Policy Update
Khushi
Background
Forensic evidence has become increasingly important in criminal investigation as India moves towards more scientific and technology-driven investigation. The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 has further increased the importance of forensic examination by providing for forensic investigation of offences punishable with seven years or more of imprisonment, creating greater demand for forensic infrastructure and trained professionals (Press Information Bureau, 2024).
However, forensic evidence is generated across multiple laboratories and jurisdictions, making its effective storage, management and sharing an important institutional challenge. To address this gap, the Government has approved the establishment of a National Forensic Data Centre (NFDC) under the Safety of Women umbrella scheme. The Centre is intended to systematically store and manage forensic data received from forensic laboratories, including biological and DNA samples, to support more efficient evidence management (Press Information Bureau, 2026). The NFDC is currently under establishment and is not yet operational.
The initiative forms part of a broader effort to strengthen India’s forensic infrastructure. The Government has also developed e-Forensics, a central application designed to create a digital repository of forensic data with safeguards for data security and integrity. In parallel, the National Forensic Infrastructure Enhancement Scheme (NFIES), approved in 2024 with an outlay of ₹2,254.43 crore for 2024–25 to 2028–29, seeks to expand forensic laboratories and professional capacity (Press Information Bureau, 2024).
The 2026–27 Union Budget also provides for ₹80 crore under the head “Upgradation of Central Forensic Science Laboratories, including setting up of National Forensic Data Centre”, indicating that the Centre has received budgetary support while remaining under establishment rather than being an already operational national facility (Government of India, 2026).
Against this backdrop, the National Forensic Data Centre raises an important policy question: can integrating forensic data make criminal investigation faster and more evidence-based, while ensuring that sensitive forensic information remains accurate, secure and accountable?
Functioning
The National Forensic Data Centre is intended to function as a central repository for forensic information generated by forensic laboratories across the country. The Government has approved its establishment under the umbrella scheme “Safety of Women”, with the objective of systematically storing forensic data, including biological and DNA samples received in criminal cases, to support more efficient evidence management (Press Information Bureau, 2026). As the NFDC is still under establishment, its role is expected to complement rather than duplicate existing forensic information systems.
The proposed Centre is being developed alongside e-Forensics, a digital platform that enables forensic laboratories to register cases, track examinations and share forensic reports electronically. The Ministry of Home Affairs describes e-Forensics as an online case registration and tracking system intended to help forensic examiners provide timely and reliable reports to investigating agencies and other stakeholders. Thus, e-Forensics primarily supports the operational and case-management functions of forensic laboratories, whereas the proposed NFDC is intended to provide a centralised repository for forensic data.
The proposed data centre is also linked to the wider Inter-Operable Criminal Justice System (ICJS). ICJS connects the major pillars of criminal justice – police, courts, prisons, forensic laboratories and prosecution – so that information held across these systems can be accessed and used for investigation.
In the emerging architecture, forensic laboratories can generate and process case information through e-Forensics, while relevant forensic information can be made available through ICJS to authorised criminal justice institutions. The proposed NFDC could provide a central repository from which relevant forensic data can be organised and made interoperable with such systems, subject to appropriate access controls and data-security safeguards. This would help move forensic evidence from isolated laboratory records towards a more integrated criminal justice information system.
The Government has already begun building the digital infrastructure required for this integration. As of March 2026, e-Forensics was operational across 117 Central and State forensic science laboratories, while ICJS had linked 105 forensic science laboratories with other criminal justice institutions. The difference does not necessarily indicate a contradiction or a difference in the number of laboratories covered by forensic digitisation. The two figures represent different forms of integration: the 117 laboratories refer to those using e-Forensics for forensic case registration and tracking, whereas the 105 laboratories refer to those connected with other criminal justice institutions through ICJS. Therefore, a laboratory may be covered by e-Forensics without necessarily being fully integrated with the wider ICJS ecosystem.
The functioning of the system will also depend on the expansion of forensic infrastructure. Seven Central Forensic Science Laboratories (CFSLs) were operational, with approval subsequently given for additional CFSLs in different States and Union Territories. The Government has also approved dedicated cyber-forensic laboratories and strengthened capabilities in areas such as DNA analysis, digital forensics, forensic psychology and narcotics forensics (Press Information Bureau, 2026).
An important complementary database is the National Automated Fingerprint Identification System (NAFIS). Unlike the proposed National Forensic Data Centre, NAFIS has a specific biometric function, focusing on fingerprint identification and enabling real-time matching and verification. As of March 2026, its database contained 1.26 crore fingerprint records, with around 90,000 records being added each month. Since its launch in August 2022, NAFIS has helped trace 8,831 chance prints, including those linked to interstate and previously unsolved crimes (Press Information Bureau, 2026). NAFIS should therefore be understood as a specialised fingerprint-identification system, rather than as a substitute for the broader forensic repository envisaged under the NFDC.
Thus, the emerging architecture can be understood as forensic data generation → laboratory processing through e-Forensics → centralised forensic data management through the proposed NFDC → authorised information exchange through ICJS → investigation and adjudication, with specialised systems such as NAFIS providing focused biometric identification capabilities. The policy objective should therefore be interoperability among these systems rather than the creation of multiple parallel databases performing the same function. This distinction is particularly important as the NFDC moves from approval and funding towards establishment.
Performance
Since the National Forensic Data Centre is still under establishment, its direct performance and impact on criminal investigation cannot yet be measured. The figures currently available therefore do not represent the performance or outcomes of the NFDC itself. Instead, they provide indicators of the forensic infrastructure, digital systems and specialised databases that form the supporting ecosystem within which the Centre is expected to operate.
The Government has approved the National Forensic Infrastructure Enhancement Scheme (NFIES) with a total outlay of ₹2,254.43 crore for 2024-25 to 2028-29. The scheme provides ₹1,309.13 crore for nine National Forensic Sciences University campuses and ₹860.30 crore for seven new Central Forensic Science Laboratories (CFSLs). As of July 2026, ₹119.09 crore had been released and utilised under the scheme (Press Information Bureau, 2026). These figures indicate the scale of investment in the forensic infrastructure that can support future data generation and integration, rather than expenditure or outcomes attributable to the NFDC.
The expansion of CFSL capacity is another indicator of this broader ecosystem. Seven CFSLs were operational as of April 2026, while seven additional CFSLs had been approved under NFIES in Kerala, Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Tamil Nadu, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan. Land had been allotted for three of these approved laboratories in Raipur, Khordha and Chengalpattu (Press Information Bureau, 2026). The distinction is important: the seven operational laboratories represent existing capacity, whereas the seven additional laboratories represent approved expansion that is part of the ongoing strengthening of forensic infrastructure. Neither figure should be interpreted as the number of NFDC facilities or as an outcome of the Centre.
Digital infrastructure has also expanded alongside physical capacity. The Government has developed e-Forensics as a central application to create a digital repository of forensic data, with safeguards for data security and integrity. The system is intended to support the movement of forensic information from laboratory-level records towards a more connected evidence-management framework (Press Information Bureau, 2026). Its progress should likewise be viewed as an indicator of the digital ecosystem that can complement the NFDC, rather than as evidence of NFDC performance.
The National Automated Fingerprint Identification System (NAFIS) provides an existing example of how a specialised forensic database can produce operational results. As of 18 March 2026, NAFIS contained 1.26 crore fingerprint records, with around 90,000 records being added every month. Since its launch in August 2022, 8,831 chance prints have been traced, helping detect interstate and old unsolved crimes (Press Information Bureau, 2026). However, these figures relate specifically to NAFIS’s fingerprint-identification function and should not be attributed to the proposed NFDC.
Taken together, these developments suggest that India’s forensic architecture is gradually moving from isolated laboratory-based examination towards digitally connected forensic information systems. However, the performance of the National Forensic Data Centre itself remains to be established and assessed after it becomes operational. At present, the more appropriate performance indicators are therefore the capacity, digital readiness and interoperability of the supporting forensic ecosystem, rather than outcomes claimed for the NFDC. Once operational, the Centre should be evaluated separately on indicators such as data integration, accessibility, evidence linkage, security, data quality and its contribution to investigation efficiency.
Impact
The potential impact of the National Forensic Data Centre lies in moving India’s forensic system from isolated evidence processing towards integrated forensic intelligence. However, since the Centre is still being established, its long-term impact cannot yet be measured. Its likely contribution can instead be assessed through the gaps it is intended to address and the capabilities already emerging through e-Forensics, NAFIS and ICJS.
1. Faster access to forensic information
A centralised repository can make relevant forensic information easier to locate and compare across cases and jurisdictions. This could reduce the time required for investigators to obtain information held by different laboratories and improve the use of forensic evidence during investigations (Press Information Bureau, 2026).
2. Better detection of links across cases and States
Integrated forensic databases can help investigators identify connections between seemingly unrelated crimes. This can be particularly valuable for inter-State crimes, where evidence generated in one State may be relevant to an investigation in another. NAFIS already demonstrates this potential: its centralised fingerprint database has helped trace chance prints associated with inter-State and previously unsolved crimes (Press Information Bureau, 2026). A broader forensic data architecture could extend this approach beyond fingerprints to other forms of forensic evidence, enabling stronger evidence linkage across jurisdictions and cases.
3. Strengthening evidence-based investigation
The integration of forensic laboratories with platforms such as e-Forensics and ICJS can strengthen the connection between scientific evidence and the wider criminal justice process. This can help investigators access forensic reports more efficiently and enable forensic findings to be considered alongside police, prosecution, court and prison records (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2026).
4. Greater interoperability across States and laboratories
Criminal networks and offences often cross State boundaries, while forensic laboratories operate within different administrative jurisdictions. A common data architecture can facilitate information-sharing across these boundaries and reduce the fragmentation of forensic records. This could improve the identification of cross-State crime patterns, repeat offenders and links between cases handled by different laboratories.
5. Supporting the new emphasis on forensic investigation
The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 requires forensic experts to visit crime scenes and collect forensic evidence for offences punishable with seven years or more of imprisonment, subject to the prescribed conditions. As the volume of forensic evidence increases, systems for storing, managing and retrieving that information will become increasingly important (Press Information Bureau, 2024).
6. Strengthening digital and cyber-forensics
The growing use of digital devices and online platforms in criminal activity is increasing the importance of digital and cyber-forensic evidence. Greater integration of forensic infrastructure can support the systematic management, analysis and sharing of digital evidence alongside conventional forms of forensic evidence. This could strengthen investigations involving cybercrime, digital communications and electronically stored information, particularly where evidence is distributed across devices, laboratories and jurisdictions.
7. Potential to improve criminal justice outcomes
Better forensic data integration could ultimately contribute to faster investigation, stronger evidence management and more informed prosecution. However, it would be premature to claim that the National Forensic Data Centre will directly increase conviction rates or reduce crime. The effectiveness of integrated forensic information will remain conditional on the quality of investigation, forensic examination, prosecution and judicial capacity. Data integration can make relevant evidence more accessible and strengthen evidence linkage, but it cannot by itself ensure that investigators identify and interpret evidence correctly or that courts ultimately rely upon it.
Thus, the real impact of the Centre will depend not simply on how much forensic data is collected, but on whether that data can be accurately analysed, securely shared and effectively used in criminal investigations.
Emerging Issues
1. Data privacy and protection of sensitive information
The proposed Centre will involve the storage and management of sensitive forensic information, including biological and DNA-related data. While such information can strengthen criminal investigation, its centralised storage also creates risks relating to unauthorised access, misuse, data breaches and excessive retention. Clear rules on who can access different categories of forensic data, for what purpose and for how long will therefore be important.
The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (DPDP Act) provides India’s broader statutory framework for the processing and protection of digital personal data. However, its application to law-enforcement processing is subject to specific exemptions, including processing necessary for the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of offences under Section 17(1)(c). The governance of the NFDC will therefore need to clearly define lawful access, purpose limitation, retention, disclosure and accountability requirements for forensic information, including where such information falls within law-enforcement exemptions.
2. Accuracy, false positives and false negatives
The usefulness of an integrated forensic database depends on the quality and reliability of the data entered into it. Incorrect records, poor-quality samples or inaccurate matching can produce false positives, potentially directing investigators towards an uninvolved person. Conversely, false negatives may cause relevant evidence or links between cases to be overlooked. Automated matches should therefore be treated as investigative leads rather than conclusive proof and should be subject to scientific validation, independent verification and appropriate human oversight.
3. Chain of custody and evidentiary integrity
Centralising forensic information does not by itself guarantee the integrity of the underlying evidence. The chain of custody—the documented handling, transfer, storage and examination of evidence from collection to presentation before a court—must remain verifiable. Any gaps in documentation, unauthorised alteration or uncertainty about the provenance of a sample can weaken the evidentiary value of forensic findings. The NFDC and associated systems will therefore require standardised protocols for evidence handling, metadata preservation, audit trails and laboratory quality assurance.
4. Federal-State capacity gap
A national data centre cannot by itself resolve differences in the availability of forensic laboratories, equipment, trained professionals and digital infrastructure across States. The Government’s continuing investment under the National Forensic Infrastructure Enhancement Scheme (NFIES) reflects the need to strengthen this underlying capacity (Press Information Bureau, 2026). A central repository may create national-level interoperability, but uneven State-level capacity could result in uneven data quality, slower uploads and unequal access to forensic services. Bridging this federal-State capacity gap will therefore be essential for the NFDC to function as a genuinely national system.
5. Interoperability and data standardisation
Forensic information is generated by laboratories using different systems, formats and procedures. Integrating such information requires common data standards, compatible digital systems and consistent quality protocols. Otherwise, a central repository may accumulate large volumes of information without making it easy to compare or use effectively. Interoperability must therefore extend beyond technical connectivity to include common standards for data quality, classification, metadata and evidence documentation.
6. Cybersecurity of the central repository
Greater concentration of forensic information also creates a significant cybersecurity concern. A breach of a national repository containing fingerprint, DNA and other forensic information could have serious consequences because such identifiers cannot simply be replaced like passwords. The Centre will therefore require strong encryption, access controls, audit trails, authentication mechanisms and regular security assessments. The Digital Personal Data Protection framework and the Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, 2025 provide part of the broader data-governance environment, but the sensitive nature of forensic information warrants additional sector-specific safeguards.
7. Due process, proportionality and risk of over-reliance on technology
Forensic databases are tools for investigation, not substitutes for professional or judicial judgement. A database match does not by itself establish guilt. The use of forensic matching should therefore satisfy principles of due process and proportionality, particularly where a match may influence the identification, questioning, arrest or prosecution of an individual. Access to highly sensitive forensic databases should be limited to legitimate investigative purposes, while automated or probabilistic matches should be subject to appropriate verification before they are relied upon in consequential decisions.
8. Data integration versus actual criminal justice outcomes
The creation of a larger and more connected forensic database should not automatically be treated as evidence of better criminal justice. Its real value will depend on whether investigators can use the information quickly and accurately, whether forensic reports reach prosecutors and courts in time, and whether the evidence ultimately contributes to fair and effective adjudication. Greater integration may improve inter-State crime detection and evidence linkage, but these benefits will remain conditional on the quality of investigation, forensic examination, prosecution and judicial capacity.
Overall, the central challenge is to ensure that greater forensic data integration does not come at the cost of privacy, scientific reliability, evidentiary integrity or due process. The success of the National Forensic Data Centre will therefore depend as much on governance, quality standards and institutional capacity as on the technology itself.
Way Forward
1. Build a common national framework for forensic data
The National Forensic Data Centre should adopt standardised data formats, reporting protocols and quality-assurance procedures across Central and State forensic laboratories. This would improve interoperability and make forensic information easier to compare and use across jurisdictions. The framework should also clearly define data ownership, access permissions, retention periods and responsibilities for maintaining data quality.
2. Strengthen State-level forensic capacity
National data integration will have limited value if State forensic laboratories lack adequate infrastructure or trained personnel. Continued investment under the National Forensic Infrastructure Enhancement Scheme (NFIES) should therefore be accompanied by recruitment, specialised training and regular upgrading of forensic equipment (Press Information Bureau, 2026). Particular attention should be given to States and regions where laboratory capacity and specialist expertise remain limited.
3. Establish strong safeguards for sensitive forensic data
The Centre should follow clear access, retention and data-sharing protocols, particularly for DNA and other sensitive biological information. Role-based access, encryption, audit trails and periodic security assessments should be built into the system from the beginning. These safeguards should operate alongside the applicable legal framework for privacy and data protection, while recognising the specific requirements of law-enforcement use. This would help balance the investigative value of forensic databases with privacy and data-protection concerns.
4. Strengthen chain of custody and evidentiary integrity
Digital integration should be accompanied by stronger safeguards for the chain of custody of physical and digital evidence. Every stage of collection, transfer, storage, examination and reporting should be properly documented and traceable. Standardised procedures, tamper-evident records, metadata preservation and audit trails can help establish the provenance and integrity of evidence. This is essential to ensure that greater accessibility of forensic information does not compromise its admissibility, reliability or evidentiary value before courts.
5. Strengthen human oversight and scientific verification
Technology should support, rather than replace, forensic expertise and investigative judgement. Database matches should be subject to independent scientific verification, with clear procedures for handling uncertain, conflicting or potentially false matches. Regular quality audits, proficiency testing and accreditation of forensic laboratories can further improve the reliability of evidence. Human review should remain particularly important where an automated match could materially affect an individual’s investigation or prosecution.
6. Integrate forensic data with the wider criminal justice system
The National Forensic Data Centre should be interoperable with e-Forensics and ICJS, allowing relevant forensic information to move efficiently between laboratories, police, prosecution and courts. Such integration should follow the principle of complementarity rather than duplication, with each system retaining its distinct role. This would help ensure that investment in forensic data infrastructure translates into practical improvements across the criminal justice process (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2026).
7. Measure outcomes, not merely databases and records
The success of the Centre should not be assessed only by the volume of forensic data stored or the number of laboratories connected. The Government should establish measurable indicators such as:
- average forensic turnaround time;
- reduction in pending forensic examinations;
- percentage of forensic cases digitally integrated with the wider criminal justice system;
- number and quality of inter-State evidence linkages identified;
- proportion of forensic reports successfully accessed by authorised investigating agencies;
- utilisation of forensic evidence in prosecution and judicial proceedings; and
- frequency of data-quality, security or chain-of-custody breaches.
These indicators would provide a more meaningful assessment of whether technological integration is translating into improvements in investigation and evidence management.
8. Establish independent evaluation and audit mechanisms
The functioning and impact of the National Forensic Data Centre should be subject to periodic independent audits and evaluations. Such assessments should examine not only technical performance and cybersecurity but also whether integration is actually reducing investigation delays, improving evidence linkage and strengthening the use of forensic evidence. Independent evaluation can also identify unintended consequences, such as systematic data-quality problems, excessive reliance on automated matches or disparities in access across States. Findings should inform periodic improvements to the Centre’s standards, governance and operating procedures.
Ultimately, the answer to whether integrating forensic data can strengthen India’s criminal justice system is yes, but conditionally. Integration can improve access to evidence, facilitate inter-State crime detection and strengthen evidence linkage, but only when supported by high data quality, privacy and cybersecurity safeguards, adequate forensic capacity, secure chain-of-custody procedures and meaningful human oversight. The National Forensic Data Centre should therefore aim to create not simply a larger repository of forensic information, but a secure, reliable and interoperable evidence ecosystem that helps investigators use scientific evidence more effectively while protecting individual rights and preserving the integrity of the criminal justice process.
References
Ministry of Home Affairs. (2026, February 20). Upgradation of Central Forensic Science Laboratories, including setting up of National Forensic Data Centre. Government of India. Official Ministry of Home Affairs document
Ministry of Home Affairs. (2026, March 17). Expansion of CFSL. Press Information Bureau. Official PIB release – 17 March 2026
Ministry of Home Affairs. (2026, March 18). Forensic Science and New Criminal Laws. Press Information Bureau. Official PIB release – 18 March 2026
Ministry of Home Affairs. (2026, April 1). Central Forensic Sciences Laboratories. Press Information Bureau. Official PIB release – 1 April 2026
Ministry of Home Affairs. (2026, July 28). Funds to NFIES. Press Information Bureau. Official PIB release – 28 July 2026
Ministry of Home Affairs. (2026, July 29). Enhancing the Forensic Capabilities. Press Information Bureau. Official PIB release – 29 July 2026
Ministry of Home Affairs. (2025, December 3). National Forensic Infrastructure Enhancement Scheme. Press Information Bureau. Official PIB release – 3 December 2025
Government of India. (2026). Union Budget 2026–27: Expenditure Budget. Ministry of Finance. Official Union Budget documents
About the contributor
Khushi holds a Master’s degree in Sociology. She serves as a Research and Editorial Intern at IMPRI and has research interests in public policy, governance, digital transformation, and institutional reforms.
Acknowledgement
The author sincerely acknowledges the IMPRI team for their guidance, valuable feedback, and continuous support throughout the preparation of this Policy Update.
Reviewers: Anushree Khare and Dolly Kaushik
Disclaimer
This article is intended for academic purposes only. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of IMPRI or any government.
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