India's COP26 "Panchamrit" Climate Pledges (2021)

Policy Update

Katyayani Sinha

Background

At COP26 in Glasgow on 1 November 2021, Prime Minister Narendra Modi unveiled five ambitious climate commitments for India, collectively known as Panchamrit, which translates to “five nectars” in Sanskrit. These pledges include: (i) 500GW of non-fossil energy capacity by 2030; (ii) meeting 50% of energy requirements from renewable energy by 2030; (iii) cutting projected cumulative carbon emissions by 1 billion tonnes between then 2030; (iv) reducing the emissions intensity of GDP by 45% from 2005 levels by 2030; and (v) achieving net zero emissions by 2070.

These pledges are extensions of India’s original 2015 Paris Agreement pledge, which included a 33-35% intensity cut and a target for 40% of its energy to come from non-fossil sources. In August 2022, the Cabinet formally integrated two of these five goals, the 45% intensity cut and the 50% target for non-fossil installed capacity into India’s updated Nationally Determined Contribution(NDC) that was submitted to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

The remaining three commitments (a 1-billion-tonne emissions cut, achieving net-zero by 2070, and a goal for forest carbon sinks) are still considered national commitments but are not included in the formal NDC text(NRDC, 2022; PIB, August 2022). This distinction is important because it affects how closely each commitment is tracked.

Functioning

Every pledge is tracked using a specific type of document, and mixing these up is the most frequent analytical mistake in this field.

Current values are sourced from live statistical portals, for instance, the MNRE’s Physical Achievements report, which gets updated monthly for capacity figures, and the CEA generation reports that detail the actual electricity produced.

Baseline values are drawn from historical records, including ministerial statements to Parliament and archived PIB releases that reference the pre-2014 starting point, rather than the current data page.

Target values, these come from policy documents like the COP26 announcement and India’s official NDC filing with the UNFCCC, not from a statistics website.

Emissions data is the slowest to arrive. It’s reported through Biennial Update Reports (BURs) to the UNFCCC, and the pipeline runs three to four years behind; the most recent one, BUR-4, was released in January 2025 but reports figures for 2020, not 2024.

Methodology used here: Progress toward absolute-capacity targets is calculated on a baseline-adjusted basis , Progress % = (Current − Baseline) ÷ (Target − Baseline) × 100. This approach is preferred over a simple Current ÷ Target ratio because India’s capacity build-out didn’t start from scratch in 2021. Giving credit for progress made before 2021 would inflate the numbers. When we can compare the required pace against the actual pace being delivered, that comparison is also highlighted.

Performance: The Scorecard

	Pledge (by 2030)	Baseline	Latest Verified Data	Progress	Verdict
1	500 GW non-fossil capacity	~81 GW (2014)	300.51 GW installed as of 31 July 2026 (MNRE)	52.4% of the baseline-adjusted journey covered; gap remaining = 199.5 GW	Ahead of pace (see below)
2	50% non-fossil installed capacity share	~30% (2014)	Crossed 50% in June 2025; now 54.4% of ~552 GW total (July 2026)	Target already met	Achieved early
2a	(Sub-metric) Actual non-fossil generation share	–	29.2% of electricity actually generated (538.97 of 1,845.9 billion units, FY2025-26, CEA)	Roughly half the capacity-share figure	Lagging , key gap
3	Cut 1 billion tonnes of emissions (2021–2030)2021 emissions	≈ 2.88 GtCO₂	No official cumulative interim figure published	Untracked by any standing public metric	Data gap / unverifiable
4	45% cut in GDP emissions intensity (vs 2005)	0% (2005)	36% reduction by 2020 (BUR-4, Jan 2025); trend 21%→24%→33%→36% (2014/16/19/20)	80% of the target banked, rising	On track / likely exceeded
5	Net-zero by 2070	–	Long-Term Low Carbon Development Strategy submitted (2022); no interim 2030 checkpoint	Directional only	Too early to score
,	(Related) Additional carbon sink of 2.5–3 GtCO₂e via forest/tree cover	0 (2005)	~2.29 GtCO₂e added (2005–2021, ISFR)	76–92% of range	Near target, momentum stalling

The most striking insight from the entire scorecard can be found in row 2a: India has already achieved its target of 50% non-fossil capacity, but only 29.2% of the electricity generated actually comes from non-fossil sources(calculation from MNRE capacity data and CEA generation reports, cited above). The discrepancy arises because solar and wind plants operate at a significantly lower capacity utilization factor(~20-25%) compared to coal plants (~60-70%), so a capacity milestone overstates the clean share of India’s real power supply. Row 3, the 1-billion-tonne reduction, is a crucial commitment for real-world decarbonization, yet it’s the only one that lacks a public tracker to monitor its progress.

Impact

The expansion of capacity has drawn in about $45.7 billion in foreign direct investment for the renewable sector from FY2014 to FY2026(IBEF, 2026). This has propelled India to the third spot globally in renewable capacity and demonstrated a real separation of GDP growth from emissions growth. However, independent evaluators have mixed opinions: the Climate Action Tracker labels India’s overall targets and actions as “Highly Insufficient” when measured against a 1.5°C pathway.

It also highlights the non-fossil capacity target as “Highly Insufficient”, not because India is lagging, but because the current policies already surpass a target that was set low enough to be easily exceeded. This paradox, exceeding a target that many critics deem unambitious, is key to understanding how India’s climate diplomacy was perceived at COP30 in Belém.

Emerging Issues

Curtailment is where the capacity-generation gap becomes visible. By May 2026, about a third of the 54.8 GW of newly commissioned renewable energy was only being utilized through temporary grid access. In places like Rajasthan and Gujarat, curtailment levels reached 50–60% during peak solar hours(Business Today, 2026). To tackle this issue, we’ll need to invest around ₹5–6 lakh crore in transmission infrastructure by FY2031-32, and it’s crucial that this planning happens ahead of developing renewable zones, not as an afterthought.

Coal capacity continues to grow in absolute terms. Currently sitting at about 210 GW, projections indicate that by 2035-36, it could reach between 307-315 GW. Since 2023, retirements have pretty much come to a standstill, and modeling from the CEA suggests that coal will still provide around 60% of evening power, even with 500 GW of renewables coming online. This means we’ll have a bigger fleet operating fewer hours, rather than a shrinking one.

DISCOM finances remain the weakest structural link. As of March 2025, the outstanding debt reached a staggering ₹7.26 lakh crore. The sector finally turned a corner, recording its first profit in ten years in FY25, with earnings of ₹2,701 crore compared to ₹25,553 crore loss the previous year. However, renewable developers working on state contracts are still grappling with payment delays that can stretch up to 11 months, significantly longer than those associated with centrally-backed agreements.

The domestic manufacturing push carries short-term risk. Starting in June 2026, the Approved List of Models and Manufacturers “List-II” mandate will require solar cells to be made domestically. However, the current cell production capacity is around ~31 GW, which is significantly lower than the module capacity of about ~193 GW. In fact, imports of PV cells surged by 86% year-on-year in FY2026, indicating that the mandate hasn’t yet achieved its intended goal of bridging that gap.

Two pledges have no verification mechanism at all. The commitment to cut emissions by 1 billion tonnes and the net-zero target for 2070. Plus, the goalposts have already shifted: NDC 3.0, which was approved in March 2026, has set more stringent targets for 2031–2035, just as the 2030 scorecard closes.

The scorecard itself is power-sector skewed. All five Panchamrit targets are related to electricity capacity, generation, or land-based sinks , none of which directly address the industry, transport, or buildings sectors, which collectively contribute significantly to India’s emissions. The two initiatives designed to bridge this gap are still in their infancy: the Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS) has recently commenced its first compliance year for approximately 490 industrial entities across seven sectors, with certificate trading set to begin in October 2026, and the National Green Hydrogen Mission had only commissioned around 8,000 tonnes per year of capacity by mid-2026, in contrast to its ambitious 5-million-tonne target for 2030.

Way Forward

Enforce time-bound transmission delivery, not just capacity targets. The CEA’s Transmission Plan for the integration of 500 GW of renewable energy and the Green Energy Corridor Phase-II must be executed according to schedule, utilizing General Network Access (GNA) regulations to enforce strict connectivity dates for developers and utilities , supported by the ₹5–6 lakh crore already allocated through FY2031-32.

Push disbursal of existing storage schemes, not just new announcements. The ₹9,400 crore Viability Gap Funding (VGF) scheme for battery storage (13,220 MWh, providing up to 40% capital-cost support) and its expansion in June 2025 (₹5,400 crore for 30 GWh through the Power System Development Fund), along with the Production-Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme for Advanced Chemistry Cell manufacturing (₹18,100 crore for 50 GWh), require expedited tranche releases to meet the 236 GWh target for 2031-32 , as of mid-2026, only approximately 8.5 GWh has been constructed. The Energy Storage Obligation should be strictly enforced on obligated entities, rather than being merely advisory.

Extend payment-security cover to state DISCOMs. The letters of credit and payment security funds that are currently utilized for centrally-backed SECI and NTPC contracts should also be applied to state-level power purchase agreements, thereby addressing the 11-month delay in payments. This initiative should be implemented alongside the ₹3.03 lakh crore Revamped Distribution Sector Scheme’s rollout of smart metering, which is essential for enhancing payment discipline.

Phase in domestic-content manufacturing rules. The cell-sourcing requirement outlined in ALMM List-II should be introduced over a period of one to two years instead of being implemented all at once. This approach should be supported by the PLI Scheme for High-Efficiency Solar PV Modules to mitigate the short-term supply shortages that the industry has indicated.

Widen climate policy beyond the power sector. Finalize the implementation of the Carbon Credit Trading Scheme across all remaining sectors and ensure that certificate trading commences as planned (targeting October 2026), which will involve pricing carbon for approximately 700 million tonnes of industrial emissions. Transition the National Green Hydrogen Mission (with a budget of ₹19,744 crore through 2029-30) from a pilot phase to full industrial scale, and support FAME-III along with state electric vehicle incentives to achieve the goal of 30% of new sales by 2030 , both of which are currently lagging behind their 2030 targets.

Close the data and finance gaps. Develop a unified, real-time public dashboard that displays capacity, generation, intensity, and sink data, while also establishing a clear tracker for the 1-billion-tonne commitment. Expedite afforestation efforts to prevent the momentum of the carbon-sink target from diminishing, and continue to advocate for climate finance and technology transfer, as outlined in the NDCs, as prerequisites for enhanced ambition.

Selected References and Important Links

Business Today. (2026a, July 8). Does grid curtailment challenge India’s renewable energy growth?https://www.businesstoday.in/india/story/does-grid-curtailment-challenge-indias-renewable-energy-growth-541674-2026-07-08

Business Today. (2026b, July 19). India’s solar push hits a manufacturing hurdle. Here’s why the cell mandate was delayed. https://www.businesstoday.in/industry/story/indias-solar-push-hits-a-manufacturing-hurdle-heres-why-the-cell-mandate-was-delayed-543808-2026-07-19

Business Standard. (2026, January 18). Power discoms recorded ₹2,701 crore profit in FY25, says Ministry.https://www.business-standard.com/industry/news/power-discoms-recorded-2-701-crore-profit-in-fy25-says-ministry-126011800483_1.html

Central Electricity Authority. (2026). Monthly generation reports. Ministry of Power, Government of India. https://cea.nic.in/dm/monthly-reports/?lang=en

Climate Action Tracker. (2026). India. https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/india/

Council on Energy, Environment and Water. (n.d.). Payment delays: The weakest link in India’s energy transition.Retrieved August 2026, from https://www.ceew.in

Down To Earth. (2026a, May 19). India loses 300 GWh renewable energy in 2026 first quarter due to transmission delays. https://www.downtoearth.org.in/energy/india-loses-300-gwh-renewable-energy-in-2026-first-quarter-due-to-transmission-delays

Down To Earth. (2026b, June 3). India’s solar ambitions face a factory floor test: Rollout of new rules sparks industry concerns over domestic cell shortage, stranded investments. https://www.downtoearth.org.in/energy/indias-solar-ambitions-face-a-factory-floor-test-rollout-of-new-rules-sparks-industry-concerns-over-domestic-cell-shortage-stranded-investments

Energy Watch. (2026, February 9). Discom debt at Rs 7.26 lakh cr; Tamil Nadu, Rajasthan, Maharashtra among biggest defaulters: Shripad Naik. https://www.energywatch.in/power/discom-debt-at-rs-726-lakh-cr-tamil-nadu-rajasthan-maharashtra-among-biggest-defaulters-shripad-naik

Forest Survey of India. (2023). India state of forest report 2023. Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change. https://fsi.nic.in/forest-report-2023

India Brand Equity Foundation. (2026, July). India’s renewable energy capacity reaches 288.58 GW.https://www.ibef.org/news/india-s-renewable-energy-capacity-reaches-288-58-gw

International Carbon Action Partnership. (2026, March 30). Compliance obligations under India’s Carbon Credit Trading Scheme enter into force for seven sectors. https://icapcarbonaction.com/en/news/compliance-obligations-under-indias-carbon-credit-trading-scheme-enter-force-seven-sectors

JMK Research & Analytics. (n.d.). Viability gap funding for battery energy storage systems in India. Retrieved August 2026, from https://www.jmkresearch.com

Ministry of New and Renewable Energy. (2026, July 31). Physical achievements: Programme/scheme-wise cumulative physical progress as on 31st July, 2026. Government of India. https://mnre.gov.in/en/physical-progress/

Ministry of Power. (2026, July). [Unstarred question reply, Rajya Sabha]: Coal capacity and battery storage investment plans. Government of India. Retrieved from https://www.psuwatch.com and https://www.aninews.in

Mongabay-India. (2026, March 26). India’s updated climate plan targets 47% emissions cut and 60% clean power capacity by 2035. https://india.mongabay.com/2026/03/indias-updated-climate-plan-targets-47-emissions-cut-and-60-clean-power-capacity-by-2035/

Natural Resources Defense Council. (2022). The road from Paris: India’s progress towards its climate pledge [Issue brief]. https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/road-from-paris-india-2022-ib.pdf

NITI Aayog. (2026). India Climate and Energy Dashboard (ICED). Government of India. https://iced.niti.gov.in/

Press Information Bureau. (2022a, August 3). Cabinet approves India’s Updated Nationally Determined Contribution to be communicated to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [Press release]. Government of India. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1847812&reg=3&lang=2

Press Information Bureau. (2023, January 4). Cabinet approves National Green Hydrogen Mission [Press release]. Government of India. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1888547

Press Information Bureau. (2026, June). India’s renewable energy capacity growth since 2014 [Press release]. Government of India. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2250039&lang=1&reg=3

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (2022, August). India’s updated first nationally determined contribution under the Paris Agreement. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/NDC/2022-08/India%20Updated%20First%20Nationally%20Determined%20Contrib.pdf

About the Contributor

Katyayani Sinha is a research and editorial intern at IMPRI. She is a second-year MA International Relations student. Her focus is foreign Policy and strategic affairs, and for the past few months She has been involved in political research at various organisations.