Partnership or Promise? The India–France Joint Statement as a Legal Instrument

Policy Update

Katyayani Sinha

Background

In February 2026, Emmanuel Macron, the President of France, made an official trip to India after being invited by Prime Minister Narendra Modi. During his visit, he took part in the Artificial Intelligence Impact Summit 2026 and engaged in bilateral discussions in Mumbai on February 17. The two leaders inaugurated the 2026 India-France Year of Innovation and agreed to elevate their bilateral relationship to a “Special Global Strategic Partnership.” This partnership is outlined in the joint statement as a “force for global good” that can help foster prosperity, resilience, and a “stable rules-based international order.”

India and France share a rich bilateral history. Their diplomatic ties were established in 1947, and in 1998, they launched their first Strategic Partnership, India’s first with a Western country and France’s first with a non-Western nation. Over the years, their relationship has deepened, expanding into defence, civil nuclear energy, space, and more recently, artificial intelligence and digital governance. The 2026 elevation to “Special Global Strategic Partnership” marks the most recent step in a series of enhancements to the official title of this relationship.

This elevation brings up a question that most commentaries seem to have overlooked: what does the term “Special Global Strategic Partnership” really signify in international law? Unlike a formal military alliance or a bilateral investment treaty, a strategic partnership usually doesn’t come with a legally binding defence agreement or explicit security guarantees, it represents an informal or politically declared arrangement. The joint statement released on February 17, 2026, is an important diplomatic milestone, but it doesn’t qualify as a treaty in the technical sense. It was not registered with the United Nations under Article 102 of the UN Charter, lacks a ratification clause, and doesn’t establish any dispute resolution mechanism.

This matters because the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 1969, serves as the cornerstone for understanding the legal status of international agreements. While India hasn’t officially ratified the VCLT, that doesn’t mean it can ignore its implications. The Supreme Court of India has recognised that the principles outlined in Articles 31–33 of the VCLT are accepted as part of customary international law, offering valuable interpretive guidance within the Indian legal system. In the AWAS Ireland case, the Bombay High Court confirmed that Indian courts have explicitly embraced VCLT principles as applicable customary law. The criteria set out by the VCLT for binding agreements are therefore relevant to India’s international instruments, even without ratification.

This article examines the India-France “Special Global Strategic Partnership” not just as a diplomatic relationship, but as a legal instrument. It asks what the joint statement from February 2026 actually is under international law, which commitments bind either state, and what the choice of soft-law language tells us about contemporary diplomacy. The central argument is that while the joint statement is non-binding in the eyes of international law, that doesn’t make it irrelevant. Grasping why states lean towards these instruments, and what hard-law framework supports political rhetoric, is crucial for assessing what the partnership is truly capable of delivering.

Functioning

To assess the legal standing of the February 2026 joint statement, it is first necessary to understand what international law says about the instruments states use to document diplomatic agreements, and where joint statements and “strategic partnership” declarations fit into that picture.

According to Article 2(1)(a) of the VCLT, a treaty is an international agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by international law. What matters isn’t the title of the document, whether it’s called a “joint statement,” “declaration,” “roadmap,” or “partnership”, but the intention of the parties to establish legally binding obligations. A document labelled a “treaty” might not create obligations if there’s no intention to be bound. Equally, a “joint statement” could include binding commitments if the language and context support that interpretation. The Opinio Juris analysis of the Berlin Accords highlights this point, a joint statement that memorialises diplomatic negotiations can hold legal significance in context, even without qualifying as a binding treaty.

The phrase “Special Global Strategic Partnership” adds no legal clarity to this picture. Strategic partnerships have no fixed legal definition; they are a fluid political concept that depends entirely on what the countries involved decide to include. As Wilkins (2026) points out, even though more than 1,400 such agreements existed by 2020, the paradigm lacks a clear legal status, with partnerships varying widely from near-alliance security arrangements to loosely defined cooperation frameworks.

What determines the legal weight of any specific commitment within a joint statement is the language used. International law distinguishes between mandatory language, “shall,” “agree to,” “commit to”, and aspirational language, “reaffirm,” “look forward to,” “aim to,” “will endeavour.” The former can create binding expectations in appropriate context; the latter expresses political intent without legal obligation. A reading of the February 2026 joint statement reveals that the overwhelming majority of its formulations are aspirational. Phrases such as “both sides reaffirm their commitment” and “the leaders agreed to explore” suggest political alignment rather than legal obligation.

The choice of soft-law framing is not coincidental. Bradley, Goldsmith, and Hathaway (2023) document in the University of Chicago Law Review that global reliance on non-binding international agreements has risen dramatically. States prefer these instruments because they enable cooperation without domestic ratification processes, maintain sovereign flexibility, and can be agreed quickly at the political level. Soft legalization, as Abbott and Snidal note, allows for compromise between parties with varying interests, timelines, and power levels in ways that rigid treaties cannot. The India-France joint statement is a textbook illustration, a document that carries political weight but intentionally avoids legal obligation.

Performance

The February 2026 joint statement does not exist in a vacuum,it sits within a bilateral relationship that already contains genuinely binding legal instruments, and the contrast between those instruments and the statement’s soft-law language is instructive.

The clearest example is the Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA) signed on April 28, 2025, for the procurement of 26 Rafale-Marine aircraft for the Indian Navy. An IGA is a binding government-to-government contract, signed by defence ministers and approved by India’s Cabinet Committee on Security, with a hard delivery deadline of 2030 and specific obligations for technology transfer, weapons integration, and MRO facility establishment in India. When the February 2026 joint statement references further Rafale co-production and deepened defence industrial cooperation, it layers aspirational political language onto a pre-existing binding instrument. Those obligations did not come from the statement,they were already laid out in the IGA.

The DTAA Amending Protocol, signed on February 23, 2026, offers an equally instructive case. Unlike the joint statement, the Amending Protocol is unambiguously a treaty, it amends the 1992 India-France Double Taxation Avoidance Convention, introduces changes to capital gains taxation, eliminates the Most Favoured Nation clause, and becomes operative only upon completion of internal legal procedures in both countries, meaning parliamentary ratification in France and equivalent domestic procedures in India. This instrument was signed six days after the joint statement, requiring its own signing ceremony, distinct signatories, and a separate ratification process. Where the joint statement required two leaders and a press conference, the DTAA amendment involves two governments’ legal machineries and will require two parliaments.

Together, these instruments reveal that the binding architecture of the India-France relationship lives underneath the joint statement, not within it. The statement announces, signals, and politically endorses, but the legal work happens elsewhere, through instruments purpose-built to bear legal weight.

Impact

The finding that the February 2026 joint statement is non-binding does not render it without consequence. The bilateral track record since 1998 offers the most direct evidence. The 1998 Strategic Partnership, equally non-binding as a designation, generated entirely concrete outcomes: all six Scorpene submarines were commissioned into the Indian Navy by January 2025, 36 Rafale aircraft were delivered by 2022, bilateral trade more than doubled over a decade to €13.59 billion in 2025-26, and France became the 11th largest foreign investor in India with cumulative FDI of €10.50 billion.

This is how soft law functions at its best. As Shelton (2000) argues, non-binding instruments are often the first rung of a ladder,creating the political conditions under which states subsequently negotiate harder, enforceable commitments. The 2026 joint statement should be evaluated not as a final legal instrument but as a political platform: its value depends on what binding instruments it generates over time, whether DTAA ratification completes, whether Rafale co-production moves from MoU to contract, whether the Year of Innovation produces institutional agreements with legal standing.

The risk is that the gap between declaration and delivery goes unmonitored. Without a dispute resolution mechanism, parliamentary scrutiny, or a formal accountability framework, there is no legal trigger for either state to act if commitments stall. Political will, not legal obligation, remains the only enforcement mechanism,and political will is revocable.

Emerging Issues

Two structural tensions in the India-France partnership deserve closer legal scrutiny than the joint statement invites.

The first concerns the limits of French authority within the European Union. Several commitments in the joint statement, covering trade, investment, digital governance, and AI regulation, touch areas governed by EU exclusive or shared competence under Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). As EUR-Lex confirms, trade policy is an EU exclusive competence, meaning only the EU can negotiate and conclude binding agreements in this domain.

Individual member states, including France, cannot make legally binding bilateral commitments on these matters. Where an agreement covers both EU and member-state competence areas, it becomes a “mixed agreement” requiring consent from both. The practical consequence is that several of the joint statement’s most ambitious commitments, on market access, investment facilitation, and AI governance alignment, are ones France does not have unilateral legal authority to deliver.

The second concerns India’s domestic legal framework for treaty-making. As NextIAS (2022) and LawBhoomi document, India has never enacted legislation governing how it assumes international treaty obligations. Under Articles 73 and 253 of the Constitution, the executive retains power to sign and ratify international agreements without mandatory parliamentary approval, Parliament’s role is limited to ex-post implementation of obligations already accepted. This creates a democratic deficit that applies not only to binding treaties but, more acutely, to non-binding instruments like the joint statement, which receive even less scrutiny. Citizens and legislators have no formal mechanism to assess what has been committed to, in whose name, and on what legal basis.

Way Forward

Three concrete steps follow from this analysis. First, India should develop a mandatory parliamentary notification mechanism for all international agreements, binding and non-binding alike. The Australian model, which requires the executive to table a “national interest analysis” before a treaty is signed, offers a workable template that preserves executive flexibility while restoring legislative oversight.

Second, analysts and think tanks covering India’s bilateral partnerships should adopt a disaggregated reporting framework, distinguishing between the joint statement as a political event and the specific binding instruments that underpin it. Treating aspirational language and legal obligation as equivalent obscures accountability and overstates what diplomacy has delivered.

Third, the 2026 joint statement should be benchmarked against specific, time-bound deliverables: DTAA ratification timelines in both parliaments, Rafale co-production moving from letter of intent to binding contract, and the Year of Innovation producing at least one institutional agreement with legal standing. Soft law earns its legitimacy not at signing but in what it generates,and that is measurable.

References

1. India–France Joint Statement, February 17, 2026. Élysée (French Government).
   https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2026/02/17/india-france-joint-statement-1

2. India–France Joint Statement, February 17, 2026. Prime Minister of India (PMO).
   https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/india-france-joint-statement-2/

3. India–France Joint Statement, February 17, 2026. Press Information Bureau, Government of India. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2229412&reg=3&lang=2
4. Inter-Governmental Agreement inked with France for 26 Rafale-Marine aircraft for Indian Navy. Press Information Bureau, Government of India.
   https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2124851&reg=3&lang=2

5. Wilkins, T.S. (2026). A Paradigmatic Study of Strategic Partnerships in International Relations. Contemporary Security Policy. Tandfonline.
   https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2026.2622863

6. Bradley, C., Goldsmith, J. & Hathaway, O. (2023). The Rise of Nonbinding International Agreements: An Empirical, Comparative, and Normative Analysis. University of Chicago Law Review, 90(5).
   https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6349&context=uclrev

7. Shelton, D.L. (2000). Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System. Oxford University Press.
   https://global.oup.com/academic/product/commitment-and-compliance-9780199270989

8. Shelton, D.L. (2009). Soft Law. In Routledge Handbook of International Law. GWU Law School Faculty Publications.
   https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications/1049/

9. Opinio Juris — “When Is a ‘Joint Statement’ a Treaty?” (2008).
   https://opiniojuris.org/2008/12/23/when-is-a-joint-statement-a-treaty/

10. Opinio Juris — “Indian Court Embraces the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties” (AWAS Ireland case, Bombay High Court) (2015).
    http://opiniojuris.org/2015/04/02/guest-post-indian-court-embraces-the-vienna-convention-on-law-of-treaties/

11. IndiaCorpLaw — “Interpretation of DTAAs: A Special Case of Explicitly Applying Vienna Convention” (Ram Jethmalani v. Union of India) (2023).
    https://indiacorplaw.in/2023/04/20/interpretation-of-dtaas-a-special-case-of-explicitly-applying-vienna-convention-for-treaty-interpretation/

12. Embassy of India, Paris — India-France Bilateral Brief (updated 2026).
    https://www.eoiparis.gov.in/page/bilateral-brief/

13. EUR-Lex — International Agreements and the EU’s External Competences.
    https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/international-agreements-and-the-eu-s-external-competences.html

14. NextIAS — “Parliamentary Oversight over International Treaties” (2022).
    https://www.nextias.com/ca/editorial-analysis/24-05-2022/parliamentary-oversight-over-international-treaties
15. LawBhoomi — “Position Relating to Treaties under the Indian Constitution.”
    https://lawbhoomi.com/position-relating-to-treaties-under-the-indian-constitution/

16. EY India — “Press Release on Amending Protocol to India-France Tax Treaty” (February 2026).
    https://www.ey.com/en_in/technical/alerts-hub/2026/02/press-release-on-amending-protocol-to-india-france-tax-treaty

17. International Tax Review — “India and France Sign Updated Tax Treaty in ‘Significant Development'” (February 2026).
    https://www.internationaltaxreview.com/article/2g0ubauasohstbihitdkw/direct-tax/india-and-france-sign-updated-tax-treaty-in-significant-development

About the Contributor

Katyayani Sinha is a research and editorial intern at IMPRI. She is a second-year MA International Relations student. Her focus is foreign Policy and strategic affairs, and for the past few months She has been involved in political research at various organisations. 

Acknowledgment

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to IMPRI (Impact and Policy Research Institute) for giving me the opportunity to write articles and providing me with this platform. 

Disclaimer

All views expressed in the article belong solely to the author and do not necessarily represent the views or policies of the organisation. 

Name of the reviewer:

Shivali Yadav

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