Mapping India’s State wise Old-Age Pension Schemes

Policy Update
Angela Rajeev

Background

Old-age pensions are one of the oldest tools of social protection anywhere. In India it sits at the crosshairs of elderly poverty relief and dignity. The Union government’s main instrument is the National Social Assistance Programme (NSAP) which is run by the Ministry of Rural Development. It has operated since 1995 and today comprises five components – the largest is the Indira Gandhi National Old Age Pension Scheme (IGNOAPS).

IGNOAPS was introduced in 2007 (NSAP, 1995). IGNOAPS offers Below Poverty Line citizens aged 60 and above a monthly pension of ₹200 and which further becomes ₹500 after the recipient turns 80 years old (NSAP, 1995).As pensions fall under the Concurrent List, the states are free to run their own schemes on top of this central floor. Naturally this results in widely differing pension amounts, age thresholds and funding.

Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Delhi, Kerala and Odisha have all contributed to the pension scheme far greater than the centre’s contribution.Conversely others continue to rely more heavily on the Union contribution. This variation is happening against the backdrop of a rapidly ageing country.

Longitudinal Ageing Study of India shows the elderly already make up around 12 percent of India’s population. A share projected to reach 319 million people by 2050 (PIB, 2025). A patchwork pension system, built at a time when the elderly population was much smaller, is now being tested by scale.

Functioning

The The NSAP comprises five components: Indira Gandhi National Old Age Pension Scheme (IGNOAPS) , the Indira Gandhi National Widow Pension Scheme , the Indira Gandhi National Disability Pension Scheme the National Family Benefit Scheme & Annapurna (free food grain to elderly citizens who are eligible for old-age pension) Under IGNOAPS the Centre contributes ₹200 per month for beneficiaries who age between 60 -79 & ₹500 for those 80 and above. States are expected to supplement this from their own resources and try to do so substantially (NSAP, 1995). 

Every state’s supplementary scheme carries its own name, eligibility rules and payment structure which is layered on top of the base that IGNOAPS provides. For example in Andhra Pradesh the old NSAP amount is added up to a combined ₹ 4000 a month under the NTR Bharosa Pension Scheme. This is for citizens holding a white ration card who are aged 60 years and above (Government of Andhra Pradesh , 2024).

Telangana’s Aasara scheme reaches ₹ 4000 a month and sets the qualifying age at 57 (Government of Telangana , 2025). Kerala funds close to 98 percent of its social security pension itself and pays a base amount of ₹ 1600 a month to 60 lakh people (Kerala Finance Department, 2024–25). Payments across states are now overwhelmingly routed through Direct Benefit Transfer into Aadhaar-linked bank accounts. This is happening with more than 2.5 crore NSAP beneficiaries’ Aadhaar numbers linked as of 2025 (PIB, 2025). 

Table 1 — State-wise old-age pension landscape

Performance

The scale gap between the Centre’s frozen scheme and the states’ expanding ones is the single most important performance fact in this landscape. IGNOAPS beneficiary numbers have effectively been capped at 2.21 crore since 2011 – 12. This is working alongside 65.7 lakh widow pension beneficiaries and 10.9 lakh disability pension beneficiaries. This has been adding up to roughly 3 crore Union-funded pensioners nationally (The Wire, 2025).

Yet the Economic Survey 2024 – 25 acknowledged that total pension coverage across NSAP and state schemes combined stood at 8.95 crore beneficiaries. This suggests that nearly 6 crore additional elderly, widowed, or disabled persons are being reached through state-funded pension schemes. Well beyond what the Union scheme alone accounts for. (Ministry of Finance, 2025)

Union budget allocation for NSAP has barely moved in nominal terms even as this state leve; expansion has occurred. The programme received ₹ 10547 crore in 2014-15 and ₹9652 crore in 2025-26 (PIB, 2025). Under the Union Budget’s outlay NSAP allocation fell under 0.20 percent in 2025 – 26. This happened despite the overall budget nearly tripling in the same period (Centre for Financial Accountability, 2025).

A Comptroller and Auditor General performance audit covering 2017- 18 to 2020 – 21 found that the Centre allocated ₹34432 crore for NSAP while states contributed a much larger ₹109573 crore over the same period. This shows that state governments now carry the larger share of India’s old-age pension bill as opposed to the Centre (CAG Report No. 10, 2023). This is driven primarily by wider state-level coverage (through relaxed eligibility and more beneficiaries) and not than the Centre raising its pension amount. Pension amounts have stayed stagnant since 2012.

Table 2 — Beneficiaries and expenditure (select programmes)

Impact

Evidence on the impact of old-age pensions in India exists but remains limited in scope. The CAG’s 2023 performance audit documented that pension payments reduce the immediate income vulnerability of BPL elderly households and are also flagging that delays in disbursement blunt this benefit. One field audit found a median payment delay of 91 to 180 days in parts of the Direct Benefit Transfer chain (CAG Report No. 10 of 2023).

Gender becomes a crucial factor we can analyse as the majority of both national and state pension beneficiaries are widows or elderly women. For instance, Kerala’s own pension rolls show more than 60 percent women among social security beneficiaries. Pension income functions like a channel of economic security specifically for older women who don’t have independent income (Kerala Finance Department, Economic Review 2024–25; LASI/PIB, 2025).

The Longitudinal Ageing Study data further shows women form 58 percent of India’s elderly population and account for a majority of the very old. As women together make up for the majority of pension beneficiaries it becomes pertinent to understand why pension adequacy matters disproportionately for elderly women (PIB, 2025).

Upon close examination a pattern emerges wherein independent evaluations tend to focus on identification, delivery and exclusion rather than measured welfare outcomes. This is itself a useful finding. Using data from the India Human Development Survey (2011–12) – Unnikrishnan and Imai (2020) show that participation in the Indira Gandhi National Old Age Pension Scheme (IGNOAPS) significantly increased household consumption, food and non-food expenditure, and asset holding while reducing labour supply — with these welfare gains concentrated among female recipients.

Emerging Issues

The clearest issue is adequacy. The central IGNOAPS amount of ₹200–₹500 a month has not been revised since 2011 despite inflation eroding its real value considerably. Researchers have separately calculated that simply keeping pace with average inflation since 2014 would have required raising the NSAP budget to roughly ₹18000 crore rather than the ₹9652 crore allocated for 2025–26 (Centre for Financial Accountability budget analysis, 2025).

Interstate disparities compound this: a beneficiary in Andhra Pradesh or Telangana now receives twenty times the central floor (Centre for Financial Accountability, 2025).This happens while beneficiaries in states without a strong supplementary scheme remain far closer to the ₹200–₹500 baseline. These states also apply broader eligibility criteria than the centre’s income and age criteria. So the disparity reflects differences in who qualifies and not just in how much qualifying beneficiaries receive.

Age thresholds add another layer of fragmentation. Telangana’s 57-year entry point sits alongside Karnataka’s 65-year threshold for its old-age component. This means the same person could be an “elderly pensioner” in one state and ineligible in a neighbouring one. The Union government’s fixed beneficiary ceiling (unchanged since 2011–12) is a structural exclusion risk in its own right.

IGNOAPS enrollment is capped nationally regardless of how the actual elderly population has grown. Eligible individuals in high-growth states can be turned away purely for want of quota regardless of their poverty status (CAG Report No. 10 of 2023). Finally, Economic Survey 2024–25  shows that the growing reliance on state exchequers to fund the bulk of India’s expanded pension coverage. This has raised a fiscal sustainability question as the elderly population itself grows toward the 20 percent share projected for 2050 (UNFPA India Ageing Report, 2023).

Way Forward

Working with the precedents states have achieved. The direction several states have already taken offers a genuinely workable template for the rest. States such as Bihar, Odisha, Telangana and Delhi have all demonstrated in just the past year that meaningful pension hikes are fiscally achievable even for states with tighter budgets than the Centre’s (Refer Table 1). A precedent worth building on rather than treating as exceptional.

Regularly revising the fixed national beneficiary ceiling. Union-funded coverage can grow alongside the ageing population rather than staying frozen at 2011 levels. This would help prevent eligible people from being left out because of outdated coverage limits and thereby help address one of the more mechanical sources of exclusion identified by the CAG. It is very important to bear in mind the rising inflation and subsequent rising costs of living for the average Indian to achieve a basic dignified life.

Strengthening the beneficiary database. Ideally through a shared Centre-state dashboard that tracks actual disbursed pensions rather than only sanctioned beneficiaries. This would let policymakers finally answer the coverage questions that current data cannot. This being what share of the eligible elderly population is actually being reached state by state. Harmonising minimum age thresholds and reducing payment delays flagged in audit findings are more modest but achievable near-term fixes.

Taken together, India does not lack the fiscal capacity or the administrative tools to build a stronger old-age pension system. Several states have already shown what is possible. The task ahead is less about invention and more about diffusion: bringing the rest of the country closer to the standard its most progressive states have already set.

References

Centre for Financial Accountability. (2025). Union budget analysis of NSAP allocations. https://www.cenfa.org/budget-for-national-social-assistance-programme-remains-stagnant-yet-again/

Comptroller and Auditor General of India. (2023). Performance audit of National Social Assistance Programme (Report No. 10 of 2023). https://cag.gov.in

Government of Andhra Pradesh. (2024). NTR Bharosa Pension Scheme notification (G.O. Ms. No. 43).

Government of Bihar, Social Welfare Department. (n.d.). Mukhyamantri Vridhjan Pension Yojana. Retrieved September 1, 2026, from https://sspmis.bihar.gov.in

Government of Kerala, Finance Department. (2025). Economic review 2024–25.

Government of Maharashtra, Thane District Social Welfare Office. (2025). Sanjay Gandhi Niradhar Yojana notification.

Government of NCT of Delhi, Department of Social Welfare. (n.d.). Old age pension scheme. Retrieved September 1, 2026, from https://edistrict.delhigovt.nic.in

Government of Odisha, Department of Social Security and Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities. (n.d.). Madhu Babu Pension Yojana. Retrieved September 1, 2026, from https://ssepd.odisha.gov.in

Government of Telangana. (2025). Aasara Pension Scheme. Retrieved September 1, 2026, from https://aasara.telangana.gov.in

Ministry of Finance, Government of India. (2025). Economic survey 2024–25.

Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India. (1995). National Social Assistance Programme. Retrieved September 1, 2026, from https://nsap.nic.in

Press Information Bureau, Government of India. (2025a). Elderly in India [Press release]. https://pib.gov.in

Press Information Bureau, Government of India. (2025b). National Social Assistance Programme [Press release]. https://pib.gov.in

Sharma, A., & Pathak, N. (2025, February 4). Budget for National Social Assistance Programme remains stagnant yet again. The Wire. https://thewire.in/news/budget-for-national-social-assistance-programme-remains-stagnant-yet-again

Unnikrishnan, V., & Imai, K. S. (2020). Does the old-age pension scheme improve household welfare? Evidence from India. World Development, 134, 105017. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.105017 

UNFPA India. (2023). India ageing report 2023.

About the Contributor

Angela Rajeev is a graduate in Political Science and History, with a minor in Economics, from Christ University, Bangalore. She approaches her research with a passion for gender, public policy, and geopolitics. As a Research and Editorial Intern at IMPRI, she works at the intersection of policy and culture while exploring issues related to governance, society and international relations.

Acknowledgement

The author extends sincere gratitude to the IMPRI team for their guidance and support along with the reviewers Ms. Rishika Soni and Ms. Gowri Kodali  for their valuable feedback and insights.

Disclaimer

All views expressed in the article belong solely to the author and not necessarily to the organization

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