Occupational Safety, Health And Working Conditions Code, 2020: From Legislative Consolidation To Effective Worker Protection

Policy Update
Gargi Bisht

Background

Occupational safety and health (OSH) is both a labour-rights concern and a public-policy challenge. Unsafe workplaces impose costs through preventable injuries, occupational diseases, lost productivity and pressure on public health systems. In India, these risks are especially pronounced in hazardous industries such as mining, construction, manufacturing and chemical processing, where workers may face prolonged exposure to dangerous substances and inadequate protective infrastructure. In a parliamentary reply, the Minister of State for Labour and Employment, provided data that recorded approximately 1,000 fatal injuries annually in registered factories. Non-fatal injuries also remained above 2,800 annually (Sansad, Ministry of Labour and Employment, 2026).

Before the Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code, 2020, workplace safety was governed by multiple central statutes including the Factories Act, 1948, the Mines Act 1952, the Plantation Labour Act 1951, and the Building and Other Construction Workers Act, 1996. These laws developed around particular industries and categories of workers. While sector specific regulation enabled tailored protections, differences in registrations, registration requirements and compliance procedures created a fragmented regulatory architecture. The Second National Commission on Labour had identified the complexity of India’s labour legislation as a concern and recommended consolidation (PRS Legislative Research, 2020)

The OSH Code was enacted on September 28, 2020, to consolidate 13 central laws into a single framework. It was brought into force on November 21, 2025, as part of the implementation of India’s four Labour Codes (Ministry of Labour and Employment, 2025). The reform’s significance, however, extends beyond legislative simplification. It attempts to reconcile worker protection with ease of doing business.

Functioning

The OSH Code establishes common employer obligations, regulatory institutions and workplace welfare requirements. Section 6 requires employers to maintain workplaces free from hazards and comply with applicable safety standards. Section 23 addresses working conditions, including cleanliness, ventilation, drinking water, lighting, sanitation and waste management (Government of India, 2020).

Several provisions seek to improve worker welfare. Eligibility for annual leave with wages is reduced from 240 days of work under the Factories Act, 1948, to 180 days under the Code. The Code also provides for appointment letters, crèche facilities in establishments employing 50 or more workers, and free annual health examinations for prescribed categories of employees. For inter-state migrant workers within its statutory definition, it provides for journey allowances and other specified protections. Institutional oversight rests on national and state occupational safety advisory boards, while safety committees are required in specified establishments meeting prescribed thresholds. The Inspector-cum-Facilitator system is intended to combine compliance assistance with enforcement. Digital registration, common licensing and electronic filings are designed to reduce administrative duplication.

These developments are important because a statute often requires subordinate rules to specify the procedures, standards and operational responsibilities through which its provisions are implemented. Nevertheless, implementation is distributed across different levels of government. State authorities retain important responsibilities for rules, inspections and enforcement in their respective jurisdictions. Consequently, the Code’s effectiveness depends on coordination between national standard-setting and state-level administrative capacity.

Performance

The Code’s performance should be assessed against three criteria: regulatory efficiency, continuity of worker protections and the capacity to enforce safety standards. First, regulatory consolidation offers administrative advantage but doesn’t necessarily eliminate regulatory complexity. The Code replaces 13 statutes with a common legislative framework and streamlines registration, licensing and returns. This could reduce compliance costs, particularly for enterprises operating across multiple states. However, PRS Legislative (2020) observed that the original Code retained numerous establishment specific provisions alongside common requirements, Consolidation therefore simplifies the legislative structure more clearly than it eliminates the complexity of substantive compliance.

Second, the Code changes the scope and thresholds of regulation. Under the Factories Act, 1948, the general definition of a factory covered premises employing 10 or more workers where power was used and 20 or more where it was not. The OSH Code raises these thresholds to 20 and 40, respectively. The government argues that general safety and welfare obligations continue to apply to establishments employing 10 or more workers, limiting the implications for basic worker protection (Ministry of Labour and Employment, 2026). Nevertheless, changes to the definition of a factory can affect which establishments are subject to factory-specific regulatory requirements. The implications therefore depend on the interaction between general protections and establishment-specific provisions. Similarly, the licensing threshold for contract labour rises from 20 to 50 workers. Although the government presents this as an administrative simplification, the change warrants monitoring to establish whether it reduces unnecessary compliance burdens or weakens regulatory visibility over smaller contractor-dependent workplaces.

Third, some provisions represent substantive improvements. The reduction in the annual-leave eligibility threshold from 240 to 180 days potentially extends access to paid leave. The Code also brings migrant-worker protections into a consolidated framework and strengthens the emphasis on health examinations and workplace conditions. These changes address genuine gaps in the earlier regulatory structure. However, legal entitlements do not establish effective access. Annual health examinations are useful only when covered workers receive them and identified hazards lead to corrective action. Similarly, migrant-worker allowances have limited practical value when workers lack information, documentation or accessible grievance mechanisms.

A comparison of the pre-Code and post-Code provisions illustrates the extent of these changes: the factory employment threshold has increased from 10 workers (with power) and 20 (without power) to 20 and 40, respectively; the contract labour licensing threshold has risen from 20 to 50 workers; and the annual leave eligibility requirement has been reduced from 240 to 180 days. These changes reflect the Code’s dual approach of relaxing certain regulatory thresholds while expanding specific worker entitlements, making its actual performance dependent on how effectively these provisions translate into workplace protection.

Impact

The Code could have an impact on employee wellbeing, productivity and formalisation. Streamlined registration/licensing systems could lead to less duplication, clear employment documentation could empower employees to know what working conditions they are entitled to, and improved hygiene, ventilation, PPE and preventative health could lead to reduced exposure to occupational hazards. This also has wider implications as occupational exposure can lead to respiratory illnesses, cancers, musculoskeletal issues, hearing loss and other issues (World Health Organization). Prevention is key here, and occupational health is strongly linked to public health and economic development.

However, larger businesses would be more likely to have the resources to implement digital compliance systems and specialist safety equipment. Smaller businesses may struggle to meet the technological aspects and employees in insecure jobs may lack the power to request that businesses comply. The Code also creates a gap between compliance and actual protection. Businesses may comply by registering, keeping records and carrying out required checks but still fail to control exposure to hazardous materials. A health check up will not prevent exposure to silica dust in mining, nor will it ensure proper ventilation in chemical environments.

Therefore, the impact of the Code should be considered based on whether employers comply, but also whether employees are actually experiencing less exposure to risk, have better access to occupational health and feel safe to report any violations.

Emerging Challenges

The most significant implementation challenge lies in India’s federal structure. Although the code established common obligations, states differ in their industrial profiles, inspection capacity, healthcare infrastructure and digital readiness. Gujarat’s chemical and manufacturing industries, Kerala’s plantations, and the mining belts of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh require different enforcement priorities. A uniform national framework is crucial for minimum protection standards, however effective implementation is only possible through state specific operational strategies. In absence of adequate manpower, technical expertise and funding, statutory obligations risk becoming unevenly enforced across jurisdictions.

The section 18 allows the Central Government to establish occupational safety and health standards. Establishing national standards can lead to less fragmentation within industries that involve dangerous processes. However it can cause the system to become overly centralised and not be adaptable to local situations if the states do not have real opportunities to highlight any risks specific to certain sectors. There must be a balance between the centralisation of standards.

Amongst the other issues faced are dispute resolution. Section 125 holds that civil courts have no jurisdiction over matters under the code. Constitutional remedies however can still be used through the High Courts, and this could cause an issue with how accessible and timely the process of resolving disputes would be. Workers would not have the resources to take legal action. The Inspector-cum-Facilitator model needs to be considered carefully. While providing advice can help employers understand what they need to do it should not replace independent inspections. Facilitation should not be used to avoid taking any real action against serious and repeat breaches. While digital recording could increase transparency, there is a variation between the capabilities of States and establishments. Digital records do not necessarily mean safer workplaces. Without accurate information on occupational injuries, exposure to dangerous substances, occupational diseases and whether corrective orders have been followed, it will not be possible for policymakers to accurately determine if the code is meeting its aims.

Way Forward

First, establish a National Occupational Safety Performance Grant. The Centre could provide baseline funding for inspector training, occupational-health infrastructure, digital systems and protective equipment. Subsequent funding could be linked to independently verified outcomes, including inspection coverage, completion of corrective actions, access to prescribed health examinations and reductions in preventable workplace injuries. The performance framework must avoid rewarding states simply for reporting fewer accidents, since weak reporting can create misleading improvements. Independent audits, worker surveys and transparent reporting should complement quantitative indicators.

Second, introduce state-specific occupational safety plans. National standards should establish minimum protections, while state implementation plans identify sectoral risks. Mining-intensive states could prioritise respiratory disease screening and dust-control measures, while industrial states could strengthen chemical-risk monitoring and emergency preparedness.

Third, strengthen enforcement and worker participation. Safety committees should operate as meaningful forums for identifying hazards rather than merely fulfilling procedural requirements. Workers and trade unions should be able to report violations through accessible grievance mechanisms without fear of retaliation. Inspectors should have adequate staffing, technical training and authority to ensure corrective action.

Fourth, improve occupational-health data. A publicly accessible national database could integrate anonymised information on workplace injuries, occupational diseases, inspections and enforcement outcomes. Data should be disaggregated by industry, establishment size, employment arrangement and state. This would enable policymakers to identify persistent hazards and direct resources towards vulnerable workers.

Finally, evaluate the Code periodically. An independent review after sufficient implementation experience should compare outcomes with the pre-Code framework, examining compliance costs, worker protection, accident rates and access to remedies. The objective should be to identify whether consolidation has improved substantive safety, not merely administrative efficiency.

References

Government of India. (2020). The Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code, 2020 (Act No. 37 of 2020). India Code. https://dgfasli.gov.in/public/Admin/Cms/AllPdf/650059fbb8f1a9.98699174.pdf

Ministry of Labour and Employment. (2025, November 21). The government makes the four labour codes effective to simplify and streamline labour laws. Press Information Bureau, Government of India. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2192463&reg=48&lang=2

Ministry of Labour and Employment. (2025). The Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions (Central) Rules, 2025. Government of India. https://www.labour.gov.in/static/uploads/2026/01/bc7d6ec2898ac322644f2887ee4f5869.pdf

Ministry of Labour and Employment. (2026). The Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions (Central) Rules, 2026. Government of India. https://www.labour.gov.in/static/uploads/2026/05/ee246f790cad0b8e99c3828f34fa09a6.pdf?

Mani Tiwari, R. (2026, September 28). Safe and healthy workplace as a legal right: Does the OSH code deliver? The Indian Express. https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/safe-and-healthy-workplace-as-a-legal-right-does-the-osh-code-deliver-10897892/

PRS Legislative Research. (2020). The Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code, 2019.

https://prsindia.org/billtrack/the-occupational-safety-health-and-working-conditions-code-2019?

World Health Organization. (n.d.). Occupational health: India. https://www.who.int/india/health-topics/occupational-health?

Government of India, Ministry of Labour and Employment. (2026). Occupational safety (Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question No. 2332) https://sansad.in/getFile/annex/270/AU2332_YseaXv.pdf?source=pqars&utm

About the Contributor

Gargi Bisht is a history postgraduate from Miranda House, specializing in medieval history. Her interest lies at the intersection of history, research, and public policy, exploring issues related to governance, society, development, and international relations.

Acknowledgement

The author would like to express sincere gratitude to the IMPRI team for providing this valuable opportunity and for facilitating a platform to engage in and contribute to research and policy discourse, and also the reviewers Nivedya Murali and Ravirala Lahari

Disclaimer: All views expressed in the article belong solely to the author and not necessarily to the organisation.