Village Defence Guards Scheme (2022): Assessing Community-Based Border Security In Jammu And Kashmir

Policy Update
Dolly Kaushik

This article examines the Village Defence Guards Scheme (VDGS) as a case study in community-based auxiliary security policy in a contested border region. Community militia models have long been used by states facing insurgency or infiltration threats in remote, difficult-to-secure terrain, offering rapid local response capacity where formal security forces face logistical constraints. However, such models also carry well-documented risks around accountability, oversight, and civilian harm when institutional command structures are weak. By examining the VDGS through its 2022 legal restructuring, deployment scale, and the operational and human costs borne by its members, this study assesses whether India’s most recent iteration of civilian border militias has meaningfully addressed the structural weaknesses of its predecessor, and what risks remain as the scheme matures.

Background and Evolution

The Village Defence Guard Scheme (VDGS) was officially approved by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) on March 2, 2022, and formally notified into effect in the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir on August 15, 2022, via Government Order No. 287-Home of 2022 (Government of Jammu and Kashmir [GoJK], 2022).

Rather than emerging as an entirely novel administrative creation, the scheme represents a revival and comprehensive overhaul that explicitly supersedes the legacy Village Defence Committees (VDC) framework originally established under Government Order No. Home-293 of 1995 (GoJK, 2022; Republic World, 2022). The historical precursor, the VDC system, was conceived in the mid-1990s during the peak of cross-border militancy in the Jammu division to protect remote, scattered, and vulnerable mountainous hamlets from sudden terror incursions where immediate deployment of formal security forces was logistically constrained.

Over nearly three decades of operation, however, the legacy VDC model encountered severe organizational bottlenecks. Judicial scrutiny played a critical catalysing role in forcing these administrative reforms, notably reflected in proceedings before the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh in WP(C) 3262/2019 (Kewal Krishan and Ors. v. State of J&K), which brought longstanding grievances regarding equity and operational remuneration to the forefront (The Print, 2022).

A principal operational flaw of the 1995 framework was its compensation asymmetry: only the designated Special Police Officer (SPO) in charge of a committee received a regular honorarium, while general members served on an entirely unpaid, voluntary basis (IBTimes India, 2022). This disparity created significant accountability gaps and morale issues over years of prolonged counter-terrorism deployment.

The 2022 order directly addresses these legacy limitations by instituting a formalized, tiered remuneration structure for all participants, thereby transitioning the nomenclature from passive “committees” to structured “groups” of “Village Defence Guards” (GoJK, 2022). Although an interim policy shift in 2020 had conceptually initiated the renaming of VDCs to Village Defence Groups, the August 2022 order translated these distinctions into binding legal parameters (The Print, 2022; Republic World, 2022).

By coupling financial compensation with clear district-level police command, the 2022 scheme transformed an ad-hoc local defense mechanism into a standardized, accountable auxiliary security framework designed to counter modern asymmetric threats in vulnerable frontier zones (GoJK, 2022).

Structural Design and Functioning

The Village Defence Guards Scheme (VDGS) 2022 establishes a formalized auxiliary mechanism engineered to decentralize local security and integrate civilian participation directly into the police command architecture (GoJK, 2022). Operating primarily within identified vulnerable border and depth areas of the Jammu division, the scheme replaces ambiguous legacy structures with well-defined operational parameters (Greater Kashmir, 2022).

Composition, Recruitment, and Training

Each Village Defence Group is formed at the panchayat or village level with a maximum ceiling of 15 members. Selection is managed by the district administration, led by the District Magistrate and the Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP), drawing from ex-servicemen, ex-policemen, and able-bodied local volunteers who possess verified credentials and proficiency in handling arms.

To ensure tactical competence, weapon handling and tactical orientation are coordinated through training regimens conducted by central security forces, including the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and the Indian Army. A critical upgrade embedded within the 2022 scheme is the transition of offensive equipment: groups are progressively re-armed with advanced Self-Loading Rifles (SLRs) to replace aging, legacy .303 rifles, enhancing their defensive capability against modern asymmetric threats.

Command, Control, and Administrative Integration

Crucially, the VDGs do not operate as autonomous or vigilante units; they are embedded within the law enforcement grid. Each group functions under the direct command, supervision, and operational direction of the District Superintendent of Police (SP) or SSP. The District Magistrate is mandated to dove-tail the deployment of these groups with existing border and depth-area security deployments maintained by central and state forces, ensuring optimized manpower and tactical synchronization.

To reinforce grassroots reporting, traditional local functionaries such as Village Chowkidars and Lambardars in designated “more vulnerable areas” are formally tasked with assisting the VDGs in intelligence gathering and community mobilization.

Tiered Remuneration Architecture

Addressing the core deficit of the 1995 framework, wherein only the group head received compensation, the 2022 scheme institutes a transparent, two-tier financial model that guarantees monthly stipends across all participating levels:

Category V-1: Comprises group leaders or coordinators in “more vulnerable areas” who command the unit, maintain primary liaison with police stations, and are authorized to utilize police wireless communication facilities for operational reporting. These coordinators receive a fixed monthly honorarium of ₹4,500.
Category V-2: Comprises general members of the defence group who execute day and night patrols and local surveillance tasks. These members receive a flat monthly stipend of ₹4,000.

Operational Duties and Tactical Deployment

The operational charter of the VDGs centers on active deterrence and localized defense. Members are assigned mandatory responsibilities including round-the-clock day and night patrolling of vulnerable settlement perimeters, safeguarding community and religious infrastructure against sabotage, and acting as immediate first-responders during sudden infiltrations or security breaches. Due to their intimate knowledge of local topography and forest trails, VDGs routinely assist security forces during search-and-cordon operations (CASO) and intelligence-led counter-militancy sweeps.

Performance, Deployment Scale, and Capacity Building

Evaluating the operational footprint of the Village Defence Guard Scheme requires looking at official deployment metrics alongside ongoing institutional investment by state and military authorities. According to official data from the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) Annual Report 2022–23, the security architecture across Jammu and Kashmir incorporates 4,153 active Village Defence Groups working alongside a complement of 32,355 Special Police Officers (SPOs) (Ministry of Home Affairs [MHA], 2023; Daily Excelsior, 2023). Within this broader human-resource matrix, the total sanctioned strength for SPOs stands at 34,707 positions, reflecting an operational filling rate of 32,355 active personnel who connect rural communities with the formal police grid (MHA, 2023).

To address historical attrition and sustain operational morale, the compensation framework governing auxiliary personnel has been progressively reformed. The remuneration structure for SPOs is linked to tenure milestones, providing a sliding scale that reaches ₹18,000 per month based on cumulative service length:

Under 3 years: ₹6,000 per month
3 to 5 years: ₹9,000 per month
5 to 10 years: ₹12,000 per month
10 to 15 years: ₹15,000 per month
15+ years: ₹18,000 per month

Beyond deployment statistics and compensation structures, the operational efficacy of the scheme depends heavily on continuous tactical reinforcement by the regular armed forces. Institutional investment in the program extends well beyond the initial 2022 statutory rollout.

A clear indicator of sustained civil-military integration is reflected in targeted capacity-building exercises, such as the training program conducted by the Indian Army’s Sabre Brigade at Purmandal in Jammu. These periodic drills focus on hands-on weapon handling, advanced firing practices, and synchronized basic battle drills, ensuring that civilian guards maintain operational readiness, minimize weapon-handling risks, and effectively coordinate with regular counter-terrorism grids when responding to security emergencies in vulnerable frontier zones.

The strategic significance of the VDGS 2022 lies in its official framing as a “force multiplier” for state police and central security forces, bridging coverage gaps in remote, difficult-to-access border and mountainous topography. The predecessor Village Defence Committees, established in the mid-1990s, are widely credited in government and security commentary with helping curb the spread of militancy across high-risk sectors of the Jammu division, particularly in districts like Rajouri, Poonch, and Doda, during the height of cross-border terrorism.

By embedding armed local volunteers who possess intimate geographical knowledge of jungle paths and isolated hamlets, the state created a layer of resistance that prevented insurgent groups from establishing unhindered safe havens in deep rural terrain.

Despite its historical utility, the legacy architecture suffered from critical capability gaps when confronted with evolving militant tactics. A definitive turning point occurred following the twin terror attacks in Dhangri village of Rajouri district in January 2023, which resulted in the deaths of seven civilians, including two children.

Post-incident security evaluations revealed that while local defense committees existed on paper, they were handicapped by outdated, single-shot .303 rifles heavily outmatched by the automated weaponry carried by infiltrating terrorists (Deccan Herald, 2023). In direct response to this operational failure and public pressure, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs and the Union Territory administration accelerated the implementation of the revamped VDGS framework, re-arming qualified VDGs, particularly retired army and paramilitary personnel, with Self-Loading Rifles (SLRs) to ensure tactical parity during initial engagements (Deccan Herald, 2023).

The reality of the VDGs’ frontline role is further underlined by the personal costs borne by its members. Active participants have repeatedly engaged infiltrating terrorists at extreme personal risk. On 28 April 2024, VDG member Mohd Sharief was killed during a cordon-and-search operation following a gunfight with terrorists at Panara village, Basantgarh, in Udhampur district (The Tribune, 2024). Such engagements highlight both the deterrent value of the guards in intercepting early-stage infiltration before it penetrates deeper into the hinterland, and the continuous physical risk faced by rural civilian volunteers operating in terrain where formal reinforcement can take hours to arrive.

Emerging Issues and Structural Challenges

Despite the overhauls introduced by the 2022 scheme, the Village Defence Guard framework continues to grapple with several operational bottlenecks and policy tensions. Chief among these is a persistent equipment disparity voiced directly by active members on the ground.

While the transition from legacy .303 rifles to SLRs represented a step forward following incidents like the Dhangri attacks, village guards have publicly demanded more advanced automatic weaponry and enhanced financial allowances (The Tribune, 2024).

Guards argue that the evolving threat matrix, characterized by heavily armed and well-trained infiltrating cadres equipped with modern assault rifles and communication gear, leaves semi-equipped civilian volunteers at a tactical disadvantage (The Tribune, 2024).

This operational reality brings to light a deeper question regarding risk exposure versus compensation. Because VDGs function as immediate first-responders in isolated and rugged terrain, they frequently absorb the initial brunt of terrorist incursions before central paramilitary forces or state police can reinforce the area.

The killing of VDG member Mohd Sharief at Basantgarh underscores that members face front-line mortality risk without the comprehensive life insurance, institutional safety nets, or specialized medical evacuation support standard to regular police forces (The Tribune, 2024).

Investigative reporting on the scheme’s 2022–23 revival has separately noted that arming non-state civilian groups carries long-term challenges around local accountability and human rights governance if strict institutional command is not continuously maintained (Article 14, 2023). No independent audit currently confirms whether such risks have materialized under the 2022 framework specifically, but the concern is worth flagging for future monitoring given the scheme’s continued expansion.

Way Forward and Policy Recommendations

Addressing these emerging challenges requires a forward-looking administrative strategy that transitions the VDGS from a reactive, crisis-driven security intervention into a professionalized auxiliary apparatus. Based on the operational trajectory observed since the 2022 rollout, the following policy measures merit consideration:

Institutionalizing Periodic Capability and Equipment Reviews: Rather than upgrading weaponry exclusively in the aftermath of security failures, such as the reactive transition to SLRs following the Dhangri attacks, the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Jammu and Kashmir administration should establish a periodic technical review board to assess shifting threat parameters and update weapon systems, night-vision equipment, and secure communication gear.

Expanding Professionalized Civil-Military Training and Intelligence Networks: The value of capacity-building initiatives, such as the training conducted by the Indian Army’s Sabre Brigade at Purmandal, points toward institutionalizing these as mandatory, recurring quarterly drills across vulnerable districts, focusing on defensive positioning, weapon-handling safety, and rural intelligence synchronization. Establishing dedicated secure communication channels between village groups and local police stations would also reduce response latency during emergencies.

Reforming the Remuneration and Welfare Parity Architecture: A notable discrepancy currently exists within the auxiliary security ecosystem. While SPOs benefit from a tenure-based pay-progression scale ranging from ₹6,000 to ₹18,000 per month, VDG remuneration remains flat (₹4,000 to ₹4,500) regardless of operational experience or tenure. Introducing a tiered, experience-linked increment structure for VDGs, alongside ex-gratia life insurance coverage and medical support for injured volunteers, would recognize accumulated tactical expertise and support long-term retention.

Institutionalizing Legal Oversight and Accountability Frameworks: To address legacy concerns regarding human rights and local friction associated with community-militia models, the administration should couple weapon deployment with legal oversight, including periodic psychological evaluations, background verifications, routine weapon-audit checks by district superintendents of police, and human rights sensitization workshops, to ensure civilian auxiliary forces operate within constitutional governance and police command structures.

References

Article 14. (2023, April 5). As J&K government reactivates a controversial civilian militia, local Hindus in an isolated village feel safer.https://www.google.com/search?q=https://article-14.com/post/as-j-k-govt-reactivates-a-controversial-civilian-local-hindus-in-an-isolated-village-feel-safer–642cd92d7f8f0

Daily Excelsior. (2023). 4,153 Village Defence Groups, 32,355 SPOs deployed in Jammu and Kashmir. https://www.dailyexcelsior.com/4153-village-defence-groups-32355-spos-deployed-in-jammu-and-kashmir/

Deccan Herald. (2023). J&K: Village Defence Guards get assault rifles to counter terror attacks. https://www.deccanherald.com/amp/story/india%2Fjk-village-defence-guards-get-assault-rifles-to-counter-terror-attacks-1179620.html

Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Home Department. (2022, August 14). Government Order No. 287-Home of 2022: Sanction to the creation of the Village Defence Guards Scheme (VDGS)-2022. https://jkhome.nic.in/pdf/287of2022.pdf

Greater Kashmir. (2022). J&K govt launches Village Defence Guards Scheme-2022. https://www.greaterkashmir.com/uncategorized/jk-govt-launches-village-defence-guards-scheme-2022/

IBTimes India. (2022). What is J&K’s Village Defence Guards Scheme? New way to foil terrorists’ evil designs, details. https://www.ibtimes.co.in/what-jks-village-defence-guards-scheme-new-way-foil-terrorists-evil-designs-details-851373

Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. (2023). Annual Report 2022-23. https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/AnnualreportEnglish_04102023.pdf

State Times. (2023, October 10). 4,153 Village Defence Groups, 32,355 SPOs deployed in J&K. State Times. https://statetimes.net/4153-village-defence-groups-32355-spos-deployed-in-jk/

Republic World. (2022). J&K Village Defence Guards Scheme comes into force; Jitendra Singh hails MHA move. https://www.republicworld.com/india-news/general-news/j-and-k-village-defence-guards-scheme-comes-into-force-jitendra-singh-hails-mha-move-articleshow.html

The Print. (2022). Village Defence Guard Scheme comes into force in Jammu and Kashmir. https://theprint.in/india/village-defence-guard-scheme-comes-into-force-in-jammu-and-kashmir/1083623/

The Tribune. (2024). Village Defence Guards want automatic weapons, enhanced allowances to fight terror effectively in J&K. https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/j-k/village-defence-guards-want-automatic-weapons-enhanced-allowances-to-fight-terror-effectively-in-j-k-616021

About the Contributor

Dolly Kaushik is a postgraduate student of Public Administration with an interdisciplinary academic foundation in Life Science. Her work explores the geopolitical dimensions of emerging technologies, global governance, and international affairs. She is currently a research intern at IMPRI, New Delhi.

Acknowledgement

The author extends her sincere gratitude to the reviewers Ambika Sharma, Himanshi Singh publisher Prisha Sachdeva and the IMPRI team for their valuable guidance throughout the process. I also extend my sincere thanks to for their valuable feedback.