Securing the Siliguri Corridor (“Chicken’s Neck”) from Independence to the Present
Aananya Atri
Introduction
The Siliguri Corridor, situated in northern West Bengal, is popularly known as the “Chicken’s Neck.” It is India’s narrow land bridge connecting the mainland to the North Eastern Region (NER) of India. It is often measured at only about 20–22 km wide at its narrowest point.
Because the corridor is located between Nepal and Bangladesh, and it falls within strategic reach of Bhutan and the China-facing Chumbi Valley or Doklam area, it comprises both the promise and peril of India’s geography. For India, the corridor has significance as a logistics artery for civilian goods and energy, a mobilization route for defence forces, and a political space where sub-state identity movements such as those in the Darjeeling hills simultaneously overlap with national security concerns.
The significance of “Chicken’s Neck” for India
The corridor’s strategic value is rooted in three factors. First, it is a geographic chokepoint, and a slight disruption by rail or road can separate the NER from the mainland of India. Second, it is a border-adjacent zone, so the flanks of the corridor are near international boundaries, which could lead to cross-border crime, smuggling, and crises in neighbouring states. Third, it is a “multi-domain” vulnerable area, easily exposed to floods or landslides, rail-road congestion, cyber or drone threats, and geopolitical coercion; all these create chokepoint effects. The Government of India has recently framed resilience as a central goal, including planning underground rail alignments and multi-line capacity upgrades in order to ensure connectivity in the area even during emergencies.
Transformation After Independence of India (1947–Present)
Partition, Border Formation, and Initial Security Concerns
The corridor’s contemporary prominence began with the 1947 Partition. The creation of East Pakistan (later Bangladesh) transformed Bengal’s cartography, leaving India’s eastern frontier connected to the NER through a narrow strip. In the initial decades, India prioritised maintaining basic administrative control, stabilising borderlines, and managing insurgency and migration pressures along the eastern frontier. The 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War further altered the strategic context, changing the former India–Pakistan (East) boundary into an India–Bangladesh boundary. These transformations led to agreements to settle enclaves, adverse possessions, and undemarcated segments.
Early Border Governance
From the 1970s through the end of the Cold War, India’s corridor strategy focused on territorial consolidation and border governance, involving curtailing the risks associated with enclaves, unclear boundary segments, and illegal cross-border activities in the area. Although major political milestones were achieved earlier, and the 1974 Land Boundary Agreement is one such case, the practical resolution of complex border challenges took decades and required sustained centre–state coordination. During this period, the corridor also emerged as a crucial area for military logistics in the east, while demands arose from the local political dynamics in the Darjeeling hills for institutional accommodation through evolving autonomy arrangements.
Look East Policy
India’s 1991 economic reforms led to a strategic shift toward Southeast Asia through the Look East Policy, in which the NER was reimagined as a “gateway” rather than a periphery. Connectivity began to be considered both development policy and geopolitical strategy. Additionally, the government emphasised road and rail improvements to reduce the single point of failure in the corridor . Simultaneously, India and Bangladesh extended cooperative arrangements on trade and transit, including the 1996 Ganga Water Sharing Treaty, which created alternatives and added to overland routes reliant on the corridor.
Act East Policy
In 2014, the Look East Policy was reframed as the Act East Policy, generating a more operational and infrastructure-driven approach to regional integration. The corridor’s vulnerability has been repeatedly mentioned in strategic discussions, especially after the 2017 Doklam standoff, which highlighted how slight changes near the India–Bhutan–China tri-junction could affect India’s security calculations. Recent policy emphasis has shifted toward resilience, focusing on increasing capacity through the development of more tracks or lanes, hardening critical nodes by building bridges and junctions, and structuring protected redundancy such as underground rail sections for the most sensitive stretch.
Key Provisions Shaping the Chicken Neck Corridor Strategy
India–Bangladesh Border Settlement and Border Management
A foundation of territorial stabilization on the eastern flank has been the India–Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) framework, concluding in the 2015 exchange of instruments of ratification that operationalised the 1974 LBA agreement and the 2011 protocol. India received possession of 51 enclaves, while Bangladesh received 111. The LBA resolved enclaves and adverse possessions and created a manageable and peaceful boundary environment in the neighbourhood.
Transit and Multimodal Alternatives through Bangladesh
The 2015 Protocol on Inland Water Transit and Trade was a legal arrangement framework to facilitate cargo transit and trade, specifying routes and operational provisions for using waterways for commerce and cargo transit. Such strategic stances matter because they provide “connectivity redundancy” by curtailing the exclusive load on the Siliguri surface corridor and lowering the extent of disruption.
Sub-state Governance and Local Accommodation in the Hills
The Gorkhaland Territorial Administration (GTA), created by the Gorkhaland Territorial Administration Act, 2011, came into effect in 2012. This provided political accommodation through sub-state autonomy mechanisms within the border region of the corridor. The GTA provisions targeted cultural identity and development grievances in the Darjeeling hill subdivisions and parts of the Siliguri subdivision, thereby reducing the risk that local unrest could create corridor vulnerabilities.
Constitutional Pathways for Union Territories and Reorganization
Discussion about converting strategic regions into a Union Territory (UT) periodically arises in India’s public debate, but UT creation requires constitutional mediation and would be politically consequential. Under Part VIII of the Constitution, UTs are administered by the President through an Administrator, as mentioned in Article 239, and Parliament has wide legislative competence for UTs. However, contemporary rumours claiming the creation of a new UT near the Siliguri Corridor were publicly refuted by the Government of India’s PIB Fact Check unit, signalling that, at least at that time, no such proposal was under consideration.
Current Situation and Government Measures related to Chicken Neck (2024–2026)
Rail Resilience
In 2026, the Railways Minister publicly announced “special planning” for the roughly 40-km strategic stretch through Siliguri, involving converting existing tracks into a four-line section and adding underground lines between Tin Mile Haat and Rangapani, forming a six-line system in which four surface lines plus two underground lines will be built in the critical segment. The intended security rationale is to maintain connectivity and defence logistics even under disruptive circumstances, while also merging with nearby defence-critical nodes like Bagdogra.
Source: https://www.instagram.com/p/DUTJ8NIADe4/?igsh=bDVuaWNzeHd2bzdz
Road and Highway Upgrades
Road connectivity programs related to national highway authorities and corridor projects in West Bengal are expected to increase throughput and reduce congestion, which otherwise heightens chokepoint risks. Greenfield and upgraded economic corridors planned under wider highway programs are continuously framed as supporting trade and providing faster mobilization routes for emergency response and security forces.
Border Surveillance and Preparedness
Government statements and local reporting have signalled increased surveillance and preparedness in the region, including the use of drones and modern monitoring systems, indicating a trend toward technology-enabled border management. These measures are often justified by the corridor’s exposure to shifting regional geopolitics and the need to prevent cross-border crime and coercive threats.
Administrative Restructuring Debate and UT Proposals
Arguments in support of a UT model for a strategic corridor stress unified command, faster infrastructure execution, and direct central control over policing and land use in sensitive regions. Arguments against UT formation stress federalism, democratic accountability, and the risk that administrative restructuring could intensify identity conflicts in the hills instead of resolving them. Constitutionally, UT administration empowers the centre as the executive authority under Article 239, but India’s experience reflects different models, as it consists of UTs without legislatures alongside elected legislatures in the cases of Delhi and Puducherry under special provisions. In the Siliguri matter, the Government publicly refuted claims regarding the formation of a new UT near the corridor.
Challenges
Neighbouring States and Geopolitical Pressures
Externally, the corridor is in proximity to multiple borders and the strategic geometry of the China-facing Chumbi Valley or Doklam region, which is the root cause of the threat environment. Events such as the 2017 Doklam standoff underlined how slight changes near the tri-junction could create downstream pressure on the Siliguri Corridor’s security. Additionally, shifts in India–Bangladesh relations can affect the reliability of transit options and the broader border environment, reinforcing the need for both diplomatic and infrastructure planning.
Cross-border Crime, Migration, and Smuggling
The southern flank of the corridor intersects with a densely populated and long India–Bangladesh boundary, chronically connected with challenges such as smuggling and illegal crossings. Border settlement and precise demarcation under the LBA were formulated to improve coordination and border management, but operational challenges remain and require sustained resources and cooperation.
Local Political Economy and Identity Movements
Local movements for autonomy or statehood in the Darjeeling hills and adjoining areas complicate governance in the region. While the GTA was introduced to provide a framework for self-governance and development, it still reflects recurring tensions over the adequacy of decentralization and the limits of delegated powers. In a chokepoint region, even threats of shutdowns can have a larger effect on supply chains and public order, making political accommodation and inclusive development integral to security strategy.
Environmental and Disaster Risks
Siliguri’s Himalayan foothill setting makes infrastructure prone to floods, landslides, and riverine erosion, which can disrupt rail-road traffic and stress emergency response capacity. The step toward protected infrastructure or underground rail alignments is partly justified by the requirement for disaster resilience along with security resilience.
Way Forward
- There is a strong requirement to complete multi-line rail upgrades and the proposed underground segments, and to accelerate highway bypasses and bridge hardening to ensure backup in the event of infrastructure failure.
- Strengthening lawful cargo transit through waterways and other consented routes with Bangladesh, as announced in existing protocols and continuous risk assessments, would enable politically feasible multimodal cross-border corridors.
- Transforming to technology-enabled border governance through the expansion of integrated surveillance using drones, sensors, and command-and-control systems, paired with legal safeguards and community engagement, would help eliminate friction.
- Adopting local legitimacy as security by investing in hill and foothill development, language- and culture-sensitive governance, and performance accountability within autonomy institutions like the GTA would help prevent governance gaps.
- Focusing more on strategic communication and misinformation resilience by using proactive public information to deal with destabilizing rumours, such as unverified UT claims, would build trust in official planning.
Conclusion
The Siliguri Corridor’s “Chicken’s Neck” vulnerability is not a new invention; rather, it is a structural element of India’s post-Partition geography. The remarkable changes noted in India’s strategy show a shift from basic border consolidation to a resilience-led approach that treats infrastructure, diplomacy, and governance as integrated elements of territorial security.
Current plans for underground rail lines and expanded track capacity emphasise a shift from relying on a single visible artery to designing redundancy and survivability into the corridor itself. Simultaneously, administrative restructuring, including conversion into a UT, remains politically sensitive, and official fact-checking indicates that it has not been adopted as policy in relation to Siliguri. Ultimately, the most credible solution is the requirement to harden and diversify connectivity, sustain cooperative transit instruments, strengthen border governance by integrating technology and legitimacy, and address local people’s aspirations through accountable and inclusive development.
About The Contributor
Aananya Atri, MA and UGC-NET in Political Science. Research and Editorial Intern at IMPRI. She is passionate about public policy, research and academic writing.
Reviewers
Gautham Shine
Vaishnavi Nandedkar
Acknowledgement
The author extends her sincere gratitude to the IMPRI team for their invaluable guidance throughout the process.
Disclaimer
All views expressed in the article belong solely to the author and not necessarily to the organisation.
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