Anil Trigunayat
The United Arab Emirates’ decision to withdraw from OPEC+, effective May 1st, represents far more than a technical dispute over production quotas–it signals the unraveling of Gulf unity and the emergence of a new geopolitical order in West Asia. This move comes at a critical moment, as the ongoing conflict between Iran, the US and Israel has already strained regional relationships and forced Gulf states to reassess their strategic positions. The UAE’s exit reveals deep fractures within what was once presented as a cohesive Arab bloc, with different countries now pursuing divergent paths based on their individual calculations of national interest.
The immediate backdrop to this decision is the Iran conflict, which has paradoxically weakened rather than strengthened Gulf solidarity. Despite being repeatedly targeted by Iranian drones and missiles–becoming the most attacked country after primary combatant–the UAE has chosen to chart its own course rather than coordinate a unified response with its neighbours. Tehran’s repeated violations in the Gulf sovereignty, using their airspace and territory to strike at US and Israeli assets, has eroded what fragile trust existed.
The fault lines run deep. Qatar and Oman are attempting to maintain working relationships with Iran, while Saudi Arabia and Kuwait navigate a middle path. The UAE, however, has decided that its interests lie elsewhere–in closer partnerships with Israel and the United States, and in aggressive economic diversification that puts it at odds with Riyadh’s regional vision. This divergence predates the current conflict but has been accelerated by it. The UAE’s investments in Yemen, Sudan, Somaliland, and Ethiopia, its deepening relationship with Israel through the Abraham Accords, and its participation in frameworks like I2U2 and IMEC have all created points of friction with Saudi Arabia, which maintains that Palestinian statehood must precede any normalisation with Israel.
OPEC itself has been a constraint the UAE has chafed against for years. With production capacity approaching 4.8 million barrels per day but restricted to a 2.7 million barrel quota, Abu Dhabi felt increasingly penalised for investments in expanding energy infrastructure. The cartel’s structure, dominated by Saudi preferences and designed to manage global prices through coordinated production cuts, no longer served Emirati interests. ADNOC’s plans to push capacity beyond 5 million barrels per day required autonomy that OPEC membership couldn’t accommodate.
But the exit is also about infrastructure and strategic autonomy. The UAE has systematically built alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz chokepoint–the very vulnerability Iran has repeatedly exploited during the conflict. The Habshan pipeline to Fujairah Port on the Arabian Sea already handles half of UAE oil exports, bypassing Hormuz entirely. A second pipeline from Jabal Dhanna to Fujairah, planned before the war, will allow the UAE to export its full production without depending on the strait. Combined with port investments in the Horn of Africa, this gives Abu Dhabi control of its own export routes–a luxury few Gulf producers enjoy.
The currency dimension adds another layer of complexity. The UAE’s threat to shift toward the yuan if US dollar liquidity tightened brought immediate American concessions in the form of emergency swap lines. This wasn’t an empty bluff–China is already a major buyer of Emirati oil and a strategic partner through the Belt and Road Initiative. The episode revealed how the petrodollar system has become a negotiable element in a multipolar energy market. Saudi Arabia is already diversifying its currency exposure; the UAE simply made its leverage more explicit.
The regional security architecture is equally in flux. Despite being the most targeted country after the main combatants, the UAE publicly claimed it no longer requires the US security umbrella and can defend itself independently. This confidence rests partly on Israeli military assistance. The Abraham Accords, initially framed as an economic normalisation, have evolved into a security partnership that directly challenges the traditional Arab consensus on Israel.
This isn’t the first time OPEC has lost members–Angola, Ecuador, Qatar, Indonesia and Gabon all departed for various reasons–but the UAE’s exit carries different weight. It comes at a moment of severe geopolitical volatility, when coordination might seem most necessary. It involves the organisation’s third largest producer. And it reflects not temporary frustration but a fundamental strategic reorientation toward economic diversification, security independence, and partnerships that transcend traditional Gulf solidarity. The cartel was founded in 1960 to give oil producers collective leverage over pricing and supply; the UAE’s calculation is that in 2026, individual autonomy serves its interests better than coordinated constraint.
For countries like India, navigating this fractured landscape requires deft diplomacy. New Delhi cannot choose between Saudi Arabia and the UAE–both are among its top strategic trading partners, and India’s energy security depends on stable relationships with major Gulf suppliers. With 23 refineries requiring at least 5 million barrels per day, India could theoretically absorb the UAE’s entire production. Prime Minister Modi’s reciprocal visit to Abu Dhabi, following Sheikh Zayed’s Delhi trip, likely addressed long term supply arrangements while acknowledging the regional tensions that complicate any single-source dependency.
What emerges from the UAE’s OPEC exit is a West Asia where the old organizing principles–Arab unity, Gulf solidarity, OPEC coordination–no longer hold the same force. Countries are pursuing individual strategies based on their specific advantages: the UAE leverages infrastructure and diversification, Saudi Arabia its market weight and Vision 2030, Qatar and Oman their diplomatic flexibility. The Iran conflict didn’t create these divisions, but it exposed and accelerated them, forcing choices that might have been deferred in more stable times.
About the Contributor:
Anil Trigunayat is a former Indian ambassador to Jordan, Libya and Malta and a distinguished fellow and head of the West Asia Experts Group at the prestigious Vivekananda International Foundation. He is also a Distinguished Fellow at the oldest Indian think tank, the United Services Institute of India.
This article was first published in the Firstpost as Abu Dhabi’s OPEC exit signals a structural shift in the Gulf.
Disclaimer: All views expressed in the article belong solely to the author and not necessarily to the organisation.
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Acknowledgement:
This article was posted by Yashkirti Pal, a Research and Editorial Intern at IMPRI.
