Rakhine State Development Programme (2017): Assessing India’s Humanitarian and Development Diplomacy in Conflict-Affected Rakhine (2017–2025)

AYAN BORDOLOI

Background

Rakhine State is at a special place in India’s neighbourhood policy. It is situated on the Bay of Bengal, flanked by Bangladesh and is home to the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (KMTTP) that is expected to connect Kolkata with Mizoram by sea, river and road as well as provide alternative access to the landlocked north-eastern states for Indian transport. It’s also where one of Asia’s worst humanitarian crises is taking place.

In August 2017, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) attacked security posts and in response the Myanmar military conducted “clearance operations” that forced an estimated 700,000+ Rohingya across the border into Bangladesh. This, along  with the early arrivals, resulted in a refugee camp of almost a million people in Cox’s Bazar, one of the world’s largest refugee centres. The roots of the crisis are long-standing.

Most Rohingya were left stateless by the Citizenship Law of 1982. In 2012, communal violence in Rakhine forced many to flee, and movement, access to health and education and livelihoods were severely restricted over the following years. In 2017, the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar determined that the operations had the “character of genocidal intent” and in 2019, The Gambia brought a case before the International Court of Justice against Myanmar. India responded with a measured, multi-layered response.

It launched Operation Insaniyat to help Bangladesh in September 2017 with relief supplies. While Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Myanmar later in the month, India expressed concern about the violence in Rakhine but did not criticise the Myanmar authorities. India and Myanmar signed an agreement on the Rakhine State Development Programme (RSDP) in 2017, a set of socio-economic assistance that will be provided for the recovery in the northern Rakhine State and in principle, for the return of displaced persons

India’s interest in this dispute serves three purposes:

• Regional stability- The protracted refugee situation is a burden for Bangladesh, one of the main partners, as well as increasing the potential for trafficking, radicalisation and illegal cross-border travel along India’s eastern border.
• Connectivity and Act East- The biggest physical gains of India’s involvement in the western coast of Myanmar is the Kaladan project and the port of Sittwe.
• Geopolitical balance- Cooperation is vital to controlling insurgent groups along the India–Myanmar border, as well as in combating China’s growing presence in Myanmar, such as the recent case in Kyaukphyu, further south in Rakhine.

The policy update is a re-evaluation of the RSDP and the broader humanitarian and development diplomacy to which it belongs. The questions it poses are what it aimed to achieve, what it has achieved in the face of a coup and a broader civil war, and what India’s approach needs to be.

Functioning

The RSDP was conceived as a development partnership between governments. It was said to have the following main features.

Structure. Independent international agencies or non-state actors were NOT to be used for project identification and implementation, but rather in cooperation with the Government of Myanmar. This was a reflection of the broader development partnership model in which the government of the partner country makes the development priorities and India pays for and implements the projects, either directly or through development agencies and contractors.

Phase I. The initial 5-year budget for the first phase was approximately US$25 million. The main component was the provision of pre-fabricated housing in the northern Rakhine, to provide temporary shelter for displaced persons and for conditions to be conducive to the return of those displaced.

Later phases. Community infrastructure, including schools, health facilities, water supply and roads, and livelihood and skills projects, were anticipated for follow-on phases, in a manner similar to the Quick Impact Projects implemented in India during their earlier phases in Myanmar.

Framing. The programme was offered as development for the entire State and all communities, consistent with the Government of Myanmar’s own plans for recovery, and the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State led by Kofi Annan.

The wider toolkit. The RSDP was among a number of instruments. The table below outlines how India’s instruments for Rakhine relate – and do not relate – to one another.

This design was based on three strategic elements. The first element, low cost high signalling value, a small program allowed India to claim a contribution to a solution without large commitments. Second, non-confrontation: India has saved its access to Naypyitaw by avoiding the terminology of accountability which is employed by western governments, and by engaging with the Myanmar government. Third, “dual audience management” – the programme could be brought up when India was questioning its silence on Rohingya and offered it to Myanmar as a goodwill gesture.

Performance

Delivery, 2017–2021. The most popular product of the RSDP was the delivery of 250 prefabricated houses in the northern part of Rakhine, to the Myanmar government. Small development work was also ongoing in Rakhine and neighbouring Chin State in India. These were real but relatively small compared to the amount of displacement.

The return problem. The main pillar of the programme, to facilitate safe, voluntary and dignified return, was not fulfilled. In late 2017, Bangladesh and Myanmar reached a repatriation agreement but the repatriation initiative in 2018 and 2019 failed due to lack of confidence among the refugees regarding the situation. The barriers remained the same – unresolved citizenship, limitations on movement and access to services, and no accountability for previous violence.

The right to a home was not the same thing as legal guarantees of rights and security. Humanitarian assistance in Bangladesh, Operation Insaniyat and then supplies to camps helped alleviate pressure on a partner and enhanced perceptions in Dhaka. But this was a path that was mostly separate from the RSDP within Rakhine and the two were rarely sold together.

Disruption after 2021. The RSDP was negotiated with a civilian government that was overthrown by military coup of 1 February 2021. The Arakan Army (AA) that had been active in the military conflict of 2019-2020 and had agreed to a truce, again went back on to the battlefield in 2023 when the ceasefire was violated. By 2024-2025, the AA had taken control of most of the Rakhine’s townships and large portions of Chin State, including Paletwa in early 2024, while the military had a few enclaves, including Sittwe and Kyaukphyu.

An initiative for central government delivery was now being carried out in an area which the government did not control. The Kaladan corridor. The project achieved some progress such as handing over the Sittwe port to an Indian operator and cargo movements commenced, but as fighting spread to Paletwa, the sections of river and road in Chin State became unsafe. Its connectivity value is yet to be exploited and protection of Indian personnel and assets has emerged as a major concern.

Rohingya Refugee Population in Bangladesh

The current scale of displacement is relevant to the policy question because India’s engagement with Rakhine cannot be separated from the continuing humanitarian burden borne by Bangladesh.

Source: Government of Bangladesh–UNHCR population data, 30 June 2026. Total Rohingya refugees: 1,200,171; Cox’s Bazar: 1,166,352; Bhasan Char: 33,819.

Timeline of key developments

Disaster diplomacy. India presented itself as a first responder after Cyclone Mocha (2023), Typhoon Yagi (2024) and the March 2025 earthquake, the last through Operation Brahma. These operations generated goodwill, but they were channelled largely through Naypyitaw and Yangon and did little to reach conflict-affected populations in Rakhine.

Impact

What worked

• Preserved access. India maintained peace in the region and avoided the situation of its partisans being confronted in the open, allowing both civilian and military relations with Myanmar to remain good, which has been significant for border security and project interests.
• Development-first identity. With this emphasis, the RSDP strengthened the image of India as a development partner and not a coercive power, a theme which is gaining currency in the Global South.
• Rapid disaster response. Logistical capacity and public goodwill was demonstrated in Myanmar during the relief operation.
• A foothold on both sides. India remained active on both sides of the crisis with its involvement in Aid to Bangladesh and development assistance in Rakhine.

What fell short

• Mismatch between ends and means. The resources were limited compared to the amount of displacement and the programme did not address the political factors that condition return.
• Transparency gaps. Spending and phases are not well publicized, and there is little information about beneficiaries and outcomes which limits accountability and independent evaluation.
• Diplomatic and reputation costs. Human rights groups criticized India’s use of the term “displaced persons from Rakhine State” as opposed to Rohingya, and its opposition to country-specific resolutions that were being discussed at the UN. Critics said that this was “wiping out a community’s identity. Supporters stated that they could only be useful on the ground if they could have access to the authorities of the Myanmar government.
• Domestic inconsistency. India’s treatment of the Rohingya is uneasy with its humanitarian claims in the external world given that it has detained and deported Rohingya, mainly from the perspective of illegal immigration and security, and hasn’t accepted the 1951 Refugee Convention.
• A structural tension. However, India’s Rakhine policy is primarily for connectivity and security reasons while it is viewed as a humanitarian and development partner. The principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence of humanitarian action are compromised when these come into conflict.Credibility is lost when these principles of humanitarian action are in conflict. Tackling those who have access to a port or a road corridor could save assets but could also mean engaging aid to line up with military and political realities instead of need.

Emerging Issues

Over the past eight years (2017-2025), some structural issues have arisen.

• The first is the single-counterpart model is falling apart: The Government of Myanmar was taken as the main counterpart for the project identification, access and implementation in the design of the RSDP. This assumption has been undermined since 2021 military takeover and territorial expansion of Arakan Army (AA). Administrative authority and territorial control is now decentralized and the delivery of a purely government-to-government is challenging. This is especially important for infrastructure, which must be easily accessible, coordinated at the local level and maintained over the long-term. The expansion of the AA, with control of Paletwa in neighbouring Chin State, impacts on the broader Kaladan corridor. India should thus differentiate between diplomatic recognition and practical engagement for access and project level engagement with who is effective on ground.
• Fragmentation of strategy: The Indian approach to Rakhine now covers the RSDP, humanitarian assistance to Bangladesh, Kaladan project and Sittwe port, border management and disaster relief. There are no clearly defined public instruments that link these instruments to a specific goal. This can leave policy gaps, when the priorities for connectivity, security and humanitarian care intersect. With so many people displaced, it is especially vital to coordinate efforts. As per UNHCR statistics, there were 1,166,352 Rohingya refugee children in Cox’s Bazar and 33,819 in Bhasan Char in Bangladesh on 30 June 2026. India must therefore have a blueprint that views humanitarian assistance, development, connectivity and regional diplomacy as a set of interlinked but separate policy strands.
• The aid–access dilemma: Contact with territorial control actors in Rakhine is becoming more important for effective humanitarian and development actors. But this involvement can give rise to issues of legitimacy, neutrality and security. Avoiding contact could make it impossible to provide assistance, and structured contact could involve diplomatic and operational dangers. India should, therefore, set a scope and goals for various types of engagement. Humanitarian access and protection of Indian personnel and project-level coordination should be separated from political recognition. When planning projects, India needs to identify who has access to the site, who owns it, who manages it and what is protected about it.
• Changing situations in Bangladesh: Bangladesh is still in the middle of the Rakhine crisis as it is host to the overwhelming majority of displaced Rohingya. According to the data of the Government of Bangladesh and UNHCR released on 30 June 2026, there were 1,200,171 refugees in Bangladesh. Bangladesh is not only a country for emergency relief, but also a country with public services, security, livelihoods, and sustainability of long-term hosting concerns, due to the prolonged nature of the scale of displacement. Hence, India should further build up its technical collaboration with Bangladesh in humanitarian preparedness, exchange of information, disaster response and border area issues. However, refugee assistance should not be viewed as a short-term measure until they return: refugee assistance is an urgent task, and the development of conditions conducive to a voluntary, safe and dignified return is a long-term diplomatic goal.
• The changing face of Rakhine’s strategic importance in the context of great power rivalry: The strategic significance of Rakhine is that it is the gateway between the Bay of Bengal and the Northeast region of India via the Kaladan corridor and port of Sittwe, and of China around western Myanmar for a broader geopolitical dimension. War can diminish India’s operating efficiency of its infrastructure and make other regional infrastructure even more necessary. India should therefore concentrate on being resilient rather than just being present. The port of Sittwe, the inland waterways and road access to Kaladan should be considered individually in terms of security, operational and maintenance considerations. The strategic competition should be one of several policy considerations, including humanitarian considerations and local factors.
• Uncertain political horizons: India should not expect political and administrative conditions as they existed at the time of the RSDP to return in the short-term. The territorial control and political distribution have changed as a result of the military takeover and the subsequent conflict in 2021. This leads to uncertainty for development projects with long-term maintenance and institutional continuity needs. India should, therefore, begin to prepare for various political possibilities instead of one foreseen outcome. Projects should be planned and budgeted to be useful in the future, in an administrative context that continuously evolves, but not in a way that would be seen as supporting disputed territorial claims. This could help to make the policy more flexible when conditions change. Gaps in data, monitoring and evaluation: Information about the spending of the RSDP, the status of their projects, beneficiaries, and the long-term consequences of their spending is kept private. MEA reporting offers baseline data, such as the USD 25M commitment, 250 prefabricated houses (2019 and future) but does not indicate if completed assets are operational or usable. The shift from output reporting to outcome monitoring should therefore be considered in India. Evaluations should consider the functional effectiveness, reach of beneficiaries, maintenance, security and ongoing accessibility. If the programme is to achieve lasting development dividends, rather than just construction results, independent assessment would help to gauge its success.

Way Forward

• Release an engagement framework for the Rakhine state. India should have a short document that connects the RSDP, humanitarian assistance, Kaladan connectivity, border security and Kaladan regional diplomacy. It is to outline principles of engagement, such as the provision of needs-based assistance, civilian protection, protection of Indian personnel and facilitation of conditions for voluntary, safe and dignified return. The framework should also set some contingencies in the event of territorial change, suspension of access or sudden surge of humanitarian needs. This would help minimise ad hoc decision-making and ensure coherence in policy instruments between the different regions of India.
• Transparency and evaluability of the RSDP: India needs to create a new ‘RSDP project register’ with budgets, locations, implementing agencies, project status, beneficiaries and existing functionality. There is already a good baseline of existing MEA reporting but the public record should be updated to show which are still operational. An independent evaluation should differentiate between outputs and outcomes. The success of the progress made should not only look at the number of houses built, roads opened or water projects finished, but at whether the assets are able to perform their functions and are operable, accessible, maintained and useful for intended beneficiaries.
• Independence from territorial control in humanitarian delivery: India must expand humanitarian assistance delivery channels, in order to not rely on one political or territorial authority. Government lines of communication can provide ongoing support for diplomatic and disaster response coordination, and UN agencies and well vetted local organizations can help access areas where traditional access is difficult. All such channels should be clear and run with clear due diligence, monitoring and safeguarding requirements. The aim should be to ensure that humanitarian assistance is in line with the requirement and continues even if the territory is changed.
• Take a needs-led and community-inclusive approach : Assistance must be based on needs and documented humanitarian and development needs, not on identity. Programmes should be able to provide benefit to those who are Rohingya, Rakhine, Chin and other populations affected by the situation where needs overlap, and where specific vulnerabilities call for targeted assistance. India should also set up clear and unambiguous criteria for who can benefit from a project and include local communities and civil society into project design and feedback where possible and safe to do so. This can enhance fairness and operational viability of development assistance.
• Communicate effectively with the international community about the situation in Bangladesh : India should have a regular technical level discussion with Bangladesh on the implications of the Rakhine crisis. Its agenda may be refugee movements, humanitarian preparedness, disaster response, information-sharing, border concerns and coordination of assistance. The two countries should also disassociate refugee assistance from return diplomacy. India could help Bangladesh in the immediate humanitarian crisis and at the same time implement the conditions for the future of a voluntary, safe and dignified return.
• Entertain de facto authorities under explicit terms: If there is effective territorial control by non-state actors, there might be a need for some operational interaction for project security and humanitarian access. India should differentiate between the two and establish certain parameters on which contact can take place. Safe access, civilian protection and non-discrimination should be the concerns of humanitarian engagement and safety of Indian personnel, protection of assets and maintenance be the concerns of infrastructure related engagement. Consistent signals could be avoided if there were general guidelines among the Indian agencies. Reevaluate Kaladan’s sequencing and options. Now, India should view Kaladan as a long-term connectivity investment and understand that a conflict should be followed by a flexible sequencing. The port of Sittwe, inland waterways and the road section need to be evaluated individually on the basis of security, operational viability, cost and maintenance. If any part of the route is temporarily off limits, India should look at other logistics options, such as possible routes that could go through Bangladesh. Diversification would not do away with Kaladan, but would minimize reliance on the one conflict-ridden corridor.

References

1. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Annual Report 2020–21, section on the Rakhine State Development Programme. https://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/33569_MEA_annual_Report.pdf
2. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Annual Report 2019–20, section on the Rakhine State Development Programme and Sittwe Port. https://meacms.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/32489_AR_Spread_2020_new.pdf
3. Government of Bangladesh–UNHCR, Bangladesh refugee population data, updated 30 June 2026. https://data.unhcr.org/en/country/bgd
4. UNHCR, Rohingya Emergency. https://www.unhcr.org/rohingya-emergency
5. Advisory Commission on Rakhine State (2017), Towards a Peaceful, Fair and Prosperous Future for the People of Rakhine.
6. UN Human Rights Council, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (2018), Report of the Detailed Findings.
7. International Court of Justice, The Gambia v. Myanmar, case documents. https://www.icj-cij.org/case/178
8. International Crisis Group, reports on Rakhine, the Arakan Army and Myanmar after the coup. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar 
9. UN OCHA, Myanmar humanitarian situation and Humanitarian Needs and Response Plans. https://www.unocha.org/myanmar
10. Observer Research Foundation, Carnegie India and other Indian think-tank analyses of the Kaladan project and India–Myanmar relations.
11. Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha replies on the Kaladan project, the RSDP and Myanmar.

12. Press coverage of Operation Insaniyat, Operation Brahma and the Sittwe port handover, including The Hindu, Indian Express and Reuters.

About the contributor

Ayan Bordoloi is an intern with IMPRI, currently pursuing his master’s in political science at the University of Delhi. His research interests lie in federalism, tribal governance, and Northeast India’s political landscape.

Acknowledgements

The author extends sincere gratitude to the IMPRI team for their guidance and support, along with the reviewers Purbaa Jagannath and Samiksha Muskan for their valuable feedback and insights.

Published by: Mahenoor Imam, a Research and Editorial Intern at IMPRI

Disclaimer

All views expressed in the article belong solely to the author and not necessarily to the organization

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