Policy Update
Ameya Satam
Background:
Since the Korean War, India and South Korea’s defence relations were founded on India’s diplomatic role in the proposal of the “Armistice Agreement” at the UNGA, which had played a crucial role in ending the war. After the end of the war as well, India helped the Prisoners of War to return to their countries, including South Korea. Over the subsequent decades, these defence relations ripened between the two countries.
Transformation of Defence Relations (2010-Present) – As a result of this ripened defence relationship, a significant development in these bilateral ties was observed as the President of South Korea, Mr Lee Myung-bak, advanced it into a “Strategic Relationship” during his visit in 2010. Later, during PM Narendra Modi’s visit to South Korea in 2015, it was promoted to “Special Strategic Partnership”.
This deepening of defence relations represents a natural strategic alignment in the Indo-Pacific; it directly links the strategy of India’s ‘Act East Policy’ with South Korea’s ‘New Southern Policy,’ as both frameworks affirm building stable security architectures with regional partners. In Feb 2019, during a state visit of PM Narendra Modi to South Korea, in a bilateral meeting, South Korea’s President Moon Jae-in and PM Narendra Modi announced the strategic plan for future defence cooperation in defence co-production and defence technology.
In November 2025, an MOU was signed between India’s Cochin Shipyard Limited (CSL) and Hyundai Heavy Industries. The MOU declared that the companies will collaborate for designing and constructing a Landing Platform Dock (LPD), which will be utilized by the Indian Navy. In December 2025, another well-planned MOU was inked by Bharat Earth Movers Limited (BEML) and Hyundai KSOE. According to the MOU, the companies will create a plan to construct a next-generation maritime and port crane system in India. For India’s trainer, Korea Aerospace Industries has upraised FA-50 to fulfill the light combat needs (Nanda, 2026). Currently, both countries engage in the ‘2+2 dialogue’ between the foreign and defence ministries.
Recently, during the visit of the Defence Minister of India, Rajnath Singh, to Seoul, on 20 May, the Minister of National Defence of South Korea, Mr Ahn Gyu-back, discussed fostering collaboration in the fields of industry production, maritime security, emerging technologies, military exchanges, logistics & regional security.
Recent Developments:
As a part of the visit, Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) & agreements were signed and exchanged. The MoUs covered important areas of defence cooperation with a focus on expanding and deepening the bilateral relations. The agreements discussed about promoting cooperation in the area of Defence Cyber. The agreement supports the countries to strengthen their partnership in multidisciplinary fields through training sessions between India’s National Defence College and Korea National Defence University, and UN Peacekeeping Cooperation.
During the India-Korea business roundtable, Defence Minister of India, Rajnath Singh and South Korea’s Minister of Defence Acquisition Program Administration, Mr Lee Yong-chul, have agreed to apply combined efforts to develop opportunities for joint development, joint production and joint exports (Press Information Bureau, 2026).
With the aim of showcasing the real potential of the India-Korea Defence Innovation Accelerator Ecosystem (KIND-X), a strategic plan to connect the innovation ecosystems of both countries was discussed (Press Information Bureau, 2026). The Korean defence companies were urged by Rajnath Singh to increase engagement with the Indian industry and assist in carrying out a long-term alliance that will result in the common good for both countries. Rajnath Singh highlighted the success of India-Korea industrial cooperation in the business sector.
In this event, L&T, India and Hanwa Co Ltd signed two agreements with each other. On 21 May, Rajnath Singh and Minister of Patriots and Veterans Affairs Kwon Oh-eul together inaugurated the Indian War Memorial, which was made from black granite imported from India’s Rajasthan (Kumar, 2026). The names of the deceased Indian soldiers in the Korean War were borne on the memorial. Rajnath Singh visited the Korean War Cemetery in Seoul and paid tribute to the brave soldiers who had sacrificed their lives during the Korean War (Press Information Bureau, 2026).
Importance:
The recent visit and bilateral discussions are all favouring to the India’s vision of the Act East Policy and South Korea’s regional strategic vision. Both visions challenge China’s dominance in the Indo-Pacific region. The defence cooperation of India and South Korea is the need of the time as the U.S. has kept silent on the Taiwan issue, which creates a doubt about the protection of the Indo-Pacific. The allied countries of the U.S., like South Korea, Japan, etc., are feeling threatened by China, due to which India’s presence in the Indo-Pacific becomes significant as one more country that advocates for an open and free Indo-Pacific.
Naval exercises along with South Korea will keep China from gaining dominance in the Indo-Pacific, especially in the South China Sea. Both countries are concerned about the security of sea lanes in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, as China’s presence is seen in both areas frequently.
Collaborative opportunities in defence co-production will allow India to capitalize on technology transfers, as South Korea is one of the advanced countries in defence technology. Along with this, it will also contribute towards the Atmanirbhar Bharat Initiative, as India and South Korea will collaboratively make defence equipment. Previously, the Hanwha Aerospace Company had collaborated with Larsen & Toubro (L&T) to produce components for 200 K9 Vajra-T self-propelled howitzers to complete the requirement of the Indian Army. South Korea’s K9 Thunder evolved into K9 Vajra-T, which was only possible due to India and South Korea’s thoughtful collaboration.
When the second contract for K9 Vajra-T self-propelled howitzers was awarded, the CEO and President of Hanwha Aerospace, Jae-i I Son, had also stated that the company supports India’s vision for self-reliance in defence manufacturing (Hanwha Aerospace, 2024). The K9 Vajra-T program’s triumph has opened the doors for more exploration and created opportunities in the areas of air defence systems and advanced military technologies (Hanwha Aerospace, 2024). The result of the collaboration was that the K9 Vajra-T became one of the weapons with extraordinary capabilities in India’s challenging terrains.
Most importantly, the K9 Vajra-T has been stationed in the northern Ladakh region, which is known for ongoing territorial contests between India and China. India is also looking for the possibilities of upgrading the current Vajra model into air-defence guns and missile systems. India’s military advancement goals can be fulfilled by this collaboration, as the company has an extensive skillset in advanced air defence systems and aerospace technologies.
In the context of Defence Cyber Cooperation, KIND-X allows India and South Korea to jointly co-develop next-generation technologies like laser weapons, mobile air defence systems, and AI-driven platforms. Both countries may organize joint military cyber exercises, they may even create a joint cyber defence platform for real-time threat hunting, incident response and information sharing.
According to Rajnath Singh, India’s defence production is expected to reach around Rs 1.75 lakh crore till July 2026 as defence exports are estimated to reach Rs 50,000 crore within the next 1-2 years (Samedov, 2026). The collaboratively made defence equipment and technologies can expand the defence export market for India, as South Korea’s expertise in advanced technologies may add more advanced features to the defence equipment.
Indian expertise in producing missile technology and South Korea’s expertise in building tanks, howitzers, and submarines can strengthen each other’s respective fields. As South Korea is an ally of the U.S., China views India and South Korea’s growing defence cooperation as a danger to its expansionist policy. Furthermore, India and South Korea are situated in strategic locations, which help them to keep an eye on the activities of China.
The construction of the Indian War Memorial highlights the role of India during the Korean War. It is the recognition of India’s wartime support.
Challenges:
It becomes difficult for any foreign investor to invest in India for building manufacturing industries, as the issues that are related to land acquisition have surfaced very often. Sometimes, even labour unrest makes it tough to invest in India. The government-controlled institutions and rules, such as offset provisions, lengthy acquisition cycles, and price negotiations, discourage investors from investing in India (Nanda, 2025).
Limited participation of the private sector is another issue; at various times, they lack funds, or there are technological gaps in their machines. Heavy dependence on foreign imported components may delay projects, as global defence supply chains can also be affected in crisis-like situations, e.g., the Strait of Hormuz conflict.
India uses a diplomatic network for promoting defence contracts, but less than required, which mostly gets less attention, and the buyer countries also don’t take much interest in buying the product. India is dependent on the exports of China for the raw materials and rare-earth minerals, which are important for creating emerging technologies. India is also dependent on the exports of Chinese-made electronic sub-components and assemblies, which are used in drones. Through this China may steal important intelligence or may spy through it.
In 2017, China gave a sharp response to South Korea through tourism, entertainment, and retail, in response to stationing the US THAAD missile system (Nanda, 2025). As China is South Korea’s largest trading partner, the policymakers from South Korea were pressured due to the response (Nanda, 2025).
South Korea’s defence industrial sector is dependent on the global supply chains that depend on Chinese raw materials, rare-earth minerals and intermediate goods (Nanda, 2025).China has tight control over exports of these raw materials and rare-earth minerals, which may affect South Korea in developing defence techs if China restricts them for export; consequently, it may delay projects. South Korea is heavily dependent on foreign imported components. Labour shortages in the manufacturing industry, which delay international arms deliveries, limit factory output and may disturb Research and Development (R & D) (Kwon, 2024; Kim & Liang, 2025).
Way Forward:
India should protect the Korean defence technology secrets while working in the partnership. Leakage of any defence technology will damage India’s image on the global level, which may create difficulties for India to get future collaborations in defence technologies with other countries. India should work on issues that are being faced by foreign investors in manufacturing industries.
To become one of the largest defence systems exporters, India will have to strengthen its defence relations to transform them into defence cooperations, which will help India and other countries to collaborate and create new defence technologies and equipment. India should focus on manufacturing electronic sub-components and assemblies that are used in drones and other necessary military devices. Self-dependency in this is a must.
In the upcoming years, India aims to produce atleast 50% of locally made defence equipment, and this goal can be fulfilled rapidly only if India expands strategic defence cooperation with other countries (Samedov, 2026). Collaborations with Hanwha-like companies, which have specialisation in aerospace and air defence systems, will benefit India in the prospect of technology transfer.
The good news is that India is trying to build a more flexible military-industrial ecosystem. Through this ecosystem, a single well-planned framework has been applied to private companies, start-ups, state corporations, and the armed forces to function. Such a framework and collaborations together will support India to achieve its planned target of attaining 50,000 crore rupees in defence exports by 2030. Once India increases local production of defence systems, it can create a market for those countries that are not willing to purchase defence systems from the West, Russia and China.
In April, during the visit of South Korean President Lee Jae Myung, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated, “From chips to ships, from talent to technology, and from environment to energy, we will realise new opportunities for cooperation across all sectors. Together, we will ensure the progress and prosperity of both our nations”. This suggests that India looks upon South Korea as a reliable partner from where India can get strong support for succeeding in its Viksit Bharat @2047 vision.
References:
- Embassy of India, Seoul. (2026). India-ROK defence relations. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. https://www.indembassyseoul.gov.in/india-rok-defence-relations
- Press Information Bureau. (2026, May 20). Raksha Mantri holds bilateral talks with Minister of National Defence, Republic of Korea in Seoul. Ministry of Defence, Government of India. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2263304
- Hanwha Aerospace. (2024, February 21). Hanwha Aerospace secures second K9 Vajra-T contract from India (Seq. No. 499). Hanwha Aerospace Media Center. https://m.hanwhaaerospace.com/eng/media/newsroom/view.do?seq=499
- DD News. (2026, May 18). Rajnath Singh to visit Vietnam, South Korea to deepen defence and Indo-Pacific cooperation. https://ddnews.gov.in/en/rajnath-singh-to-visit-vietnam-south-korea-to-deepen-defence-and-indo-pacific-cooperation/
- Larsen & Toubro. (2024, December 23). L&T Precision Engineering Systems wins major order for K9 Vajra-T artillery platforms [Press release]. https://www.larsentoubro.com/pressreleases/2024-12-23-lt-precision-engineering-systems-wins-major-order-for-k9-vajra-t-artillery-platforms
- Nanda, P. (2026, May 23). Subs, jets, missiles, thunder: India, South Korea set to boost defense ties despite Chinese speed barriers. The EurAsian Times. https://www.eurasiantimes.com/subs-jets-missiles-thunder-india-south-korea-set-to-boost-defense-ties-despite-chinese-speed-barriers/
- Ho, B., & Yoo, H. (2026, April 14). China-South Korea relations: Strategic imperatives amid a changing Asia-Pacific geopolitical landscape (IDSS Policy Report No. IP26021). S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/idss/ip26021-china-south-korea-relations-strategic-imperatives-amid-a-changing-asia-pacific-geopolitical-landscape/
- Samedov, M. (2026, May 24). China built an arms empire. Now India wants its own. News.Az. https://news.az/news/china-built-an-arms-empire-now-india-wants-its-own
- Kumar, S. (2026, May 24). India, South Korea unveil Korean War memorial near DMZ. The Korea Herald. https://www.koreaherald.com/article/10755243
- Kwon, P. B. (2024, November 13). South Korea’s military manufacturing hub needs revitalisation. East Asia Forum. https://eastasiaforum.org/2024/11/13/south-koreas-military-manufacturing-hub-needs-revitalisation/
- Kim, M., & Liang, X. (2025, December 10). Can the growth trend in South Korea’s arms industry last? SIPRI Commentary. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2025/can-growth-trend-south-koreas-arms-industry-last
- Srivastava, A. (2026, May 22). From chips to ships: India, South Korea elevate a trusted partnership to futuristic partnership. New Delhi Times. https://www.newdelhitimes.com/from-chips-to-ships-india-south-korea-elevate-a-trusted-partnership-to-futuristic-partnership/
- Linganna, G. (2025, April 16). The hidden Chinese shadow in India’s defence: A wake-up call. India.com. https://www.india.com/news/world/the-hidden-chinese-shadow-in-indias-defence-a-wake-up-call-7760529/
About the Contributor
Ameya Satam is a Research & Editorial Intern at IMPRI specializing in International Relations and Strategic Studies. He completed his post-graduation in International Relations at Sikkim University, focusing on Indo-Pacific geopolitics and India–US cooperation, and is dedicated to analyzing regional security frameworks to inform evidence-based policy discourse.
Acknowledgement
I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to Ms.Tanvi Nerurkar, Ms.Samah K. and IMPRI India for their guidance and support.
Disclaimer: All views expressed in the article belong solely to the author and not necessarily to the organization.




