradip port authorities to develop green-hydrogen and ammonia hubs (Sembcorp, 2025). These projects are still under development, so their contribution to India’s hydrogen capacity and exports cannot yet be measured. They support the objectives of India’s ₹19,744-crore National Green Hydrogen Mission (MNRE).
2. Sustainable Finance
The partnership’s impact on sustainable finance remains limited. Temasek and GIC invest in Indian renewable-energy assets (Temasek; GIC). India has also raised more than ₹36,000 crore through sovereign green bonds since January 2023 (RBI). These bonds are Indian government issuances and should not be counted as Singapore–India financing. India and Singapore do not yet have a dedicated bilateral green-finance or blended-finance facility. Establishing one would be a future opportunity, not an existing outcome.
3. Technology and Innovation
Technology cooperation is still developing. NUS and Indian partners are researching advanced solar technologies, including tandem solar cells. There is not yet enough public evidence to measure their commercial or emissions impact (NUS). Digital cooperation has produced clearer results. The PayNow–UPI linkage enables real-time cross-border payments, while TradeTrust has supported a paperless trade-finance pilot (NPCI; Singapore Government). The Green and Digital Shipping Corridor is still a planned initiative focused on low-emission fuels, digital information exchange and joint research. It has not yet produced measurable emissions reductions (India–Singapore MoU, 2025).
4. Trade and Investment
Singapore remains a major source of investment in India. Singaporean investors also have stakes in Indian renewable-energy companies such as CleanMax and Greenko (Government of India; Temasek; GIC). However, the specific impact of green-sector cooperation is difficult to separate from wider bilateral investment. The green-hydrogen supply chain and semiconductor Green Lane Initiative discussed at the 4th ISMR remain areas of ongoing cooperation, not measurable economic outcomes (4th ISMR, 2026).
5. Regional and Indo-Pacific Impact
The partnership supports India’s Act East Policy and strengthens its links with ASEAN, with Singapore serving as a key regional partner (MEA). The Green and Digital Shipping Corridor connects India’s industrial and renewable-energy capacity with Singapore’s maritime infrastructure (India–Singapore MoU, 2025). Its possible benefits include greater alternative-fuel trade, lower shipping emissions and stronger regional supply chains. These remain future benefits because no measurable regional impact has yet been reported. The partnership is therefore building the institutional and commercial foundations for wider Indo-Pacific green cooperation. It has not yet transformed the region’s green economy.
Emerging Issues and Challenges
1. Financing Gap
The biggest challenge is scale. India may need around US$1.5 trillion by 2030 and US$19 trillion by 2070 for its energy transition, far exceeding current clean-energy financing (BEE, Ministry of Power). Singapore’s Temasek and GIC already invest in India, but there is no dedicated bilateral green-finance facility. Future cooperation should focus on green bonds, blended finance and climate-focused investment channels to mobilise additional capital.
2. Differences in Economic Scale and Capacity
India and Singapore have very different economic and energy structures (World Bank). India’s huge and growing economy still relies on coal for reliable power, while Singapore is a small city-state with limited domestic renewable resources and depends heavily on imported energy (IEA; Singapore Government). India’s priorities centre on manufacturing, energy access and jobs, whereas Singapore focuses more on finance, standards, alternative fuels and its role as a regional hub (Government of India; Singapore Government). Their differences can be complementary, but the partnership must recognise where their needs do not directly align.
3. Technology and Knowledge Transfer
Much of the cooperation announced so far remains at the level of investment, research and MoUs, rather than measurable technology transfer (4th ISMR, 2026). NUS research on tandem solar cells is promising but still developing (NUS). There is limited public evidence of Singaporean green-tech companies establishing large-scale manufacturing or R&D operations in India (Government of India; Singapore Government). Without joint IP, co-development agreements or localisation requirements, cooperation could remain focused on capital rather than building technological capacity in India.
4. Carbon Market and Regulatory Challenges
India and Singapore are still exploring Article 6.2 cooperation under the Paris Agreement (Government of Singapore; Government of India). Effective carbon-market cooperation requires reliable emissions accounting, independent verification and safeguards against double counting (UNFCCC). India’s Carbon Credit Trading Scheme is still developing, while Singapore relies on its carbon tax and Eligible International Credits framework (Bureau of Energy Efficiency; Singapore Government). Aligning these systems will require significant technical and regulatory work.
5. Greenwashing and Standards
The absence of fully aligned green-taxonomy frameworks creates a risk of inconsistent sustainability standards and greenwashing (Government of India; Monetary Authority of Singapore). India’s Climate Finance Taxonomy is still being developed, while Singapore has its own sustainability-classification frameworks (Ministry of Finance, India; MAS). Without greater alignment, projects considered “green” in one market may not meet the standards of the other, potentially weakening investor confidence.
6. Energy Security vs. Decarbonisation
India faces a difficult balance between decarbonisation, affordability and energy security (IEA). Coal remains a major part of India’s power system even as renewable capacity expands rapidly (Central Electricity Authority). Technologies such as green hydrogen and offshore wind are also still relatively expensive compared with conventional power in many applications (IEA). Singapore can pursue faster decarbonisation because of its different economic and energy circumstances, while India must simultaneously meet the needs of a much larger and growing population (World Bank; IEA).
7. Implementation Gap
The main structural weakness is the gap between announcements and measurable outcomes (4th ISMR, 2026). Initiatives covering the Green Economy pillar, Article 6.2 and green-hydrogen supply chains are still developing, with limited consolidated public data on their actual impact (Government of India; Government of Singapore). Ministerial meetings can set priorities, but delivery requires working-level coordination, private-sector financing and transparent reporting on investment, capacity added and emissions avoided (4th ISMR, 2026). Until such data is regularly published, it remains difficult to assess how much of the partnership’s green agenda has moved from diplomatic commitments to tangible results.
Way Forward
India and Singapore should encourage Singaporean banks, Temasek, GIC and other investors to finance Indian green projects through green bonds, blended finance and dedicated climate funds. This can bring more private investment into renewable energy and low-carbon infrastructure.
The Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) and Singapore’s relevant agencies can expand joint projects in solar power, green hydrogen, energy storage and smart grids. This would support India’s clean-energy goals while strengthening Singapore’s access to reliable green-energy supply chains.
Both countries should also work towards compatible carbon-market rules. Their environmental and financial regulators can strengthen monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) systems to prevent double counting and make cross-border carbon-credit projects more transparent.
Universities, research institutions, start-ups and companies in both countries should be encouraged to develop joint R&D projects, shared facilities and technology partnerships. This would help turn research into practical solutions and create skilled employment.
Governments should create more opportunities for business-to-business partnerships through industry forums, joint ventures and simpler investment procedures. This would help move cooperation from agreements to actual projects.
India and Singapore can also use Singapore’s ASEAN networks to expand cooperation in green shipping, renewable energy, sustainable infrastructure and clean technologies across Southeast Asia.
Finally, both governments should set clear targets for investment, renewable capacity, emissions reduced, projects completed, technology partnerships and jobs created, with regular progress reports. This would make the partnership easier to assess and keep both sides accountable.
Overall, the India–Singapore partnership is moving towards sustainable growth, energy transition, finance and technology. Its success will ultimately depend on turning agreements into funded projects, shared technology and measurable results.
References
Bureau of Energy Efficiency. (2023). Carbon Credit Trading Scheme, 2023. Ministry of Power, Government of India.
Central Electricity Authority. (n.d.). Central Electricity Authority. Ministry of Power, Government of India.
Government of Singapore. (n.d.). Singapore Green Plan 2030.
High Commission of India, Singapore. (2026). India–Singapore bilateral relations. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India.
https://www.hcisingapore.gov.in
International Energy Agency. (n.d.). India.
https://www.iea.org/countries/india
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (2025). India–Singapore relations.
Ministry of New and Renewable Energy. (2023). National Green Hydrogen Mission. Government of India.
Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways. (2025). India–Singapore Green and Digital Shipping Corridor. Government of India.
Ministry of Power. (2023). Renewable energy sector and foreign direct investment. Government of India.
Monetary Authority of Singapore. (2023). Singapore-Asia Taxonomy for Sustainable Finance.
National Climate Change Secretariat. (n.d.). Singapore’s climate action. Prime Minister’s Office, Singapore.
National Payments Corporation of India. (2023). UPI–PayNow linkage.
National University of Singapore. (n.d.). National University of Singapore.
Prasar Bharati. (2025). News On AIR.
Reserve Bank of India. (2023). Sovereign green bonds.
Singapore Business Federation. (2026). Singapore Business Federation.
Singapore Ministry of Trade and Industry. (n.d.). India–Singapore economic relations.
Temasek. (n.d.). India.
World Bank. (n.d.). India. World Bank Open Data.
https://data.worldbank.org/country/india
About the Contributor
Pragya Raghav is pursuing a B.A. (Hons.) in History at Mata Sundri College for Women, University of Delhi, with a minor in Political Science. She is passionate about public policy, international relations, governance, climate policy, and sustainable development. Through research and policy analysis, she aims to contribute to evidence-based policymaking and create meaningful social impact.
Acknowledgement
I would like to sincerely thank IMPRI (Impact and Policy Research Institute) for giving me the opportunity to work on this policy update and deepen my understanding of the India–Singapore Green Economy Partnership and its role in advancing sustainable growth. I am grateful to Arjun Sir and the entire IMPRI team for their guidance and support throughout the process. I would also like to thank my fellow interns and peers for their valuable discussions, feedback and encouragement, which made this learning experience more meaningful and enriching.
Name of the reviewers: Sneha Kohli and Neha Pal
Disclaimer
The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policies, or positions of IMPRI (Impact and Policy Research Institute) or any other affiliated organisation.
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